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Passwords, despite being the primary means for users to authenticate on the Web
or to a computing device, are marred with several usability and security problems:
users nowadays have too many accounts and passwords to remember; typing pass-
words correctly can be cumbersome, particularly on touch screen devices. As a
result, users often pick simple, easy-to-remember, and easy-to-type passwords and
reuse them across different websites. Simple passwords, unfortunately, are also
easy-to-guess. Reused passwords can put all of a user’s accounts at risk if any of
them are compromised.
In this dissertation, I show how to improve the state of passwords and password-
based authentication (PBA) systems by incorporating knowledge of real-world
password distributions. I identify three challenges faced by current passwords and
PBA systems. Using a combination of empirical and analytical methods, I first dis-
till out the details of those problems and then use that knowledge to guide building
the next generation PBA systems that provide better usability and security.
First, to help users deal with too many account passwords, I design NoCrack,
a secure password vault system (also called password manager) that uses honey
encryption to encrypt user passwords under a master password. Honey encryption
provides NoCrack’s vault ciphertexts with a novel property: decryption with any
incorrect master password will output decoy but plausible-looking sets of pass-
words. Therefore, if an attacker tries to decrypt a NoCrack’s vault ciphertext
with several guesses for the master password, the attacker does not immediately
learn the correct master password even if it is included in the list of guesses. To
learn which of the decrypted passwords are real, the attacker has to try them on-
line, which can be relatively slow, potentially detectable by the websites for which
the user has an account, and also subject to website rate-limiting for too many
incorrect password submissions.
Besides having too many passwords, users often make mistakes while typing
passwords, and, in current settings, login is rejected if the entered password is not
exactly what is used during registration. This is annoying and counter-productive
for legitimate users. Via studies conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk and with
Dropbox’s production login infrastructure, I measured the extent that password
typos cause a usability burden. I showed how to design PBA systems that can
tolerate typos without degrading the security of passwords.
Finally, due to billions of breached passwords and rampant password reuse
habits, credential stuffing attacks have become a serious threat to password secu-
rity: an attacker can compromise a user account by simply trying the password of
that user stolen from other websites. To prevent such attacks, some third party web
services have started providing APIs for checking if a user’s password is present in
a leaked set of passwords. I give a framework to analyze the security requirements
of such compromised credentials checking (C3) services. I go on to provide new
C3 protocols that provide a better security/bandwidth trade-off.
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Authenticating users to a digital system (such as a mobile phone, a computer, or a
remote server) is a fundamental challenge in computer science. There are several
mechanisms for authenticating users. The most prevalent ones rely on passwords.
A password is a secret string shared between a user and a digital system, most often
chosen by the user during a process known as registration. At the time of login, the
user furnishes the same password (along with some user identifier). The concerned
digital system checks if the provided password matches precisely with the one
used during registration, and if so, the user is allowed to log in. We refer to such
systems as password-based authentication (PBA) systems. PBA systems allow
users to authenticate based on “what they know”, such as a secret alphanumeric
string. Besides passwords, users can also authenticate based on “who they are” or
“what they have”. Biometrics, such as fingerprints (Touch ID [3]), face (e.g., Face
ID [4]), or iris, fall in the former category. Smart cards, physical security tokens
(e.g., YubiKey [5]), or OAuth [6] fall in the latter category, where a user proves
their identity based on proving possession of another account or a device.
Despite these alternatives, passwords are by far the most widely deployed
and used authentication mechanism. This is because none of the alternatives to
passwords comprehensively outperform passwords. Biometric authentication tech-
niques lack the ability to unlink a user’s physical identity from their digital iden-
tity. Moreover, unlike passwords, such physiological features, once compromised,
cannot be changed easily. Account ownership-based authentication requires an
authenticated account to seed the process, which is often authenticated based on
a password. Device-based authentication requires additional hardware support.
1
Due to such shortcomings of other authentication techniques,1 passwords remain
the de facto authentication on the web and elsewhere.
To understand the current state of passwords, we need to look into its past.
Therefore, I begin with a brief history of passwords and PBA systems, before
delving into the core issues they face now.
1.1 A Brief History of Passwords
Finding an accurate history of passwords is very challenging, particularly because
there is no clear definition of what is considered as a password and what is not.
For example, Roman soldiers used secret watchwords to authenticate each other
in the second century B.C. Watchwords were human-memorized secrets used for
authenticating one soldier to another.
Even if we ignore such ancient use of “passwords”, computer passwords have
also been around for a relatively long time. The first computer password was
used with MIT’s Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS) in 1960 [8]. Fernando
Corbato´, one of the key developers of CTSS, designed the first password-based
authentication system and integrated it with CTSS’ multi-user environment, where
passwords were used to ensure that users of CTSS mainframe system can keep
their personal files private from each other [9]. In the early days, passwords of all
users were stored in plaintext format in a single file, readable only by the system
administrators. The file, however, got accidentally exposed to all users due to
a software bug. Robert Morris and Ken Thompson recall this incident in their
seminal paper on password security [10]:
1See [7] for more discussions on replacing passwords.
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“Perhaps the most memorable such occasion occurred in the early 60s
at a time when one of the authors (Morris) happened to be using the
system. A system administrator on the CTSS system at MIT was edit-
ing the password file and another system administrator was editing the
daily message that is printed on everyone’s terminal on login. Due
to a software design error, the temporary editor files of the two users
were interchanged and thus, for a time, the password file was printed
on every terminal when it was logged in.”
This initial design of passwords was imperfect. Nevertheless, they became the
de facto method for authenticating users to computers. Given the sensitivity of
passwords, Robert Morris designed the first password hashing scheme using the
cipher M-209 [11], used during World War II. Morris, who was a developer of the
Multics system, included his hash function as a utility program named crypt
(which was later inherited by Unix, and then by Linux). To make the hashes
difficult to invert, he used the password as the key to the cipher (instead of the
message) to encrypt a constant value. In the 1970s, he also introduced a standard
file, called /etc/passwd, in Multics where password hashes were stored — which
was also inherited by Unix systems and is still used. As the passwords were hashed
and the password file also contained access control information necessary for many
user-level programs, the /etc/passwd file was allowed to be read by anyone. But
soon it was discovered that the hashing alone was utterly insufficient in protecting
passwords: users pick very simple and easy-to-guess passwords (such as a single
character or often use their username as the password). Therefore, an attacker,
after obtaining the password file, can make repeated guesses for the user password
and simulate login (oﬄine) to discover user passwords from the hashes stored in
/etc/passwd. This attack is known as a brute-force guessing attack and it can
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be very damaging against human chosen passwords. Morris and Thompson showed
that an attacker could recover 82% of user accounts in MIT’s CTSS mainframe
within a week worth of 1979’s computing time [10].
Two important takeaways from the Morris-Thompson experiment are as fol-
lows. First, hashing passwords is not enough: proper access control of the pass-
word file is necessary for a multi-user system. Hence, password shadowing —
the /etc/shadow file — was introduced in the mid 1980s along with the de-
velopment of SunOS.2 Second, password hashes, once leaked, can be inverted via
brute-force guessing attacks; so we need ways to slow down checking a guess for a
password hash. To do so, in the late 1990s, password-based key derivation func-
tions (PBKDF) were introduced, which used iterated hashing to increase the cost
of a single password hash. Though iterated hashing with off-the-shelf hash func-
tion, such as MD or SHA hashes, slows an attacker who is using a standard CPU
to mount a guessing attack, its effect is negligible for an attacker with graphics
processing units (GPUs) or application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs).
Ideally, the attacker must perform an equal amount of work for checking a guess
as an honest server would have to. Servers typically use CPUs, but there is no
limit on what hardware an attacker can use. This disparity in computation power
between servers and attackers motivated research on different types of slow hash
functions. In 1999, bcrypt [12] was designed. Bcrypt, in addition to using longer
computation time, also requires a larger (4KB) amount of random memory accesses
(compared to SHA or MD family hashes), thereby avoiding GPU or ASIC-based
acceleration of password hashing. However, it turned out that a sophisticated
FPGA with RAM blocks can expedite bcrypt computation significantly. To over-
come this shortcoming, in 2009 Perchival introduced sequential memory-hard hash
2An implementation of the Unix operating system by Sun Microsystems.
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functions and designed a special hash function called scrypt [13].
In the mean time, with the advent of the World Wide Web and public com-
mercial use of the Internet in the late 1990s and its global proliferation in the next
decade, passwords were being used to authenticate billions of people across the
globe. PBA was the only feasible authentication mechanism that could support an
internet scale variability of users and devices. Nevertheless, passwords were (and
are) not without shortcomings. In particular, users tend to pick predictable pass-
words and reuse them across different websites. Websites are particularly bad at
managing password databases. In the last decade, billions of passwords were com-
promised [14, 15] and posted online. Therefore, several attempts have been made
to do away with passwords [16] and alternative techniques were proposed [17, 18];
nevertheless, none have replaced passwords entirely.
Interestingly (and ironically), leaked passwords provide a new perspective on
how users choose passwords. While these leaks are often used to create better
attacks against passwords, in this dissertation, I showed how to utilize these leaks
to build better PBA systems.
Currently, an wide array of authentication techniques are being built to work in
conjunction with passwords for different settings. To counter some of the security
shortcomings of passwords, two-factor (2FA) or multi-factor (MFA) authentica-
tion techniques are being used, where the user not only provides a password, but
also proves ownership of an account or a device. Moving forward, combinations
of different authentication methods are expected to be used; which also means
passwords will continue to be in use for the foreseeable future. Therefore, instead
of despising passwords, we should invest in improving their usability and security.
What follows is a discussion of some of the key issues with current passwords and
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how this dissertation addresses them.
1.2 Password’s Problems and their Solutions
One of the key design limitation of passwords is that the usability and security
goals of passwords are inversely correlated: passwords must be easy to remember
and type, while still be hard for an attacker to guess; and a user should pick
completely different passwords for different websites and remember them, despite
having hundreds of accounts; a user must enter the password accurately every time
she wants to log in. Such conflicting goals3 force users to choose between security
and usability — obtaining effective security with passwords, in current settings,
requires significant degradation in usability. Therefore, users make decisions that
alleviate the usability burdens, often at the cost of security. The insecurity of
passwords arises primarily due to its usability problems. Users constantly find
ways to circumvent “the best advice” for handling passwords and, instead, make
passwords the weakest link in computer security. Therefore, to improve the security
of passwords, we need to address not only the security issues but also the usability
issues associated with them.
I identify three key problems with passwords and current PBA systems that
are impeding the usability of passwords and thereby degrading its security.
Too many passwords. Users nowadays have tens or even hundreds of ac-
counts [22, 23]. Remembering different passwords for each of them is too cum-
3Not to mention, the tyranny of password policies that has been annoying users for more
than a decade with outrageous requirements for creating a password. Such policies provide very
limited security benefits [19, 20] at the expense of huge usability burdens. Though NIST finally
do away with password policies in 2017 [21], it might take a decade or more for them to retire
from the Internet completely.
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bersome. To deal with the complexity of too many passwords, users pick easy-
to-remember, simple passwords and reuse them across websites. All of which
drastically degrade the security of passwords.
Experts advise using a password vault (also called password manager), where
a user can store all of her account credentials — usernames and passwords — in
one place and encrypt them using a master password. The user only needs to
remember and enter the master password. Because password vaults hold all of a
user’s passwords, they are a lucrative target for attackers. Therefore, their security
is extremely critical. Current password vaults however provide limited security
once stolen. An attacker can try to recover the passwords stored in an encrypted
password vault by brute-force decrypting the vault using guesses of the master
password. Such an attack succeeds because traditional encryption mechanisms
reveal clearly when the correct master password (or key) is used to decrypt the
vault ciphertext. The attack is also oﬄine in the sense that the attacker is not
required to make any online queries. Therefore, the attacker is only bounded
by the computational budget she can spend on decrypting the vault ciphertext.
With the improved hardware (e.g., GPU cluster4) and powerful password guessing
techniques (e.g., [24]), oﬄine brute-force guessing attacks can be very damaging.
I therefore designed a new kind of password vault, called NoCrack, which uses
honey encryption [25] to encrypt passwords under a master password. Decrypting a
NoCrack vault ciphertext with an incorrect master password does not fail or output
garbage values, rather it outputs a decoy but plausible looking set of passwords
for the user’s different accounts. A brute-force decryption attempt to recover




results in millions or billions of decoy but plausible looking password vaults, one for
each guess of the master password. The attacker is now faced with the challenge
of finding out which of the decrypted vaults are real. The decrypted passwords
has to be checked online on the websites the user has accounts with. Thus, the
attack, which an attacker could pull off completely oﬄine previously, now with
NoCrack, requires online communications. Websites can monitor repeated login
failures against an account and can flag anomalies in the password submissions.
They can also lock the user’s account to foil an attacker’s further verification
attempts, and thereby significantly restricting brute-force guessing attacks on the
stolen password vaults.
Difficult to type. While password managers alleviate the burden of remembering
and typing hundreds of user passwords, users still have to type the master pass-
word. A master password should be long and complex. Users often make mistakes
while typing their passwords for decrypting password vaults or logging into an web
account. In current settings, the decryption (or the login) attempt is rejected if
the password is mistyped, and the user has to retype her password. This is very
annoying and counter-productive for legitimate users. As shown in Appendix B.3,
users take more time to type long and complex passwords and make more mistakes
while typing them. Also, users have to type master passwords fairly often (e.g.,
LastPass5 typically requires users to type their master passwords every time the
browser session is restarted and after 8 hours of inactivity). Therefore, typos in
such passwords can cause a significant usability burden on users, even when using
a password vault.
I first quantified the problem of password typos. I partnered with Dropbox, a
5https://www.lastpass.com/
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software company with hundreds of millions of users to instrument its production
login infrastructure for 24 hours and measured how often users mistype their pass-
words. I found that 3% of Dropbox users fail to log in to Dropbox due to some
simple, easy-to-correct typos such as accidentally capitalizing the first letter of the
password or leaving the caps lock on; many more were delayed in their login due
to these typos. Allowing users to log in with these small mistakes would signifi-
cantly improve the usability of passwords. However, allowing user to log in with
typos might degrade the security — the attacker can compromise a user account
by guessing either her password or a typo of it. In this dissertation, I show al-
lowing a specific subset of easy-to-correct typos does not degrade the security of
user passwords relative to existing PBA systems, while still providing significant
usability improvements.
While allowing some typos might be safe, it was unclear how to do that, given
passwords are stored as cryptographic hashes: how to differentiate between genuine
typos from an attacker’s guesses. I proposed a corrector-based typo correction
scheme, which can correct a small set of population wide popular typos by applying
corrector functions to the incorrect password submission. Corrector functions are
specifically designed functions for correcting particular types of typos. About 20%
of password typos can be corrected using the corrector-based approach. However,
this approach leaves 80% of users without the benefits of typo-tolerance.
I designed a new personalized password typo correction scheme, called TypTop,
which monitors a user’s password typing mistakes, and if a user makes the same
mistake she made in the past, TypTop lets the user log in, should it be safe to
do so. I formally analyzed the security of TypTop and proved that the security of
user passwords remains unaffected due to typo-tolerance for real-world password
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and typo distributions. I built TypTop as a Unix tool which renders a laptop login
prompt typo-tolerant. Via a pilot deployment study with 24 users for a median of
four weeks, I showed that TypTop can correct 63% of all password typing mistakes
that users made, which is 300% more effective than corrector-based approaches.
Password reuse and data breaches. About 40% of users reuse their passwords
on different websites [26, 27]. The difficulty of remembering too many passwords
might encourage users to reuse their passwords. Nevertheless, password reuse leads
to credential stuffing attacks, where an attacker tries to compromise a user account
by simply using the leaked passwords of that user from other websites.
In the last decade, billions of user credentials — usernames and passwords
— have been breached. The breached data is often posted online or sold on the
Internet. Much of the leaked data, contained plaintext passwords (meaning the
concerned websites did not bother to hash the passwords), while others were hashed
with a fast hash function (e.g., MD5 or SHA1), or used no salt6. As a result, user
passwords were recovered relatively quickly using brute-force guessing attacks.
With the availability of a daunting number of user passwords, credential stuff-
ing attacks have become one of the most prevalent (and successful) vectors for
account compromise [28]. Though password vaults would solve the problem of
reusing passwords, the low adoption rate of password vaults [26] suggests we need
complementary approaches to protect user accounts.
To prevent against credential stuffing attacks, many web services proactively
look for leaked passwords and take action to protect accounts vulnerable to cre-
dential stuffing. Third-party services, such as HIBP [1] or Google’s Password
6A salt is a per-user random string used to make hashes of different users unique, despite the
underlying passwords being the same.
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Checkup [2] provide APIs for checking leaked passwords, to which other web ser-
vices can subscribe to know about whether or not a user password is leaked. We
call such third-party services compromised credential checking (C3) services.
Such services often require the user to share a small prefix of the hash of the
password with the C3 server. In this dissertation, I provided a thorough security
analysis of the existing C3 protocols, and showed they can be very damaging to the
secrecy of user passwords should the C3 server be compromised. An attacker can
compromise 34% of user accounts in less than 10 guesses if the attacker obtains the
prefix of the hash of those account passwords shared with the C3 server. This is
12x more than what an attacker could compromise without the hash prefix (2.8%).
The security loss is even higher if the user has been affected by a prior data breach.
I went on to give more secure protocols for checking compromised credentials that
provide better security/bandwidth trade-off.
1.3 Methodology: Empiricism-Informed System Design
The main challenges in designing a real-world system — particularly ones that
include human actors, such as PBA systems — lie in understanding the details
of how users and attackers are going to interact with the system. Often the lack
of understanding leads to insecure or unusable deigns. For example, the use of
complicated password policies and periodic forced password reset are two such
design choices that provide minimal security benefits at the cost of huge usability
degradation.
Traditionally, security of a system is argued using analytical techniques. How-
ever, analytical techniques alone fail to identify all the details of real-world systems,
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and are therefore ineffective for analyzing the security and usability of them. Sim-
ilarly, purely data-driven approaches are also insufficient to rigorously argue the
security of a system. Conclusions drawn based on empirical analysis is subject to
change based on the variability of the underlying data.
I therefore took a different approach that combines empirical techniques with
analytical methods to design and evaluate PBA systems. I used analytical tools to
understand security of a system under well-defined assumptions, and then verified
them using empirical methods. I followed an iterative four-step approach to design
and build new systems. In each part of this dissertation, I began with measure-
ments to understand a specific part of the problem, then used that knowledge to
guide designing new solutions. I then evaluated the performance and the security
of those solutions empirically and analytically. Finally, I built a system to test
how the solutions fit in the larger landscape, and iterate. Such a measure-design-
evaluate-build-measure cycle is what I refer to as empiricism-informed system de-
signing.
A key contribution of this dissertation is to put empiricism-informed system
design into a solid, explicit framework for building real-world secure systems. I
showed this approach can be very useful to design and build new solutions for
passwords and PBA systems. I believe this generic framework can also be applied
to designing and building real-world secure systems.
1.4 Contribution and Outline
The security of passwords is deeply intertwined with its usability. Often this con-
nection is either overlooked or ignored because of the belief that usable passwords
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are unlikely to be secure. One of the key contribution of this dissertation is to show
that it is possible to improve usability of passwords without compromising its se-
curity. Using a combination of analytical and empirical methods I designed and
built several solutions to overcome some of the topical problems with passwords.
The rest of the dissertation is organized in four chapters covering works
from [29, 30, 31, 32] done in collaboration with Devdatta Akhawe (Dropbox),
Junade Ali (Cloudflare), Anish Athalye (MIT), Joseph Bonneau (NYU), Anusha
Chowdhury (Cornell), Ari Juels (Cornell Tech), Lucy Li (Cornell Tech), Yuval
Pnueli (Technion), Bijeeta Pal (Cornell Tech), Thomas Ristenpart (Cornell Tech),
Nick Sullivan (Cloudflare) and Joanne Woodage (Royal Holloway).
 In Chapter 2, I show how to design a novel decoy based password vault
system, called NoCrack, that can resist oﬄine brute-force attack.
 In Chapter 3, I show, via studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk and with
Dropbox production authentication service, that password typos cause a sig-
nificant usability burden. I demonstrate how to correct a carefully chosen
set of typos that will improve usability without any degradation in security.
 The typo correction can be further improved by personalizing the corrections.
In Chapter 4, I design a system called TypTop, which, once engaged with a
authentication service, learns a user’s password typing mistakes over time,
and let the user login with frequent mistakes that are safe to do so. I show
TypTop can correct 66% of all typos that users make. TypTop provides equal
protection against untargeted attacks as traditional authentication systems
do.
 In Chapter 5, I create a framework to analyze the security and computational
overhead of protocols for checking against compromised passwords hosted by
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third party services. I show that the protocols currently in use can severely
damage password security should an attacker compromise the server provid-
ing leaked password checking service. I go on to give more secure protocols
for checking compromised passwords hosted by third party services, that are




This chapter was published in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S&P), 2015 [29].
2.1 Introduction
To alleviate the burden of memorization, many security experts recommend the
use of password vaults, also known as “wallets” or “managers” [7]. Password vaults
are applications that store a user’s website passwords, along with the associated
domains, in a small database that may be encrypted under a single master pass-
word. Vaults enable users to select stronger passwords for each website (since they
need not memorize them) or, better yet, use cryptographically strong, randomly
chosen keys as passwords. Many modern vault applications also backup encrypted
vaults with an online storage service, ensuring that as long as users remember their
master passwords, they can always recover their stored credentials.
These vault management services provide attackers with a rich target for com-
promise. The popular password vault service LastPass, for example, reported a
suspected breach in 2011 [33]. Security analyses of several popular web-based
password managers revealed critical vulnerabilities in all of them, including bugs
which allow a malicious web site to exfiltrate the encrypted password vault from
the browser [34].
An attacker that captures users’ encrypted vaults can mount oﬄine brute-force
attacks against them, attempting decryption using (what the attacker believes to
be) the most probable master password mpw1, the second most probable mpw2,
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and so on. With standard password-based encryption (PBE) algorithms (e.g.,
PKCS#5 [35]), only the correct master password produces a valid decryption, so
an attacker knows when a vault has been successfully cracked. Such attacks are
oﬄine in the sense that they can be conducted without interaction with a server and
hence are limited only by the attacker’s computational capabilities, as measured
by the number of decryption attempts performed per second.
Available evidence (c.f., [36]) suggests that most master passwords selected by
users are weak in the sense that even a modestly resourced attacker can feasibly
crack them in a matter of minutes or hours.
This state of affairs prompts the following core question addressed by our work:
Can password vaults be encrypted under low-entropy passwords, yet resist oﬄine
attacks? We call such vaults cracking-resistant. Cracking-resistant vaults would
have the benefit that attackers, even after investing significant resources in oﬄine
cracking, would still need to perform a large number of online login attempts.
Such online login attempts would significantly impede attackers and enable service
providers to detect vault compromises evidenced by failed login attempts.
Breaking Kamouflage. At first glance, it may seem that preventing oﬄine
cracking is impossible. After all, the attacker has access to the ciphertext and
the key is likely low-entropy and so easily guessable. But Bojinov, Bursztein,
Boyen, and Boneh, who first investigated the question of cracking-resistance for
vaults, suggest a clever idea: include decoy or honey vaults in an attempt to force
oﬄine attacks to become online attacks [37]. Their system, called Kamouflage,
permits seemingly successful decryption under some incorrect master passwords.
Kamouflage stores not only an encryption of the true vault (under the true master
password) but also a large number N − 1 of decoy vaults encrypted under decoy
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master passwords. The security goal is for an oﬄine attack to reveal only a set
of equally plausible vaults, forcing an attacker to attempt a login with a password
from each of the decrypted vaults in order to find the true one. The quantitative
security claimed in [37] is that an attacker must first perform oﬄine work equivalent
to that needed to crack conventional PBE, but additionally perform an expected
N/2 online queries.
Our first contribution is discovery of a subtle vulnerability in this approach;
we show a cracking attack that exploits it, and evaluate the attack’s efficacy.
To explain briefly, Kamouflage stores N − 1 decoy vaults encrypted under decoy
master passwords that are generated by parsing the true master password and
using its structure to help select the decoys. Analysis of password leaks shows that
learning the true master password’s structure reduces the attacker’s search space
substantially more than one might expect. Successfully cracking any of the N
vaults (decoy or true), therefore, reveals this structure and confers a big speed-up
on an attacker. We explain the issue in greater detail in the body.
The upshot is that using Kamouflage actually degrades overall security relative
to traditional PBE: an attacker can perform significantly less computational work
(on average about 40% less for N = 1,000) and make just a handful of online
queries. In practice, an attack against Kamouflage would therefore require less
total computational resource than one against traditional PBE, in almost all cases.
Unfortunately this flaw is not easy to fix, but rather seems fundamental to
the Kamouflage design. Thus our finding re-opens the question of how to build
cracking-resistant vaults.
Natural language encoders. Our next contribution is a new approach to
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cracking-resistant vault design. The vulnerability in Kamouflage is leakage of in-
formation by the explicitly stored set of decoy ciphertexts about the true master
password. So we seek a design that stores a single explicit ciphertext and has the
property that decryption with the wrong key ends up generating on-the-fly decoy
vaults. Here we are inspired by Hoover and Kausik’s cryptographic camouflage
system [38] and a generalization called honey encryption (HE) [25]. These prior
schemes, however, work on plaintexts that are drawn from simple distributions, i.e.,
uniform over some set. They would work (with some adaptations) for computer-
generated random passwords, but fail, as we confirm experimentally, to impart
cracking-resistance to password managers that include human-selected passwords.
To meet the challenge of good decoy vault generation, we introduce the con-
cept of natural language encoders (NLEs). An NLE is an algorithm that encodes
natural language texts (in our case, lists of human-selected passwords) such that
decoding a uniformly selected bit string results in a fresh sample of natural lan-
guage text. Technically, NLEs are a new class of the more general concept of a
distribution-transforming encoder [25], previous examples of which generated uni-
form prime numbers and uniform integers. NLEs require different techniques given
the (widely understood) additional complexity of modeling natural languages, even
in the restricted domain of passwords [39, 24, 40].
Rather than design NLEs from scratch, we instead show how to convert ex-
isting models from statistical natural language processing into NLEs. Models are
compact representations of the distribution of natural language texts; particular
choices might include n-gram Markov models, probabilistic context-free grammars
(PCFGs), etc. We focus on the first two because they have been used to build
effective password crackers [39, 24, 40, 41]. Our constructions of NLEs from these
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model types therefore gives, in effect, a way to retool password crackers to help
us build cracking-resistant vaults. This approach has significant benefits, as it
permits future improvements to natural language models to be incorporated easily
into password vault systems.
We build a number of NLEs based on existing models trained from password
leaks as well as one new PCFG-based model. To evaluate security, we must deter-
mine whether decoys generated via the decode function are distinguishable from
true passwords. More specifically, given a sample that is either a decoy or a ran-
dom sample from a password leak (which acts as proxy for a real password), the
adversary must classify its input as a decoy or not. We experimentally evaluate a
number of machine learning classification attacks that allow the adversary to train
on decoys as well as passwords from the true distribution. These analyses show
that basic machine-learning attacks do not break our schemes. A human might
be able to distinguish real from decoy, but forcing attackers to rely on the manual
effort of humans (across thousands of decoys in a typical parametrization) would
also be a huge improvement in security over existing solutions.
We also provide the first model of the password sets associated with password
vaults which may include related or repeated passwords. Unlike single-password
models, for which there is a large amount of public data available, there is not yet
much public data available to researchers on full password vaults. (This dearth of
data is also presumably problematic for would-be attackers.) Again we perform a
preliminary analysis using a small number of leaked vaults. This analysis suggests
that an extension of our PCFG-based NLEs generates password vaults resistant to
simple machine-learning attacks that attempt to distinguish fake vaults from real
ones. We caution that future work might find better attacks against our particular
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NLEs. By construction, however, our approach never yields security worse than
conventional PBE, unlike the case with Kamouflage (as shown by our attack). Our
NLEs at least provide another obstacle that crackers must find ways to overcome,
one that may be bolstered by improvements in language models.
A full vault system. We incorporate NLEs into a full encrypted vault service
called NoCrack that resists oﬄine brute-force attacks better than alternative pass-
word vault schemes. NoCrack addresses several previously unexplored challenges
that arise in practical deployment of a honey vault system: concealing website
names associated with vault passwords, incorporating computer-generated pass-
words in addition to user-selected ones, and authenticating users to the NoCrack
service while ensuring service compromise does not permit oﬄine brute-force at-
tacks. We report on a prototype implementation of NoCrack that will be made
public and open-source.
Summary. In summary, our contributions include:
• Breaking Kamouflage: We show that Kamouflage provides less security than its
original analysis suggested, and in most realistic cases even less than traditional
PBE schemes.
• Natural-language encoders (NLEs) for vaults: We introduce the concept of nat-
ural language encoders, and show how to build them from typical password
models. This approach allows us to generate realistic decoys on the fly during
brute-force attacks.
• Cracking-resistant password vaults: We use our new NLEs as the basis for a
password vault system called NoCrack. It addresses a number of issues for the
first time, including how to deal with authentication, concealment of the websites
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for which a user stores vault passwords, and more.
2.2 Background and Existing Approaches
In practice, password vaults are encrypted under a user’s master password using a
password based encryption (PBE) scheme. In more detail, a user’s set ~w of pass-
words is encrypted under a master password mpw using authenticated encryption.
Encryption and decryption use a password-based key-derivation function (KDF),
meaning encryption is under a key computed by applying a hash chain to a random
salt and mpw [35]. (The salt is stored with the ciphertext.) A decryption opera-
tion under an incorrect master password mpw′ will fail, as it will not authenticate
correctly1. It is for this reason that an adversary can mount an oﬄine brute-force
attack against a vault. The adversary’s trial decryption will fail until the correct
master password mpw is discovered.
Currently in-use KDFs prevent precomputation attacks [42] (such as rainbow
tables [43]) by salting. They also increase the cost of brute-force attacks by iterated
hashing, which slows down each decryption attempt. See [44] for a formal analysis.
But all this only slows down brute-force attacks and does not prevent them; the
protection conferred on ~w by PBE is ultimately a function of the resistance of
mpw to guessing attacks. Numerous studies, e.g., [45], have shown that users tend
in general to select passwords that have low guessing entropy. There is no avail-
able evidence indicating that users choose significantly stronger master passwords.
Given the growing use of password vaults by consumers and the vulnerabilities
they introduce — bulk compromise on servers or compromise on consumer devices
1Some systems may use unauthenticated encryption such as CBC mode. Decryption under
the wrong master password is still detectable with overwhelming probability, c.f. [25].
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— the risk of brute-force attacks is real and pressing.
Enter decoys. It is the inherent limitations of conventional PBE in thwart-
ing oﬄine brute-force attack that motivated Bojinov et al. [37] to propose the
Kamouflage system. As explained above, the idea behind Kamouflage is to en-
able multiple master passwords to successfully decrypt a vault, while only the true
master password yields the correct vault plaintext. The hope is that the attacker
cannot distinguish between real and decoy oﬄine, and must instead make online
queries using decrypted credentials to identify the true vault.
Specifically, to protect the true master password and vault (mpw∗, ~w∗), Kamou-
flage generates N − 1 decoy (mpwi, ~wi) pairs and stores them in a list. Decoys are
generated using dictionaries of commonly seen tokens (strings of contiguous letters,
numbers or symbols) found in a password leak. We describe decoy generation in
more detail in the next section. Every ~wi is encrypted using a conventional PBE
scheme under mpwi and kept at a location Lj that also calculated from mpwi. If
a collision results during the generation process, i.e., a master password is created
that maps to an already occupied location, then a fresh (mpwi, ~wi) pair is gener-
ated. Thus, given master password mpw′, it is possible to locate the corresponding
vault and attempt to decrypt it with mpw′.
Kamouflage has some notable deployment limitations. As it stores N vaults,
its storage cost is linear in the security parameter N . Additionally, Kamouflage
discourages user passwords that are not parsable using its dictionaries, a major
obstacle to practical use. Such password rejection may also degrade security by
encouraging users to choose weaker passwords than they otherwise might. Finally,
Kamouflage provides no guidance on protecting the confidentiality of domains
paired with the passwords in a vault and on storing computer-generated passwords,
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Statistics RockYou RY-tr RY-ts Myspace Yahoo
Number of accounts 32.6 M 29.6 M 2.98 M 41,537 442,846
Number of Unique passwords 14.3 M 13.0 M 1.3 M 37,136 342,517
Min-entropy (bits) 6.8 6.7 5.3 9.1 8.1
Avg. password length 7.9 7.9 7.9 8.5 8.3
Avg. letters per password 5.7 5.7 5.6 6.4 6.2
Avg. digits per password 2.2 2.1 2.3 1.8 2.0
Avg. symbols per password 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.04
Letter-only passwords 44.0% 44.1% 43.8% 7.0% 34.6%
Passwords w/ digits 52.2% 54.0% 54.3% 84.8% 64.7%
Passwords w/ symbols 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 10.7% 2.8%
Figure 2.1: Statistics of the password leak datasets used in this chapter.
both features of today’s commercial systems. More fundamentally, the approach
of hiding the true vault among an explicitly stored list of decoy vaults has inherent
security limitations, as we explain in the next section.
Threat Model. The primary threat model that we consider is theft of encrypted
password vault due to adversarial compromise of a vault storage service, a lost
or stolen client device, or a software vulnerability allowing exfiltration of the en-
crypted vault (c.f., [34]). The attacker does not know anything about the passwords
present inside the vault but she has knowledge about the distribution of human
generated passwords (learned from publicly available password leaks). She also
knows the encryption algorithm and the other information (if any) used by the
algorithm at the time of encryption or decryption. She does not know the master
password or any randomness consumed by the encryption algorithm.
Her objective is to learn the correct master password (and corresponding in-
vault passwords) using a minimal amount of computation and online querying.
She tries to decrypt the vault using oﬄine brute force attack against the master
password. She tests the correctness of a vault by attempting to log into a domain
with a corresponding credential in the vault.
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We will measure both the oﬄine and online resources used by the attacker in
terms of number of decryption attempts and number of online queries, respectively.
To attack a conventionally encrypted vault, no online queries are required and
the oﬄine work is a function of the adversary’s uncertainty about the master
password; for Kamouflage, the claimed security is oﬄine work equivalent to that
of conventional encryption and an expected N/2 online queries. In each of our
experiments, we will calculate expected oﬄine and online work over a choice of
master password drawn from a distribution that we will explicitly specify. The
distributions we use will be informed by password leaks, as we now discuss.
Datasets. In the course of this chapter, we use a number of datasets to train
password language models, to train attackers, and to test attackers. We primarily
use three large-scale password leaks: RockYou, Myspace, and Yahoo. RockYou
is the largest leaked clear-text password set to date and is used extensively in
modeling distributions of human-chosen passwords [39, 40, 46]. The Myspace leak
occurred when passwords for user accounts were publicly posted; the passwords
were gleaned from a phishing attack against Myspace’s home page. In 2012, Yahoo
lost nearly 450,000 passwords after a server breach. Note that all of these leaks
contain only original plaintext passwords and not cracked password hashes, as in
some other leaks.
As we wish to ensure different training sets for the password model and at-
tacker in some cases, we partition the RockYou passwords into two sets, randomly
assigning 90% of the passwords to a set denoted RY-tr and the remaining 10% to
RY-(ts). We train our language model with RY-tr only, but use all sets for adver-
sarial training and testing (with cross-fold validation as appropriate). Figure 2.1
presents statistics on our data sets. Given its large size, we did not make use of
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multiple splits of the RockYou data set in our experiments. We use RY-ts as a
testing set to model settings in which the adversary and defender have equivalently
accurate knowledge of the distribution from which user passwords originate. The
Myspace and Yahoo data sets serve to model more challenging scenarios in which
the adversary has more accurate knowledge of the password distribution than the
defender.
2.3 Cracking Kamouflage
The stated security goal for Kamouflage is that given an encrypted vault, an at-
tacker must first perform an oﬄine brute-force attack to recover all of the plaintext
vaults and then perform an expected N/2 online login attempts to identify the true
vault. Through simulations using the leaked password datasets discussed above, we
now show that Kamouflage falls short of its intended security goal. We first present
more details on Kamouflage, and then describe and analyze an attack against it.
Decoy generation in Kamouflage. To construct decoy plaintext vaults, Kam-
ouflage uses an approach based on deriving templates from the true plaintext vault.
Let Ln, Dn, and Sn each be a subset of all n-digit strings containing only upper
or lower case English letters, only decimal digits, and only punctuation marks and
other common ASCII symbols, respectively. We refer to the sets Ln, Dn, and Sn as
token dictionaries and individual strings in token dictionaries as tokens. No token
appears in multiple token dictionaries. Token dictionaries are initially populated
with tokens by parsing the passwords in a password leak2 and placing each result-
ing token in the appropriate dictionary. Here parsing of each password in the leak
2Also suggested in [37] is to use the dictionaries used by password cracking tools such as “John
the Ripper”. In our experience leaks work better for Kamouflage.
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is performed by greedily picking the longest contiguous prefix of just letters, digits,
or symbols of a password, moving this prefix to the appropriate token dictionary,
and then repeating the process on the remainder of the original password.
Once token dictionaries are fixed, Kamouflage parses a user-input password as a
sequence of tokens found in the dictionaries. Successful parsing yields a sequence
of tokens whose concatenation equals the original password. As above, parsing
involves greedy decomposition of the password into tokens of contiguous letter,
digit, or symbol strings; the presence of each token in the appropriate dictionary
is then checked. (If any token is not present in its appropriate dictionary, then
Kamouflage rejects the input password and prompts the user to pick another.)
A password template is the structural description of a password, expressed as
the sequence of token dictionaries corresponding to tokens yielded by parsing of the
password. For example, the password password@123 is parsed as password,
@, 123, and the associated template is therefore L8S1D3.
A vault template extends the notion of a password template to sequences of
passwords, while also keeping track of reuse of the same token in multiple locations.
For a sequence of passwords mpw∗, ~w∗, the vault template is generated as follows.
First, parse each password. Then, for each unique token across all of the parsings,
replace it with a symbol Xin for X ∈ {L,D,S} where n denotes the length of the
token and i denotes that this is the ith token in Xn found in the sequence of parsings.
The resulting sequence of password templates constitutes the vault template. In
the example below, the first column contains the passwords composing a small
vault: a master password followed by two in-vault passwords (for logging into
websites). The second column contains the sequence of corresponding password













Observe that the symbol L18 is used twice, as the substring password appears
twice, but the distinct substrings site and Site are respectively replaced by
distinct symbols L14 and L
2
4.
Given the vault template for (mpw∗, ~w∗), Kamouflage produces each decoy vault
(mpwi, ~wi) by replacing each unique symbol X in with a token chosen uniformly at
random from the token dictionary Xn.
The attack. We exploit two vulnerabilities in Kamouflage. First, all of the
decoy master passwords have the same template as the true master password.
As soon as an adversary recovers any (decoy or real) master password during an
oﬄine brute-force attack, the corresponding template is revealed. Knowledge of
this template enables the adversary to narrow its search significantly, to master
passwords that match the revealed template. This strategy permits an oﬄine
attack to be accelerated to the point where it is faster than cracking a conventional
PBE ciphertext.
Second, decoy master passwords are chosen uniformly with respect to the
master-password template, i.e., tokens are selected uniformly at random from
their respective symbol dictionaries. The decoy master passwords that result are
distributed differently than real, user-selected passwords. Thus, if an adversary
guesses master passwords in order of popularity, the real master password is more
likely to be assigned a high rank (and so guessed sooner) than the decoy master
passwords.
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Given these two vulnerabilities, we craft an attack that employs a simple model
of password likelihood in which the probability of a password is the product of the
probability of its template and the probabilities of replacements for each template
symbol. For example, Pr[password9] = Pr[L8D1] · Pr[password|L8] · Pr[9|D1]. The
model is trained using a password leak. Specifically, Pr[L8D1] is defined to be
the empirical probability that a password in the dataset has template L8D1, and
similarly for other passwords. (Other models may be used, of course.)
Given this model and a challenge consisting of N Kamouflage-encrypted vaults,
the attack proceeds using two guessing strategies, one oﬄine and one online. First,
in an oﬄine effort, the attacker generates trial master passwords in decreasing order
of their probability within the password-likelihood model, until one decrypts one
of the N vaults decrypts successfully. At this point, the adversary has learned the
template of the true master password and may narrow its oﬄine search to master
passwords that match this template, still in order of their probability within the
password-likelihood model.
Upon decrypting any vault successfully, i.e., discovering its corresponding (true
or decoy) master password, the attacker makes an online login attempt against a
website3 with one of the retrieved vault passwords. If the login succeeds, the
adversary has identified the true vault and halts. Otherwise, the adversary resumes
the oﬄine attack against master passwords.
Attack evaluation. To evaluate the speedup of our attack over a na¨ıve
Kamouflage-cracking strategy, we perform simulations in a simplified attack model.
The adversary is given a Kamouflage-encrypted vault and access to an oracle that
indicates whether a queried password is the true master password or not. (This
3Recall that Kamouflage does not encrypt the sites associated with each entry in the vault.
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oracle corresponds in a real attack to an adversary’s ability to test a password from
a decrypted vault via an online query to a real website.) We count oracle queries
as well as oﬄine decryption attempts. (We treat the KDF-induced slowdown as a
unit measure.) Thus the challenger takes a master password (mpw∗) and a number
N , and generates an encrypted Kamouflage vault set of size N . Then the attacker
is given this vault set and access to the oracle. Its goal is to guess mpw∗.
The Kamouflage decoy generation algorithm uses a dictionary of replacements
for Xn. Given that this is public (being used by any implementation of Kamouflage),
we assume the adversary has access to it as well.
Evaluation. We use the RY-tr dataset for training both Kamouflage’s parser
(i.e., populating the token dictionaries) and the attacker mentioned above. We
use master passwords sampled from the RY-ts, Myspace, and Yahoo leaks for
testing the performance of the attack. Our evaluation therefore covers both the
case when master passwords are chosen from a distribution (RY-ts) similar to that
used to train Kamouflage as well as the case when they are chosen from a difference
distribution (Myspace and Yahoo). For every password in each of the three sets,
we use the password as the true master password mpw. We then construct N − 1
decoy master passwords4 for both N = 103 and N = 104 (the values suggested
in [37]). We then calculate the median oﬄine and online work of 100 iterations for
each (mpw,N ) combination using fresh coins for decoy generation in each iteration.
We used only the first 50 million trial master passwords generated by the at-
tacker’s password-likelihood model for the attack, meaning the attack will not
succeed against every master password in the datasets. We also exclude any pass-












PBE – 5,740 0 2,467 0 114 0
Kamouflage
103 2,550 11 1,261 22 84 2
104 1,381 108 751 219 64 18
Kamouflage+
103 165 344 76 302 9 190
104 150 3,118 70 2,168 7 777
Figure 2.2: The expected amount of oﬄine work (rounded to nearest thousand decryption
attempts for integer) and online work (rounded to nearest number of login attempts to
a website) required to break a conventional vault (PBE), Kamouflage, and Kamouflage+
for N ∈ {103, 104}. Here expectations are taken over the distribution of Myspace, Yahoo,
or RY-ts passwords, normalized after removing those that cannot be parsed using the
Kamouflage grammar and that cannot be cracked using the first 50 million guesses of
our cracker.
words that can’t be parsed by Kamouflage (only 0.01%, 11.43%, and 13.49% of
passwords for RY-ts, Myspace, and Yahoo).
This allows us to compute a number of statistics regarding the attack’s efficacy.
We start with the average difficulty of cracking a given password sampled from the
three challenge distributions, assuming it is crackable using the first 50 million
guesses by our password cracker. Figure 2.2 gives a breakdown of this statistic
across the various settings. (The results for Kamouflage+ are explained below.)
The takeaway is that for N = 103, breaking a Kamouflage vault requires on
average only 44% of the computational cost of breaking PBE and incurs only 11
online queries if master passwords are sampled from Myspace leak. If the value of
N is increased to 104, an attacker needs less than 24% of the computational work
required in the case of PBE to break a Kamouflage vault. The oﬄine work therefore
goes down with increasing N , which stems from the fact that more decoys means
more chances of learning the master-password template early in the attack. The
online work does increase with increasing N , for N = 104 requiring an expected
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RY-ts N = 104
PBE Oﬄine Kamouflage Oﬄine Kamouflage Online
Kamouflage+ Oﬄine Kamouflage+ Online
Figure 2.3: Experimental results for attacking conventional PBE (the baseline) and
for Kamouflage and Kamouflage+ vaults for N ∈ {103, 104}. Shown is the α-guesswork
measured in number of oﬄine attacker decryptions and number of online attacker queries
(both log2 scale).
108 queries for Myspace or 219 for Yahoo challenges. Nevertheless, all the numbers
for Kamouflage are an order of magnitude smaller than the goal that an attacker
must make expected number of queries N/2 = 5, 000 (for N = 104). For RY-ts the
oﬄine speedup is less but the attacker requires only 2 online queries on an average
for N = 103 and 18 for N = 104 to break RY-ts challenge. The PBE numbers
are also quite low for RY-ts: the attacker does better when trained on a master
password distribution close to that used by the target user.
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A perhaps more refined measure of attack success is the α-guesswork factor
introduced by Bonneau [45]. This factor measures the work required to break
any αt-sized subset of a corpus of t total passwords. So at α = 0.5, we give the
α-guesswork in terms of the number of oﬄine computations to break any half of
the passwords in each leak and the number of online queries to break any half of
the passwords. Figure 2.3 shows the results for the range of α we considered. The
graphs end at α = 0.82 for Yahoo and α = 0.76 for Myspace, reflecting the 18% and
24% of challenge passwords we either did not crack in the first 50 million guesses
or which were not parsable by Kamouflage. For RY-ts the first 50 million were
able to crack all but a handful of the passwords. While we display both online and
oﬄine queries on the same charts, they do not necessarily correspond to the same
subsets of master passwords.
The charts give a more expansive view of Kamouflage’s resistance to attacks
as compared to conventional PBE. Looking at the top left chart in Figure 2.3,
we see that for conventional PBE (the highest solid black line), up to α = 0.5 of
Myspace passwords can be cracked in 221 oﬄine decryptions, while for Kamouflage
the same can be achieved with only 219 oﬄine queries (second highest red dashed
line). Half of the master passwords can be broken in two online queries for N = 103
(lowest densely dashed red line). Increasing Kamouflage’s security parameter to
N = 104 (bottom left chart) slightly increases the online work for some α (bottom
blue curve), but at the cost of yielding even more efficient oﬄine decryption costs.
Breaking Kamouflage for a set of α = 0.5 of Myspace passwords is achievable with
215 oﬄine computations. The Yahoo charts (middle two) show a similar picture.
Half the master passwords can be cracked in just two online queries for N = 103.
The attack performs best in the case of RY-ts. Here the attacker can break more
than 95% of master passwords with only one online query (top right chart). This
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is because the attacker has a very good estimate of the distribution of the user’s
true password.
The largest number of online queries needed at α = 0.5 across all six settings
is just 11 for Myspace with N = 104.
Kamouflage+. Our attack against Kamouflage required few online queries, which
is due to the fact that decoys were mostly ranked lower by our cracker than the true
master password. This vulnerability arises because Kamouflage’s uniform selection
of tokens produces relatively unlikely decoy master passwords. We therefore exper-
imented with a modified version of Kamouflage, called Kamouflage+, that instead
chooses tokens according to their frequency in the RY-tr dataset. We repeated
simulations of our attack, exactly as above but now with decoy master passwords
generated by Kamouflage+. The expected work for our various experimental con-
figurations is given in Figure 2.2. The results in terms of α-guesswork are shown in
Figure 2.3 (the dotted blue line, third from top being oﬄine work and the dotted
blue line second from bottom being online work).
This modification to Kamouflage actually backfires in the case of oﬄine work.
This is because decoys are now more likely to be probable passwords, speeding
up even further the attacker’s discovery of the master password template. On the
other hand, Kamouflage+ does increase the online work for our attack, but this is
still noticeably below the intended goal of N/2 in all cases. Even with N = 104,
the expected number of online queries is never more than 65% of the goal of 5,000
queries.
Summary. This relatively simple attack shows how existing approaches to
cracking-resistant vaults actually degrade security relative to conventional PBE.
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Specifically, the general Kamouflage approach of storing an explicit list of cipher-
texts, with one true vault embedded among many decoys generated as a function
of the true master password, provides brute-force attackers with an oﬄine speedup
that increases with the number of decoys. Attackers may even be able to do better
in the online portion should they analyze the vault contents more carefully (our
attack above orders online queries solely by master password likelihood).
The lesson here is a warning against building decoys as a function of the true
master password. One might consider modifying Kamouflage to use decoy master
passwords independently sampled from a model of the password distribution, in
order to eliminate the speedups obtained by our attack. But this approach gives
rise to other limitations, such as a cap of N/2 expected online queries irrespective
of the entropy of the true master password. We therefore go a different route.
2.4 Overview of Our Approach
The approach of hiding a true vault in a list of encrypted vaults appears to have
fundamental limitations. Most obviously it only allows a number of decoys linear
in the storage size, and the construction of effective decoy master passwords, as
shown for Kamouflage in the last section, is challenging.
We take a significantly different approach. Instead of explicitly storing de-
coy vaults, we construct single ciphertext which, when decrypted with any wrong
master password, yields a decoy vault that appears to have been sampled from
the distribution of plaintext vaults (across the entire user population). This ap-
proach is inspired by the theory of honey encryption [25]. As we will see, though,
successfully building a honey vault using honey encryption raises a number of chal-
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lenges, chief among them accurately modeling the distribution of human-generated
password sets in vaults.
Honey encryption. Juels and Ristenpart [25] introduced honey encryption
(HE) as a mechanism for encryption of secrets under low-entropy passwords. We
describe their general approach, with terminology tailored to our setting. En-
cryption with HE takes as input a master password mpw and plaintext M and
outputs a ciphertext, which we denote by C = HEnc(mpw,M ). Encryption is
usually randomized. Decryption takes as input a master password and cipher-
text C, and outputs a plaintext, denoted M = HDec(mpw,C). In our setting,
a plaintext is a single password w or vector of passwords ~w. We require that
HDec(mpw,HEnc(mpw,M )) = M with probability one for all mpw,M (over any
randomness used in encryption).
HE schemes are designed so that a ciphertext, when decrypted under an in-
correct master password mpw′ , mpw, emits a “plausible” plaintext M ′. This
requires a good model, built into the HE scheme specification, of the distribution
from which plaintexts are drawn.
As a concrete example Juels and Ristenpart gave an HE scheme for a messageM
that is a uniformly sampled prime number. (This scheme can be leveraged to
encrypted RSA private keys.) Their construction follows a general approach to
building HE schemes that composes a distribution-transforming encoder (DTE)
with a carefully chosen, but still conventional, PBE scheme. The latter can be,
for example, CTR-mode encryption with key derived from the master password
using a PBKDF. A DTE scheme specifies a randomized encoding of a message as
a string of bits. Decoding does the reverse (deterministically). For a secure HE
scheme, it is a requirement that the output of the encoding, for M drawn from
35
some target distribution, looks uniformly distributed and that decoding a uniform
bit string give rises to a distribution for M similar to the target distribution. For
prime numbers, Juels and Ristenpart give a secure DTE that essentially converts a
sampling algorithm for uniformly distributed prime numbers into a DTE encoding
and decoding algorithm pair.
Given DTEs suitable for password vaults, an HE-based approach has several
benefits over the hide-in-an-explicit-list approach of Kamouflage. First, regardless
of the quality of the DTE, because there is only one ciphertext, the amount of
oﬄine cracking effort required by an attacker is never less than for a conventional
PBE-only ciphertext. This means that, unlike Kamouflage, an HE-based scheme
will never provide attackers with a speed-up in oﬄine work. Additionally, the size
of ciphertexts in HE does not depend on the number of decoys possible, rather
decoys are generated “on-the-fly” during a brute-force attack for each guessed
master password. Therefore, given a good DTE, the online work required by an
adversary is essentially the strength (guessing entropy) of mpw. A strong mpw
will mean the attacker must make many online queries.
We would like a cracking-resistant vault to support use of both computer-
generated and human-chosen passwords. The former is relatively straightforward,
as computer-generated passwords come from an easy-to-characterize distribution.
Human-chosen passwords present a significant challenge, however, as they raise the
question of whether one can build DTEs that accurately model natural language-
type distributions. We show in the next section that such modeling is possible, and
handle further challenges of building a full-fledged, encrypted vault management
service in the sections that follow.
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2.5 Natural Language Encoders for Passwords
Formally, a DTE is a pair of algorithms DTE = (encode, decode), where encode is
randomized and decode is deterministic. In our context, encode takes as input a
vector of passwords ~w and outputs a bit string of some length s. The deterministic
decoder decode takes as input an s-bit string and outputs a password vector.
We require that the DTE be correct, meaning that decode(encode(~w)) = ~w with
probability 1 over the coins used by encode. Our DTEs will be designed so that
the length l of outputs of encode depends only on `, the number of passwords in
~w.
As an example, it is simple to construct a DTE for uniformly random, fixed-
length strings of symbols drawn from an alphabet Σ that consists of the 96 ASCII
printable characters. Encoding works in a character-by-character manner on an
input string x1x2 . . . xk, where xi ∈ Σ. Let xi denote the position of xi in Σ
under some canonical ordering of Σ. Then for each symbol xi in turn, encode out-
puts a large (e.g., 128-bit) integer Xi selected randomly subject to the constraint
Xi mod 96 = xi. (See Appendix A.2 for details on security bounds and other con-
siderations.) Decoding operates in the natural way: Given input X1‖X2‖ . . . ‖Xk,
it yields output x1‖x2‖ . . . ‖xk such that xi = Xi mod 96. Straightforward exten-
sions that we omit for brevity allow construction of a DTE over passwords that
conform to standard password-composition policies (such as needing at least one
integer, one special symbol, etc.). We refer to this DTE as UNIF.
We will use such a simple uniform DTE for computer-generated passwords
later. But it provides poor security for human-selected passwords, which are
clearly not distributed uniformly. This observation brings us to one of our core
tasks: building DTEs that securely encode samples from distributions of natural
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language-type text. Because we feel that such DTEs will be of broad use, we give
them a special name: natural language encoders, or NLEs. We focus on DTEs for
messages consisting of a single password and, later, lists of passwords. We note,
however, that our constructions are quite general and may be applicable in other
natural language contexts.
2.5.1 NLEs from password samplers.
A starting point for our NLE constructions is password crackers. Early crackers,
such as John the Ripper, simply have stored dictionary lists of popular passwords,
and can produce samples in order of likelihood. More modern crackers instead learn
compact representations of password distributions from password leaks [39, 40],
and permit efficient sampling of passwords over the distribution model.
In a bit more detail, we can view a sampling model for passwords as a deter-
ministic algorithm Samp that takes as input a uniformly random bit string U of
sufficient length (often called the “coins”) and produces a password w. We can
characterize Samp in terms of a distribution p, meaning that a password w is out-
put by Samp with probability p(w) (over the selection of bit string U). The goal of
a password cracker is to learn an algorithm Samp from one or more password leaks
whose corresponding distribution p closely approximates that of human-generated
passwords seen in practice.
We might hope, a priori, that one can build a secure DTE from any sampling
algorithm Samp. Unfortunately this seems unlikely to work, in the sense that there
exists (admittedly artificial) Samp for which building a DTE appears intractable.
Briefly, let Samp(U ) = H(U ) for some cryptographic hash function H, where U
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is a random bit string. Then the natural approach for DTE construction is to
set decode(U ) = H(U ). But for such decode, correctness would mandate that
encode(w) somehow can sample from the set H−1(U ) of preimages of U , which would
contradict the hash function’s security. Of course there may be other ways to build
encode, decode that use Samp only as a black-box, and yet achieve correctness and
security. We conjecture that a full counter-example exists, but do not have proof.
Such artificial counter-examples aside, for various classes of Samp we can in fact
use the straightforward approach of having decode(U ) = Samp(U ). The only re-
quirement is that we can build encode(w) that samples uniformly from Samp−1(w).
We show how to do so below for a couple of useful classes of samplers: n-gram
models and probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG) models. We start with the
single password case for the different models, and then discuss extensions to the
(trickier) case of a vault of possibly related passwords.
2.5.2 NLEs from n-gram models.
So-called n-gram models are used widely in natural language domains [41, 47,
48]. For our purposes, an n-gram is a sequence of characters contained in
a longer string. For example, the 4-grams of the word ‘password12’ are
{pass, assw, sswo, swor, word, ord1, rd12}. In building models, it
is convenient to add two special characters to every string: ˆ to the beginning and
$ to the end. Given this enhancement, the 4-gram set in the example above would
also include ˆpas and d12$.
An n-gram model is a Markov chain of order n− 1. The probability of a string
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is estimated by





xi|xi−(n−1) · · ·xi−1 ]
where the individual probabilities in the product are calculated for a given model
empirically via some text corpus. For example, for the RockYou password leak, we




xi|x1x2 · · ·xi−1 ] = c(x1x2 · · ·xi)∑
x c(x1 · · ·xi−1x)
for any string x1 · · ·xi of any length i. Let Fxi−(n−1)···xi−1 denote the CDF associated
the probability distribution for each history. Then the Markov chain associated to
such an n-gram model is a directed graph with nodes labeled by n-grams. An edge
from node xi−(n−1) · · ·xi−1 to xi−(n−2) · · ·xi is labeled with xi and Fxi−(n−1)···xi−1(xi).
To sample from the model one starts at node ˆ, samples from [0, 1), finds the first
edge5 whose CDF value is larger than the sample, follows it to move to the next
node, and repeats. The process finishes at a node having the stop symbol. The
sequence of xi values seen on the edges is the resulting string.
Note that such a Markov chain may not have edges and nodes sufficient to
cover all possible strings. For use in encoding, then, we extend the Markov chain
to ensure that each node has an edge labeled with each character. We set the
probabilities for these edges to be negligibly small, and re-normalize the other
edge weights appropriately. If this implies a new node we add it as well, and have
its output edges all have equal probability.
We can build a DTE by encoding strings as their path in the Markov chain.
To encode a string p = x1 · · ·xk, process each xi in turn by choosing randomly
from the values in [0, 1) that would end up picking the edge labeled with xi+1.
5We again assume an ordering on edges for which CDF values are strictly increasing.
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Decoding simply uses the input as the random choices in a walk. Both encoding
and decoding are fast, namely O (n) for a password of length n.
In our experiments, we use a 4-gram model trained from RY-tr. We denote the
resulting DTE by NG. We also explored 5-gram models, but in our experiments
these used up more space without a significant improvement in security.
2.5.3 NLEs from PCFG models.
A PCFG is a five-tuple G = (N,Σ, R, S, p) where N is a set of non-terminals, Σ
is a set of terminals, R is set of relations N → {N ∪ Σ}, S ∈ N is the start
symbol, and p is a function of the form R → [0, 1] denoting the probability of
applying a given rule. We require that for any non-terminal X ∈ N , it holds that∑
β∈N∪Σ p(X → β) = 1. PCFGs are a compact way of representing a distribution
of strings in a language. Each derivation for a member of the language defined by
the underlying CFG has a probability associated to it.
Weir, Aggarwal, de Medeiros, and Glodek [39] were the first to apply PCFGs to
the task of modeling password distributions. They constructed a password cracker
that could enumerate passwords (in approximate order of descending probability)
in a way that ensured faster cracking compared to previous approaches like John
the Ripper. Weir et al. parsed passwords into sets of contiguous sequences of letters,
digits or symbols. Further improvements are possible by employing their approach
with alternative parsing schemes. Jakobsson and Dhiman [46] and later Veras
et al. [40] used a (so-called) maximum coverage approach for parsing passwords
with the help of external language specific dictionaries. Veras et al. also used the
semantic meaning of passwords to provide finer granularity parsing, and improved
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PCFG cracking performance.
We now show how to build a DTE for a single password from any PCFG model.
Intuitively, the encoding of a password will be a sequence of probabilities defining a
parse tree that is uniformly selected from all such giving rise to the same password.
Decoding will just emit the string indicated by the encoded parse tree. We first
fix some definitions. A rule l → r can be specified as a pair (l, r), where l is a
non-terminal and r is a terminal or non-terminal. Every edge in a parse tree is a
rule. A rule set is a lexicographically ordered set of rules with the same left-hand-
side. A rule list is an ordered list of rules generated by depth-first search of the
parse-tree of a string / password (with siblings taken in left to right order).
A CFG is completely specified as a set of rule sets. A PCFG is completely
specified by what we call here an admissible assignment of probabilities to CFG
rules. Let S be a rule set of size |S| and pS(l → r) be the probability assigned to
a rule l→ r in S. An admissible assignment of probabilities has the property that∑
(l→r)∈S
pS(l → r) = 1. We refer to the probability distribution over rules in a rule
set S for a given admissible assignment as its induced probability distribution.
As a technical modification to such a PCFG, we add a special catch-all rule. Its
left-hand side is the start symbol and its right hand side represents any string. We
assign this catch-all rule a very low probability (and normalize other probabilities
accordingly). This rule ensures all passwords can be parsed (and generated) by
the PCFG model and that the model will never fail to encode any real password.
For a given PCFG, a parse tree, and thus a string str, may be specified as
a sequence of probabilities p1, . . . , pk (for sufficiently large k). To construct this
parse tree, a rule is selected using p1 from the rule set for the start symbol S,
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producing the children of S in the tree. A rule from the rule set for each child is
then selected using p2, p3, etc., from left to right. Recursing in this way produces
the full parse tree; its leaves, read left to right, constitute str.
As shown in Appendix A.2 we can represent a rule-set probability by an b-bit
integer. It follows that a parse tree for a PCFG, and thus a generated string P ,
may be completely specified by a vector ~X = 〈X1, . . . , Xk〉 of k integers, where
Xi ∈ {0, 1}b. This vector is not necessarily unique: There may, of course, be
multiple vectors corresponding to str.
We can now build a DTE from any PCFG model. Decoding takes as input
a vector ~X of integers, uses it to determine a parse tree, and outputs the corre-
sponding password P . This requires time O (n log s) for n-character passwords and
where s is the size of the largest rule set in the PCFG. Encoding takes as input a
password P and selects uniformly at random a vector ~X from the set of all that
decode to P . This inverse sampling can be efficiently implemented by finding all





time operation [49, 50]. Note that ~X is of a fixed size k; thus encod-
ing pads out the resulting vector with random bit strings representing sufficiently
many extra integers.
Of course, all of the above relies on having a PCFG that accurately models
the password distribution, a research topic in its own right [39, 24, 40, 41]. Our
general approach has the benefit of allowing us to use any of these prior PCFG
construction approaches. We built our own hand-tuned PCFG using the RockYou
training set, employing a combination of techniques from Weir et al. [39] and Veras
et al. [40]. In initial evaluations it performs better than the Weir et al. PCFG (in
terms of security; see Section 2.6). Some further details on the process for gener-
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ating it are provided in Appendix A.1. We refer to the DTE built from our new
PCFG as PCFG. As baselines for decoy generation quality, we built two additional
DTEs, WEIR and WEIR-UNIF. WEIR uses the grammar proposed by Weir et al. [39].
WEIR-UNIF is the same grammar except it ignores frequency information and treats
all rules inside a rule-set with equal probability. These grammars are functionally
equivalent to those used by Kamouflage+ and Kamouflage, respectively, when re-
stricted to a single password.
2.5.4 From one-password DTEs to vault DTEs.
We can easily extend any single-password DTE to handle multiple passwords by
applying an encoder independently to each password in the vault. This models
a vault distribution in which passwords are independent of one another. This
is especially useful when we have both computer-generated passwords in a vault
as well as human-chosen; we can choose appropriate single-password DTEs for
each case. We denote this independent-password DTE by MPW-DTE (for multiple
passwords).
Such a DTE may not work well when users repeat or have related passwords
in their vaults, however, motivating a decode algorithm that generates a vector of
passwords ~w in which passwords repeat in full or part. We introduce a technique
for embellishing PCFG-based single-password DTEs to handle vaults in this way,
what we refer to as the sub-grammar approach. The intuition is that if DTE-decode
samples passwords from a smaller domain than the actual trained PCFG, it will
often end up using the same password components or full passwords.
In more detail, SG-DTE (for sub-grammar) is the following DTE scheme. En-
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coding first parses all the passwords in ~w using the trained PCFG. It then generates
a new sub-grammar PCFG that consists of the cumulative set of rules used in pars-
ing the passwords in ~w. The rule probabilities are copied from the original PCFG
and then normalized over the sub-grammar PCFG. (We also copy special rule sets
described in detail in Appendix A.1. For example, T, the catch-all rule, is always
included in the sub-grammar.) This sub-grammar is encoded as the first part of
the DTE output, as detailed below. Finally, the DTE separately encodes each
w ∈ ~w as in PCFG, but using the sub-grammar PCFG.
Decoding works in the natural way: first decode the sub-grammar PCFG, then
decode the encoding of each password using the resulting sub-grammar PCFG.
Encoding/Decoding of the sub-grammar. Given a canonical representation
of the trained PCFG, a sub-grammar can be specified by simply encoding for
each non-terminal (except T) the number of corresponding rules used by the sub-
grammar followed by a list of such rules. Each rule in the list is encoded in the
same way as a derivation rule for a password.
To encode the size of a rule set we proceed as follows. Using a set of leaked pass-
word vaults in Pastebin (see Section 2.6.1), we generate the sub-grammar PCFG
for all the vaults of size ≥ 2. For each non-terminal in the PCFG (except T),
we then create a histogram of the number of the non-terminal rules used by each
sub-grammar. This gives a per-non-terminal empirical distribution on the number
of rules used, which we use as the distribution for sizes that should arise when
decoding a random string to a sub-grammar. The DTE encodes this distribution
via the inverse transform sampling mechanism of [25].
We have explained now how SG-DTE encodes an input ~w in a way that captures
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structure across passwords, making SG-DTE suitable for encoding of password
vaults. One additional step is required in the full specification of encode: SG-DTE
pads out all encodings to a constant length with random bits. This is important
because the size of the encoding will otherwise leak the size of the sub-grammar.
2.6 Evaluating the Encoders
We have shown how to construct functional NLEs that model real-world password
selections by human users of password vaults. To evaluate the quality of these
NLEs, we now study their resilience to attack using standard machine-learning
techniques.
Recall that in an oﬄine brute-force attack the adversary makes repeated guesses
at the master password and decrypts the target vault under each guess. The task of
the adversary is to identify the result of decryption under the true master password,
i.e., to determine the true plaintext for the vault.
Suppose q is the number of such guessing / decryption attempts. If the true
master password is among the adversary’s guesses, the result will be q− 1 random
samples from the NLE, as well as the true plaintext, and thus q plaintext candidates
in total.
We consider an adversary that orders these q plaintexts in a list from highest to
lowest likelihood of being the true vault (in the adversary’s view). The adversary’s
best strategy for attacking the vault is then to make online authentication attempts
using one password from each plaintext (decrypted vault) in order from the list.
Thus the position of the true plaintext vault in the list indicates the number of
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online authentication attempts the adversary must make. We evaluate such an
attack for an adversary that ignores master password likelihood, and instead uses
machine learning (ML) algorithms on the plaintexts to order the list.
Evaluating single decoy passwords. We start by evaluating the security of
NLEs for single decoy passwords, and leave full vault analysis to the next subsec-
tion. The security goal for a single-password NLE is to produce a decoy password
that is indistinguishable by an adversary from a true, user-selected one. We eval-
uate security in two ways.
First, we look at the accuracy with an binary adversarial classifier can assign
the right label (“true” / “decoy”) to a password. Second, we evaluate the ability
of such a classifier to assign a high rank to a true password in an ordered list of
plaintexts (single passwords) as described above. For this second evaluation, we
use the confidence measure of the classifier for a label assignment of “true” as the
basis for ranking passwords in the list.
Methodology. We explored a number of approaches to attack, and settled on
building machine learning (ML) classifiers to distinguish between true and decoy
passwords. We treat this as a supervised learning problem. That means we train a
classifier with two sets: labeled true passwords and labeled decoy passwords. We
test by drawing from two (disjoint) sources of real passwords and decoy passwords.
After experiments with a number of feature and classifier types, we have chosen to
report only on the best-performing option, random forest classifiers [51] with 20
estimators using the following features:
(1) Bag of characters: This feature captures the frequency distribution of char-
acters in a password. We represent this feature as a vector of integers of size
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equal to the number of printable characters. We also append the length of the
password to the vector.
(2) n-gram probability: We train two 4-gram models separately on each of the
two classes of password (true and decoy) provided for training. For a given
password, we use the probability yielded by each of these two models as a
feature. (These two probabilities / features do not sum in practice to 100%,
as they would for perfectly complementary models.)
We apply this classifier to the various training set / testing set pairs explored in
our experiments.
We evaluate five distinct NLEs as sources of decoys: WEIR-UNIF, WEIR, UNIF,
NG, and PCFG. These are all trained using the RockYou training set RY-tr. To
generate a decoy using any of these NLEs, we decode a fresh, random bit string of
suitable length. As a sixth source of “decoys” we sample directly from RY-tr.
As sources of true passwords, we use the RY-ts, Myspace, and Yahoo data sets.
Use of RY-ts creates a case where the NLE is trained using samples from the same
data set (but not the same data) as the classifier is tested upon. Use of Myspace
and Yahoo data sets creates a case where true passwords originate from a different
distribution, which we expect to make the task of distinguishing true from decoy
easier for the adversary.
As we have six sources of decoy passwords and three sets of true passwords,
we have a total of eighteen true / decoy source pairs on which to conduct our
experiments.
For each experiment, given a true / decoy password source pair, we first sample




α r¯ α r¯ α r¯
WEIR-UNIF 66 24 72 13 82 5
WEIR 63 35 54 36 60 25
UNIF 86 2 97 <2 97 <2
NG 70 22 68 41 61 41
PCFG 70 26 58 39 57 39
RY-tr 70 22 64 50 50 50
Figure 2.4: For different decoy / true password source pairs, percentage classification
accuracy (α) and percentage average rank (r¯) of a real password in a list of q = 1,000
decoy passwords for ML adversary. Lower α and higher r¯ signify good decoys.
derived set of true passwords. We set t = 100, 000 or the size of the true data
set, whichever is smaller. We treat the sampled data set as a multiset, meaning
that the probability of selecting a password is proportional to the number of times
it appears in the set. We also treat the derived data set as multiset, meaning
that a given true password can be sampled and thus appear multiple times. We
then generate a set of t decoy passwords using the decoy source, i.e., by using the
appropriate NLE or sampling from the “decoy” set RY-tr. Using the resulting pair
of derived data sets, we do a 10-fold cross-validation of the random forest classifier
with 90% / 10% training / testing splits.
For our experiments in true / decoy password classification, we measure α, the
average accuracy of the classifier on testing data. In those experiments involving
ranking of q passwords in order of likelihood of being the true password, we order
passwords according to the confidence of the classifier in assigning a “true” label.
We measure r¯, the average rank of the true password in the resulting list. (Thus
r¯ is an estimate of the number of online authentication attempts required for a
brute-force attacker that uses the classifier to identify the true password.)
An effective classifier will achieve a high value of α and a low value of r¯.
For example, a classifier that performs no better than random on a given decoy
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generation algorithm will on expectation achieve α = 50% and r¯ = (q + 1)/2. A
perfect classifier will achieve α = 100% and r¯ = 1.
Figure 2.4 reports the average classification accuracy (α) and average rank (r¯)
(expressed as a percentage) across our eighteen true / decoy password source pairs.
For experiments, we set q = 1,000. In other words, we drew one password from
the true password set and inserted it in a randomly selected position among 999
decoys generated from the decoy source. (We chose q = 1,000 as larger values,
e.g., q = 10,000, yielded similar results in preliminary experiments, but resulted
in significantly longer times generating decoys and thus for overall experiment
execution.)
Several outcomes of our experiments are notable. As expected, the uniform
NLE UNIF does quite poorly, with the classifier strongly distinguishing it from
true passwords. Also as expected, the adversary performs better in nearly all
cases against Myspace and Yahoo data than RY-tr, that is, when the adversary
trains on the true password source, and the decoy generator designer does not.
(As a sanity check, given the use of RY-tr as a source of “decoy” passwords, and
RY-ts as a source of true passwords, i.e., a common source for both, the adversary
does no better than random guessing in distinguishing true from “decoy.”)
It is important to observe that no decoy generator is consistently superior
to others across the board. For example, WEIR resists attack best for Myspace
and Yahoo data sets, while PCFG is superior in the case of RY-ts. As all decoy
generators are trained on RY-tr, these results suggest that WEIR generalizes better
than PCFG, in the sense that it can be deployed effectively to protect password
sources different from those on which it has been trained. Strikingly, in the task of
distinguishing decoys from true passwords drawn from the the Myspace and Yahoo
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data sets, WEIR generates decoys that are harder for the adversary than “decoys”
(true passwords) from RY-tr.
2.6.1 Evaluating complete password vaults
We now describe our evaluation of SG-DTE, our NLE for generating full decoy
vaults. Our evaluation relies on a set of leaked password vault contents that we
obtained from an anonymous public post to Pastebin. We refer to this data set
as Pastebin. Pastebin appears to have been gathered via malware running on a
number of clients, and is thus suggestive of the kind of data an adversary might
exploit. A limitation of the data set is that it takes the form of unordered username
/ password pairs. Thus the only way to ascertain that two passwords came from
the same vault is on the basis of a common or similar associated usernames. We
organized the passwords into hypothesized vaults through a manual sanitization
procedure on Pastebin whose details we omit for brevity, but which we will publish
with our code.
Some statistics on Pastebin are given in Figure 2.5. Here m denotes the number
of passwords in a vault.
Adversarial classifier. To construct a classifier capable of distinguishing true
vaults from those generated by SG-DTE, we make use of the following four feature
vectors:
(1) Repeat count: A vector of three vault features: (1) Number of unique pass-
words, (2) Number of passwords unique up to leet transformation and capi-
talization, and (3) Number of unique tokens inside a vault. These counts are
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m Statistic Value
2 ≤ m ≤ 3
Users 100
Domains 140




4 ≤ m ≤ 8
Users 89
Domains 329




9 ≤ m ≤ 50
Users 87
Domains 887




Min. entropy of full data-set 6.13
Figure 2.5: Summary statistics for Pastebin password vault leak. Here, m is the number
of passwords in a vault.
normalized by (divided by) the number of passwords in the vault.
(2) Edit distance: A vector ~x =< ~x1, ~x2 . . . ~xk > of size k, where ~xi denotes the
number of passwords pairs within edit-distance i (case insensitive). This fea-
ture aims to capture user “tweaking” of passwords across sites, i.e., small
modifications made to a password to create unique per-site variants.
(3) n-gram structure: A vector ~x of size k, where ~xi is the percentage frequency
of the ith most popular n-gram in the vault, for some n. (We use n = 5.) This
feature characterizes token reuse among passwords.
(4) Combined: By this we denote a combination of all three aforementioned feature
vectors.
In all individual vectors, we let k = 5. We experimented with several ML
engines, including random forest and clustering, but the best-performing was a
Support Vector Machine (SVM). We construct four support vector machine (SVM)
classifiers with a radial basis function kernel, one for each of the feature vectors
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given above.
Our training set consists of an equal number of labeled decoy and true pass-
word vaults of equal size (m). We use the Pastebin data set for true vaults. (See
the “Users” statistic in Figure 2.5 for the number of available instances.) By anal-
ogy with our evaluation of single passwords, the adversarial algorithm runs the
SVM on q vaults in turn, and orders these vaults according to the SVM-estimated
probability of being in the “true” class.
For each size m, let cm be the number of true vaults in the Pastebin data-set
with m passwords. We perform (cm−1)−fold cross-validation, meaning we set aside
one vault of size m for testing as the true vault and train on all others; we repeat
this process for every vault. To generate decoy vaults for training and testing
we generate uniformly random bit strings and decode them using the appropriate
NLE.
As previously described, the success metric is r¯, the average value over all true
passwords vaults of the rank r in the adversarially ordered list, expressed as a
percentage.
Figure 2.6 summarizes results for two full-vault NLEs. Recall that the one la-
beled SG-DTE is the sub-grammar NLE built from our PCFG. For comparison, we
also consider a na¨ıve one, labeled MPW-DTE, that outputs m independent appli-
cations of the PCFG NLE. We set q = 1, 000. The table on the left compares the
different attacks across all vaults of size 2–50 against the two NLEs. As expected,
treating passwords as independent in MPW-DTE yields decoys that an attacker
can easily distinguish from a true vault, with r = 0.6% for two of our adversarial
algorithms. In contrast, our sub-grammar approach SG-DTE achieves r > 30% in
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r¯ (average rank %)
Feature used MPW SG
Repeat count 0.6 37.4
Edit dist. 1.2 41.4
n-gram 0.6 38.5
Combined 1.0 39.7





Figure 2.6: Performance of ML attacks against NLEs. (Left) Average rank of the real
vault (r¯) over all vault sizes (m ∈ [2, 50]) for MPW-DTE and SG-DTE using different
feature types. (Right) Average rank r¯ of the true vault obtained with Repeat-count
feature vector, broken down by vault size m.
all of our presented experiments.
The right table compares the performance of the Repeat-count feature vector
against MPW-DTE and SG-DTE by vault size. This attack is quite effective against
MPW-DTE, confirming the observation that treating passwords within a vault
independently poorly models real vaults. This series of experiments also brings to
light the fact that the security of the NLE degrades as the vault size m increases.
Again, SG-DTE fares much better.
2.7 Honey Encryption for Vaults
Given the NLEs from Section 2.5, we can now build an encryption service for
vaults. Our construction uses a similar design as Juels and Ristenpart’s [25]
honey encryption (HE) construction, which composed a DTE with a conventional
password-based encryption scheme. But ours will necessarily be more complicated.
We will combine multiple different DTEs (an NLE for human-generated and a reg-
ular DTE for computer-generated passwords) and handle side information such as
domains in a privacy-preserving manner. We will also need to handle adding new
entries to an existing vault and removing entries.
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Abstractly, vault encryption takes as input a set of domains ~D = (D1, . . . ,
D`), associated passwords ~w = (w1, . . . , w`), and a vector of bits ~h = (h1, . . . , h`)
for which a 1 signifies that the password was input by a user and a 0 signifies
that the password was randomly generated. The client selects randomly-generated
passwords by selecting uniformly from a large set (of size about 290) that includes
passwords accepted by all the website policies that we tested.
We now present a basic HE scheme. This scheme hides passwords, but takes
the simple approach of storing domains in the clear with the ciphertext.
Basic HE scheme. Upon input ~D, ~w,~h, this scheme proceeds as follows. We
first apply the sub-grammar NLE SG to the subset of passwords in ~w for which
hi = 1. To each of the remaining passwords with hi = 0 we apply the DTE UNIF.
The result from both steps is a bit string S = S0‖S1‖ · · · ‖S` with S0 the output
from encoding the sub-grammar and each Si either an encoding under PCFG using
the sub-grammar (hi = 1) or an encoding under UNIF (hi = 0).
The string S is then encrypted as follows. First, derive a keyK = KDF(mpw, sa)
for a freshly generated uniform salt sa and where mpw is the user’s master pass-
word. Here KDF is a password based key derivation function (PBKDF) that is
strengthened to be as slow as tolerable during normal usage [35]. Then, encrypt
each Si (for i = 0 to `) independently using AES in counter mode with key K
and a fresh random IV. This produces a sequence of ` + 1 CTR-mode cipher-
texts ~C = (C0, . . . , C`). The final vault ciphertext includes a (conventional) encod-
ing of ~D,~h, sa, ~C. Decryption works in a straightforward way.
This HE scheme is relatively simple (once the NLE and DTE are fixed) and
space efficient. However, ~D and ~h are stored in the clear and this means that
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attackers obtaining access to the ciphertext learn the domains for which the user
has an account as well as which passwords were randomly generated. One approach
to rectify this would be to specify a DTE for encoding ~D. One could use popularity
statistics for domains, for example based on Alexa rankings. However note that
this may sacrifice security against oﬄine brute-force attacks in the case that an
attacker knows with high certainty the set of domains associated with a user’s
vault.
This highlights a delicate challenge in the use of HE: if an attacker can easily
obtain knowledge about a portion of the plaintext, it may be better to not apply
HE to that portion of the plaintext. We may view domain information as such
easily-obtainable side information that it is not worth encrypting. To provide
domain privacy, though, we must do more. We now describe two approaches:
HE-DH1 and HE-DH2.
HE-DH1. In this scheme, we hide an individual user’s domains in the set of
all domains used by users and include in each user’s vault “dummy” entries for
unused domains. To achieve privacy of domains the goal will be that an attacker
cannot distinguish between a dummy and real entry. In the following, we fix a set
of popular domains ~D∗ = (D∗1 , . . . , D
∗
s1
). We require that ~D∗ be a superset of all
the domains used by users. We discuss how to achieve this momentarily.
To encrypt an input ~D,~h, ~w we first encode the passwords as described above
for the basic scheme: apply SG to the set of human-generated passwords and
UNIF to each of the computer-generated passwords. For any domain in ~D∗ but
not in ~D, we generate a dummy encoding as follows. First we choose a bit h
to select whether this domain should have a human-generated dummy entry or a
computer-generated one. We discuss how to bias this bit selection below. Then we
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generate a random bit string of length equal to the length of outputs of PCFG (if
h = 1) or UNIF (if h = 0). We then generate the full encoding S = S0‖S1‖ · · · ‖Ss1
by inserting the per-password encodings or dummy encodings to match the order
from ~D∗. We then encrypt S as in the basic scheme.
The distribution alluded to above for dummy encodings does not affect confi-
dentiality of mpw or ~w, but rather confidentiality of the domains associated to a
user and whether the user has human or generated passwords for each such domain.
One can, for example, set this distribution to be biased towards human-generated
passwords.
Note that decryption with either the correct mpw or an incorrect one produces
s1 passwords. The s1 − ` honey passwords corresponding to the dummy entries
obscure from an attacker which sites are in use by the user (even in the extreme case
that the attacker has guessed mpw somehow). When mounting brute-force attacks,
the dummy entries might hinder attempts to perform online checks of recovered
passwords. In particular, if a domain’s login web page follows best practices and
does not leak whether a user has an account there (regardless of correctness of
the provided password), then the attacker may not be able to distinguish between
the situation in which a certain domain is not used by a user and the situation in
which the decryption attempt resulted in a honey password.
The downside of the above approach is that s1 may need to be very large and for
each user the storage service (described below in Section 2.8) must store O (() s1)
bits of data. We can grow s1 over time by having clients inform the service of when
a new domain should be added to D∗ and the server can insert dummy entries in
previous vaults by just inserting random bit strings in the appropriate location for
each vault ciphertext. (this is possible because a separate CTR-mode encryption
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is used for each vault entry.) When the system is first setup, an initial relatively
small popular domains list can be seeded with highly popular domains.
Another approach to reducing overheads is to bucket users into separate groups,
each group having their own popular domains list. This enables tuning the size of
vaults relative to per-group domain confidentiality.
HE-DH2. In this scheme, we adopt an alternative approach to dealing with the
long tail of domains, and use a honey-encrypted overflow table. Fix some number
s2 > 0. For each of the domains not in the current popular domain set, we use
the following procedure. First apply the PCFG (using the sub-grammar or UNIF
appropriately to the password to get a bit string S ′. Then hash the domain name
and take the result modulo s2 to yield an index j ∈ [0..s2 − 1]. Set S∗s1+j+1 to S ′.
Some indices in [0..s2 − 1] will be unused after handling all domains outside the
popular domain set; we fill these with dummy encodings. The additional s2 seeds
are each encrypted with CTR mode, making the final, full ciphertext ~D∗,~h∗, sa, ~C.
Note that now, ~C contains s1 +s2 +1 individual CTR-mode encryption ciphertexts
for the sub-grammar and s1 + s2 individual, possibly dummy, passwords.
By setting s2 large enough relative to the expected number of domains not in
D∗ we can ensure that with high probability no two domains hash to the same
location. Note that the domains associated with the overflow table are not stored
with the ciphertext. To decrypt, the requested domain is checked to see if it is in D∗
and if not it is hashed to find the appropriate entry in the last s2 HE ciphertexts.
Updating a vault. To update a password for a particular domain in the basic
scheme or HE-DH1, one first decrypts the entire vault, changes the appropriate
entry, and then encrypts the modified vault with fresh randomness (including the
58
salt). needed to ensure the sub-grammar is consistent with the encoded content.
For HE-DH2, one proceeds much the same, also decrypting each of the s2 entries
in the overflow table. The appropriate domain’s entry is updated (found either
by looking in the popular domains list or, failing that, hashing the domain to be
updated to find it in the overflow table). Finally, the modified vault is encrypted
(with fresh randomness).
Deletion of a password can be performed by converting the appropriate entry
into a dummy entry while also updating the sub-grammar by removing any now
unnecessary rules.
Security discussion. Our primary goal is confidentiality of the plaintext pass-
words. All passwords are first encoded using an appropriate DTE and then en-
crypted using a PBE scheme. Should the user’s master password be strong, even
an oﬄine brute-force attack is infeasible and, in particular, it will require as much
work to break any of the schemes above as would be to break a conventional
PBE encryption. Should the user’s master password be weak, then by construc-
tion decrypting the ciphertext under any incorrect master password gives back
a sample from the DTE distribution. In particular, we believe there to be no
speed-up attacks that allow the attacker to rule out a particular incorrect master
password without having to determine if the recovered plaintext is decoy or not.
As we showed in the previous section, our NLE is good enough that distinguishing
human-generated passwords is challenging even for sophisticated adversaries.
The above is admittedly informal reasoning, and does not rule out improved
attacks. We would prefer a formal analysis of plaintext vault recovery security akin
to those given for simpler honey encryption schemes in [25], which would reduce
security to solely depend on DTE quality. Those techniques rely on a closed-form
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description of the distribution of password vaults as produced by decoding uniform
strings. Unfortunately we do not know how to determine one; even estimating the
distribution of single passwords is impractical with sampled data [36]. Formal
analysis remains an interesting open question.
If an attacker obtains the encryptions of a vault before and after an update,
then security falls back to that of conventional PBE. One simply decrypts both
vaults under each guessed master password, and with high probability the contents
of the two plaintext vaults will match (except where updates occurred) with high
probability only with the correct master password. This is a limitation of all decoy-
based approaches we are aware of and finding a solution for update security is an
interesting open question.
Another security goal is domain hiding. As discussed earlier, adding dummy
ciphertexts (random bit strings) for the latter two schemes for unused domains
means that an oﬄine attacker will recover passwords for these domains as well. The
same reasoning extends to the use of the overflow table. The complexity of the sub-
grammar may leak some information about the overall number of human-generated
passwords in-use, but not which of the domains marked as having human-generated
passwords are dummy encodings.
2.8 The NoCrack System
We now turn to the design of the full honey-vault service that we call NoCrack.
Our architecture closely follows deployed commercial systems, such as LastPass6.
A web-storage service exposes a RESTful web API over HTTPS for backing up user
6http://www.lastpass.com
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vaults and synchronizing vaults across devices. To achieve the security benefits of
HE, however, we must design this service carefully.
The challenge of password-based logins. One encounters an interesting chal-
lenge when attempting to build a decoy-based system which supports backup of
user vaults: how to authenticate users to the service that is responsible for backing
up their vaults. In particular, the status quo in industry is for users to choose a
username and service password. The password would be sent over HTTPS to the
server, hashed, and stored to authenticate future requests. But customers are likely
to choose this service password to be the same as their vault’s master password. If
an attacker compromises the storage service and obtains both a user’s encrypted
vault and the service password hash, they can mount a brute-force attack against
the service password hash, learn the service password, and then decrypt the vault.
One might attempt to mitigate with this by securing the password hash sepa-
rately from vaults. Or one could avoid backup of encrypted vaults entirely, but this
would leave users responsible and violate our goal of matching features of existing
services. We therefore go a different route, and forego password-based login to the
storage service completely.
Device enrollment. A new user registers with the service by providing an email
address (also used as an identifier), to which a standard proof-of-ownership chal-
lenge is sent. To hinder abuse of the registration functionality, the service can rate
limit such requests and require solution of an appropriate CAPTCHA [52]. The
proof-of-ownership is an email including a randomly generated 128-bit temporary
token (encoded in Base64 format, 22 characters long). The user copies this tem-
porary token into the client program which submits the token over an enroll API
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call. The server verifies the temporary token, and returns to the client program a
(long term) bearer token (also 128 bits) that can be used as a key to authenticate
subsequent requests using HMAC. At this stage the client device is enrolled. Note
that all communication is performed over TLS.
Additional devices can be enrolled in a similar manner by having an already-
enrolled client device to generate a token for the new device or sending a new
temporary token via email. Should a user lose all access to a device with a current
bearer token, they can easily obtain a new token via the same enrollment process.
We note that two-factor authentication would be straightforward to support
by requiring a proof-of-ownership of a phone number or a correct hardware token-
generated one-time password to obtain a device bearer token.
Synchronizing with the server. An enrolled client device can compare their
local information with that stored under their account on the server. This involves
ensuring the client and storage service have the same version of the vault, which,
in normal usage, is cached on the client device. To save bandwidth, downloads and
uploads can be done in an efficient manner via any standard “diff” mechanism —
in particular our HE schemes support sending only portions of the ciphertext at a
time.
The client. We currently have only a command line client supported, but future
versions could easily integrate with popular browsers via an extension. The client
caches the vault locally, but never stores it in the clear on persistent storage. The
client queries the service when run to determine if it needs to synchronize the
vault. At the beginning of a browsing session, the user is prompted for the master
password and the vault is decrypted. To check for typos, we can use dynamic
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security skins [53] (as suggested also for use with Kamouflage), which show a color
or picture that is computed as a hash of the master password (but never stored).
The output of the KDF can be cached in memory in order to decrypt individual
domains as needed, while the master password itself is expunged from memory
immediately.
Note that the HE scheme does not handle login names; we assume that browser
caching mechanisms can handle this for a user if they desire. Should a login
detectably fail for the user due to master password typo and the user does not
observe the incorrect security skin, the client can prompt the user to reenter their
master password. By construction, there might be dummy password entries in
NoCrack for some domains where the user does not have an account. The user
and/or the browser is responsible to distinguish the domains where the user has
an account.
Implementation and performance. We implemented a prototype of NoCrack
in Python-2.7. On the server side we used Flask and Sqlite3. To normalize do-
mains we use the Python Public-Suffix library. All cryptographic operations use
PyCrypto-2.6.1. We use AES within CTR mode encryption, and SHA-256 within
PBKDF2 for key derivation. Many of the operations are parallelizable; we use the
Python multiprocessing library for this but note that our prototype implementa-
tion does not yet fully take advantage of parallelization. The client and server
consist of 3,102 total lines of code as counted by the utility cloc (not counting li-
braries). All experiments were performed on an Intel Core-i5 with 16 GB of RAM
running Linux.
We provide some basic performance numbers for our most complex honey
encryption scheme HE-DH2, but emphasize that this is a naive implementa-
63
Operation s = 2 200 2,000 20,000
Recover password 6.34 ms 6.41 ms 6.42 ms 6.50 ms
Add password 0.13 s 0.68 s 1.11 s 9.25 s
Vault size on disk 4.71 KB 164.00 KB 1.55 MB 15.26 MB
Figure 2.7: Running times (median over 100 trials) of operations for different vault sizes
s = s1 + s2. The final row is size of encrypted vaults on disk.
tion and some improvements will be easy. We fix various vault sizes s ∈
{2 , 200 , 2,000 , 20,000} and set s1 = s2 = s/2 (these are the sizes of the popular
domains table and overflow table, respectively). We used integer representation
size b = 128. for encoding fractions. We start by generating a random ciphertext
of size appropriate for the values of s1, s2 assuming some short arbitrary domain
size and that all passwords are human generated (the worst-case for performance).
We then measure the time to recover a particular vault password as well as to add
a password to the vault. We report in Table 2.7 the median times over 100 trials.
Variance in timing was negligible.
Time for recovering a single password is fast, and agnostic to the size of the
vault. This is because our design allows random access into the vault. Time for
adding passwords increases with s, since our scheme decrypts and decodes all s
entries, updates the new password, then re-encodes and re-encrypts all s entries
(this is required to keep the sub-grammar synchronized with the contents of the
vault.) The bulk of the time is spent in encoding and re-encoding passwords.
This operation is still only around one second for large vaults, and large vaults are
needed only to support domain hiding. The encrypted vaults are also of reasonable
size. We conclude that, while NoCrack does incur time and space overheads relative
to conventionally encrypted vaults, the absolute performance is more than sufficient
for the envisioned usage scenarios.
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2.9 Related work
Honey objects. The use of decoy objects such as honeypots or decoy docu-
ments [54, 55] is well-established in information security practice. More closely
related to our work here are honeywords [56], decoy passwords associated with
each user in a password database. The honeywords system involves fake individ-
ual passwords, rather than password sets, and does not help with decoy security
for password vaults, our goal here.
We also note that decoy document and honeyword systems are distributed:
they assume explicit storage of secrets that distinguish decoy from real objects in
a trustworthy location (a “honeychecker”) separate from the system containing the
decoy objects. See [57] for a discussion of the distinction between such systems
and those in which these secrets (e.g., master passwords) are provided by a user,
as in NoCrack.
An early decoy system involving encryption under user-furnished secrets was
proposed by Hoover and Kausik [38]; it only supports encryption of specially
crafted RSA private keys. Honey encryption [25] introduced a general framework
for incorporating honey objects into encryption. As explained earlier, it does not
prescribe constructions for specific message types, which gives rise to one of the
major technical challenges we faced in building NoCrack.
A detailed discussion of Kamouflage [37] was given in Section 4.2.
Password-based key derivation. Key stretching, where one slows down key
derivation, was first defined by Kelsey et al. [58], and standardized later in
PKCS#5 [35]. Boyen proposed halting password puzzles [59] in which the key-
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derivation will run indefinitely on incorrect password guesses and only terminates
(after an unspecified length of time) upon correct guesses. Another approach is to
incorporate memory-hard functions, which require a significant amount of RAM
to compute efficiently, such as done in scrypt [13]. Each of these techniques slows
down oﬄine brute-force attacks, but do not force attackers to make online queries.
Stateless password managers. Several schemes exist for strengthening user
passwords (and preventing direct password reuse) by hashing a master secret with
domain names to dynamically generate per-domain passwords. An early example
was the Lucent Personal Web Assistant (LPWA) [60]; later variants include Pwd-
Hash [61] and Password Multiplier, a scheme by Halderman et al. [62]. Chiasson
et al. conducted a usability study of both PwdHash and Password Multiplier and
found the majority of users could not successfully use them as intended to gener-
ate strong passwords [63]. Another usability challenge is dealing with sites with a
password policy banning the output of the password hash; for this reason NoCrack
uses a simple set of rules for computer-generated passwords.
Password managers. In addition to Kamouflage [37], several academic propos-
als have sought to improve the usability and security of stateful password managers.
Passpet [64] generates random passwords per-domain and allows users to assign
avatars to different websites to easily identify which passwords are used with which
website. Tapas [65] is a prototype two-factor password manager which distributes
passwords into shares between a computer and a mobile phone.
Karole et al. [66] performed a usability evaluation comparing three common ap-
proaches to password vaults: online services, phone applications, and USB tokens.
Interestingly, they found that the online service was by far the easiest for partic-
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ipants to use, although participants stated a clear preference for the phone-based
solution because most didn’t want to entrust all of their passwords to a cloud-based
service. These findings are a compelling justification for NoCrack, which enables




PASSWORD TYPOS AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM SECURELY
This chapter was published in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S&P), 2016 [30].
3.1 Introduction
Despite repeated calls for their demise (cf. [7]), human-chosen passwords remain
the primary form of user authentication on the Internet. A long line of investigation
has shown that passwords are easily predicted by attackers (cf. [67, 36, 68]), that
strength meters offer limited improvements to security [69], that password expira-
tion does not increase security [70], and that users have a hard time remembering
complex passwords [71, 72, 73, 69].
A handful of works have pointed out that complex, user-chosen passwords are
not only more difficult to remember, but also more difficult to type [74, 75, 72].
But these studies are quite limited, investigating neither the prevalence nor form
of typos across a wide user base. Additional anecdotes arise in industry, where a
few web services seem to intentionally allow a small set of typos [76, 77, 78, 79].
Facebook currently accepts a password whether or not the user capitalizes the
first letter of their password (assuming it starts with a letter), and whether or not
they have the caps lock on. But no information about why they do this has been
published, and, more importantly, whether this degrades security is unclear.
We provide the first detailed treatment of password typos. We start by mea-
suring empirically the rates and nature of typos made by users. We perform pre-
liminary experiments with Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in which we task
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human workers with transcribing passwords drawn from the RockYou password
leak.1 This does not perfectly model password entry (among other reasons, be-
cause the passwords were not the workers’ own), but allows us to collect over
100,000 submissions in short order across thousands of workers. Our experiment
provides important, basic insights into common typographical errors. We find that
a large number are proximity errors (hitting a key near the intended one). Several
other common ones are what we call “easily-correctable” typos: they can all be
corrected by simple functions applied to the submitted, incorrect password. Exam-
ples of the latter include accidentally hitting the caps lock, implementing incorrect
first-letter capitalization, adding a character to the front or end of a password,
and missing the shift key when entering a symbol at the end of a password. These
easily-correctable typos account for 20% of the typos observed in our MTurk study,
an observation that serves as a key basis for our work.
Armed with correction functions for easily-correctable typos, we instrument
Dropbox’s production, Internet-scale login infrastructure. This permits measure-
ment of typo prevalence at scale without changing the way Dropbox currently
performs user authentication and with no increased risk of exposure of passwords
(i.e., we never store passwords or any information that could help in guessing
them). While we cannot reveal the absolute number of requests seen during mea-
surements for reasons of confidentiality, we note that Dropbox has hundreds of
millions of customers and all user accounts were instrumented. We first perform
a 24-hour measurement to identify login attempts involving the easily-correctable,
common typos surfaced in the MTurk study. We find that over 9% of failed login
attempts result from just one of three easily-correctable typos (caps lock, first let-
ter case, and adding a character to the end). We perform a subsequent 24-hour
1We submitted our experiment design to our IRB, but received an exemption for lack of
collecting any PII.
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experiment to analyze the impact of correcting just these top three typos. This
experiment reveals that 3% of all users failed to login, but could have done so given
correction of one of these three easily-correctable typos. Many other users could
have avoided multiple login attempts, significantly decreasing the time required
to login. In summary, our measurements suggest that easily-correctable password
typos represent a significant burden on users and businesses.
All of this suggests typo-tolerance could bring substantial usability benefits.
What remains is to determine if such typo-tolerance necessarily degrades security.
The intuition would be that it does, because guesses might cover multiple possible
passwords. We show, however, that this intuition is flawed.
We provide a formal framework that enables principled investigation. We define
typo-tolerant password checkers, and among these a special class that we call relaxed
checkers. Relaxed checkers are systems that start with an existing exact system
(e.g., comparing salted bcrypt hashes or using an encrypted password onion [80]).
The system is “relaxed” through a modification that additionally searches a small
space of corrections to the submitted password. This search allows easy deployment
of typo-tolerance, while ensuring that security in the face of server compromise is
as in the exact checking case (since stored values remain unchanged). Thus we
focus on analyzing online guessing attacks that seek to maximize their probability
of success by exploiting the extra typo checks.
We prove a free corrections theorem. It states that there exists an optimal, fully
secure typo-tolerant checker for any desired set of corrections. Consequently: (1)
The optimal remote attack up to some query budget q is no more successful than
the optimal attack against an exact checker and (2) No other checking scheme can
improve the utility of typo corrections while maintaining no loss in security. The
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key insight is that one can build a typo-tolerant checker that forgoes corrections
in the rare cases when doing so will allow checking for multiple high-probability
passwords.
Unfortunately, the optimal checker underlying the free corrections theorem
must be based on exact knowledge of the password distribution—an assumption
unlikely to be realizable in practice. We therefore explore the security of a number
of practical typo-tolerant checkers, such as always correcting the top three ty-
pos, checking corrections only when they do not appear on a blacklist of common
passwords, and a version of the optimal checker that uses the RockYou password
leak [81] to estimate the password distribution. We then perform a number of sim-
ulations to show that these typo-tolerant checkers improve usability while remote
guessing attacks improve negligibly, even in the worst case of attackers that some-
how know the precise password distribution. For real attackers that estimate the
distribution, our simulations suggest no improvement in online guessing attacks.
The contributions of this chapter are the following:
• We are the first to investigate the rate and nature of password typos made by
users via measurement studies using Mechanical Turk and the production login
infrastructure at Dropbox. Our work surfaces a small set of easily-correctable
typos, such as capitalization errors, that alone prevent 3% of users from logging
in during the period of study. Correcting these few typos could therefore non-
negligibly boost user access to the Dropbox service.
• We introduce a formal framework for typo-tolerant password checkers and prove
a free corrections theorem that establishes the existence, in theory, of an optimal
typo-tolerant password checker that has no loss in security over exact checking.
• We introduce a number of practical typo-tolerant password checkers that are
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compatible with existing password storage systems. Simulations show that these
checkers can achieve no degradation in security yet still significantly improve
login success rates.
Our focus is on web password ecosystems, but nothing about our techniques is
unique to this setting. Our typo-tolerant checkers could easily be integrated in
other settings such as logging into a desktop or laptop computer, though measure-
ments are probably warranted to understand what are the best typo corrections
for these other settings. We leave this to future work.
Immediate impact of our work. In the course of this research, our results
prompted Dropbox to deploy a caps lock indicator on their website’s password
login interface. This indicator is like the one already available in Apple OS X, but
appears in all browsers. Preliminary results suggest that it reduces caps lock errors
by about 75%, and thus provides significant benefit. Unfortunately, it does not
eliminate caps-lock errors nor assist with other sorts of common typos. So while
our results in this chapter have already had a practical impact, we hope that they
will also fuel further advances in the mitigation of password typos.
3.2 Background and Related Work
Password checking and threats. Traditional password-based authentication
systems work as follows. A user chooses a username and a password at registration
time. For subsequent logins, the user submits their username and password. Using
some stored representation of the password (e.g., a salted hash), a password check-
ing scheme determines whether the submitted password matches the registered
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one. Login is allowed only if the equality check passes. A more formal treatment
appears later in Section 3.5.
In terms of security, two main threats arise in the context of password checking
systems. The first is online guessing attacks in which the attacker can submit
guesses to the checking system via the standard interface. The attacker might tar-
get a particular login (a vertical attack), or try popular passwords against multiple
accounts (a horizontal attack). Here the system can employ various countermea-
sures to mitigate online attacks, such as slowing down how quickly responses are
returned, locking accounts after a certain number of queries per unit time, and
using anomaly detection mechanisms to flag requests as unauthentic based on con-
textual information. The second main threat is leakage to attackers of password
hash databases due to compromise of authentication systems or accidental data
disclosure. These attackers can mount oﬄine brute-force attacks in an attempt to
crack the passwords. Our focus will be on online brute-force attacks as, looking
ahead, our checkers will be compatible with existing password storage schemes
and thus no alter security with respect to oﬄine attacks. We discuss more in
Section 3.5.
Typos in user-selected passwords. A number of prior measurement studies
reveal the tendency of users to choose weak passwords [73, 67, 10] with highly
skewed, heavy-headed distributions (i.e., a relatively small number of passwords
are chosen by a large number of people). The most-stated reason is that ease-of-
memorability guides users to simple, common passwords. While memorability is
clearly a critical aspect of usability, users may also be reluctant to choose more
complex passwords because entering them is difficult, error-prone, and slow. The
problem may be exacerbated by various input device form factors, e.g., mobile
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phone touch keyboards.
Few works have measured the difficulty of correctly entering user-chosen pass-
words. Keith et al. [74] measured the usability of user-selected passphrases in
comparison to passwords for a cohort of 56 undergraduate students. They showed
that 2.2% of entries of user-chosen passwords had a typo (defined by thresholding
via Levenshtein distance), and the rate of typos roughly doubles for more complex
passwords (at least length 7, one upper-case, one lower-case, one non-letter). A
follow-up study by the same authors also revealed a typo rate of roughly 2% with
another small corpus of students [75]. Their studies, being of small scale, may not
generalize to other settings, and the authors do not analyze the types of errors
subjects made.
Mazurek et al. [82] hypothesize that users may pick weaker passwords because
they are simpler to type and that more complex passwords are harder to type. Via
large-scale measurements of a university authentication system, they show that
login errors are correlated with stronger passwords. However, they do not analyze
the nature of errors, i.e., whether they were in fact typos, typing in the entirely
wrong password, or some other problem.
Server-side hashing changes. In theory a secure sketch [83] could be used
to correct some typos in the server side. However, the proven bounds for existing
constructions are too weak to provide meaningful protection for our setting (in
which entropy is quite low). More details are given in Appendix B.1. Mehler and
Skiena [84] propose to allow controlled collisions in password hashing so that, with
high probability, passwords with a transposition or substitution error hash to the
same value. Both such approaches to typo-tolerant techniques are not backwards-
compatible with existing password storage and also will degrade oﬄine attack
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security.
Typos in passphrase systems. Shay et al. [71] perform a study of system-
generated passwords that are chosen uniformly for a user, chosen uniformly to
be pronounceable, or chosen uniformly among CorrectHorseBatteryStaple-type
passphrases [85] of various word lengths. They measure typos and investigate
the correlation between password/passphrase length and typing errors, and inves-
tigate simple typo-tolerance strategies such as ignoring case completely and, for
passphrases, combining words from a dictionary whose strings have large pairwise
Damerau-Levenshtein distance [86, 87], which, in turn, enables correction by com-
parison with the dictionary. This latter suggestion is originally due to Bard [88].
Later, Jakobsson and Akavipat [89] suggest similar dictionary-checking-based error
correction in what they call fastwords. In contrast to the above works, we focus on
arbitrary user-chosen passwords, so these previous measurements and mechanisms
unfortunately do not apply to our setting.
Typo-tolerant checking in industry. There have been several examples of ma-
jor websites accepting slightly incorrect versions of user-chosen passwords. Face-
book as early as 2011 accepted the correct password, the password with all letters’
cases flipped, or the password with the first letter’s case flipped (if it is indeed
a letter) [76, 77]. These two modifications correspond to errors resulting from
leaving the caps lock on (or off) or the tendency of (particularly) mobile phone
keyboards to automatically capitalize the first entered character. Early password
authentication mechanisms at Amazon allegedly ignored case and any characters
beyond the eighth position due to a bug [90]. Users of Vanguard (an investment
management company) reported that the answers to security questions could have
typographical errors and still be accepted [79].
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These companies faced significant backlash in the media and from some security
professionals [79, 90, 77]. The assumption underlying the criticism seems to be
that accepting any variant of a password will necessarily speed up online guessing
attacks.
Open questions. To summarize, before our work there was no information avail-
able about the kinds of typos that burden users typing user-selected passwords and
whether typo-tolerant password checking systems are achievable without degrading
security. We seek to answer these questions here.
3.3 Understanding Typos Empirically
We start with experiments using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [91] to mea-
sure the kinds of typos that people make when typing passwords. The goal of this
preliminary measurement study is to discover the most frequent typos across a
population for typical user-chosen passwords. We will follow on up these MTurk
experiments with real user data using instrumentation of the Dropbox operational
environment (discussed in Section 3.4).
Experiment design. MTurk allows custom-designed human-intelligence tasks
(HITs) to be submitted to workers over the web. We created a password-typing
HIT that asks a worker to type k passwords within a given time limit. Inside a
HIT, every password needs to be typed within a conventional HTML password-type
input box, i.e., each typed character shows up as a dot. Copy-paste functionality is
disabled in the input boxes using the html “onpaste=false oncopy=false”
option. This check can be circumvented by changing the browser settings, but
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we recorded all key presses inside an input box and used this to help filter out
copy-paste attempts. We did not find any circumvention in the collected data.
Our MTurk experiment design mainly aims at gathering data efficiently to
identify common typos and trends. We note that the typos found in transcribing
passwords in MTurk may not be truly representative of the typos users make when
typing their own passwords. Performing a longitudinal study using MTurk where
users retype their chosen password multiple times would be interesting, but it
would be logistically complicated and would greatly slow the data collection rates
while still not providing real ecological validity [92]. The reasons for experimenting
in MTurk is that prospecting for common typos in a real operational environment,
such as Dropbox’s, would seem to require storing information about plaintext
passwords in between logins, which could represent a significant security problem.
Thus we adopt the two-phase investigative approach. First prospecting for common
typos via MTurk and, given a list of such typos, presenting a measurement of real-
world Dropbox user typos later in the chapter.
In our MTurk experiments we ask workers to type the passwords which are
sourced from the RockYou password leak [81]. This data set is the largest plain-
text password leak to date, with passwords from over 32 million users. It has
been used widely for password-related studies and the distribution of passwords
is similar to other leaks. The data set contains a number of passwords that may
be objectionable to some people (e.g., many popular passwords are based on pro-
fanities from a wide number of languages). Instead of removing these passwords,
which would bias the study, we used the MTurk mechanism of indicating that
there may be vulgar content in the HITs. This restricts the HITs to be used only
by adult workers as well as providing a warning to them about the potential for
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objectionable content. We also removed all passwords of length greater than 25,
as these are (by manual inspection) not user-selected passwords.
Amazon allows the HIT creator to specify the required qualification and loca-
tion of the worker. We allowed workers with more than 10% acceptance rate2 and
that were located in countries whose official language is English.
None of the data we recorded contains personally identifying information. We
nevertheless submitted our experiment designs to our institutional review board
and received an IRB exemption.
3.3.1 Measured Typo Rates
We sampled 100,000 passwords randomly with replacement according to the em-
pirical probability distribution of RockYou passwords of length 6 or more. (The
length requirement matches the Dropbox policy for passwords, as discussed in the
next section.) By sampling with replacement, this means we match the expected
distribution of submitted passwords a web service might see across their entire user
base (e.g., the password “123456” appears frequently). We split the sample into
HITs, ensuring that none of the HITs contain more than 180 characters in total.
(This approximately normalizes the amount of typing effort of a single HIT.) Each
MTurk worker is given 300 seconds to type all the passwords in the HIT. The
number of passwords in a HIT ranges between 16 to 22. To ensure a broad pool of
users, a worker is only allowed to submit a maximum of 3 HITs. To impose this
restriction, we used a third-party JavaScript function provided by a website called
2Acceptance rate in MTurk paradigm means the percentage of HITs, that the worker has
submitted, have been accepted by the requester of the work. This is an eligibility filter provided
by MTurk.
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Unique Turker [93]. In addition to the submitted passwords, we collected the user
agent string of the browser from which the worker submitted the job, and all the
key presses (and their timestamps) inside the input boxes within the HIT.
A total of 4,362 workers participated in our study. Several passwords were not
typed at all (e.g., the worker accidentally submitted the HIT before typing all the
passwords), and sometimes the wrong password was entered (e.g., when prompted
“123456” the user entered “password”).
Sanitization. We sanitize the received data first, by removing the submissions
where either no password was typed or typed passwords have a case-independent
edit distance of five or more from the prompted password. This excluded 226 of
the password samples. Here and throughout this section edit distance includes
insertions, deletions, and substitutions each as unit cost.
Preliminary analysis of the remaining data revealed that a large fraction of
errors were caused by accidental pressing of the caps-lock key. Looking at the
data, it was clear that in many cases workers had caps lock on for a large number
of contiguous entries. We therefore sanitized our data with a heuristic to figure
out improper propagation of caps-lock errors across multiple entries. The details
are given in Appendix B.2.
After sanitization, there were in total 4,364 incorrect submissions across 97,632
valid submissions (4.5%). There were 81,595 unique passwords among the sani-
tized submissions, and 5.5% of all unique passwords were mistyped at least once.
Because we instrumented all key presses, we could see when users corrected entries
before submission. An additional 8.2% of submissions were first incorrectly typed
by the workers, but corrected before submission. In total, we found that 42% of the
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workers made at least one typo across all their submissions, while 1.6% submitted
more than four mistyped passwords in their submissions.
From now on our analyses are based on the submitted passwords unless other-
wise specified. We include duplicate passwords in our analyses because they reflect
the distribution of passwords a provider would see.
The data resulting from the MTurk measurements suggest that there is some
correlation between typo likelihood and password complexity under various mea-
sures such as length and lexical diversity. As this is not our main focus we defer
discussion to Appendix B.3.
3.3.2 The Nature of Typos
We now analyze the nature of typos made by the MTurk workers. First, we look at
typos based on the edit distance between the mistyped password and the correct
password. For 86% of incorrectly typed passwords, if we normalize the cases of
alphabetic characters, the edit distance between the submission and the correct
password was one. This suggests most password typos are relatively simple.
To obtain better clarity on the kinds of typos made, we analyze typographical
errors on a representation of strings that accounts for the keys that must be pressed
while entering it. This allows us in particular to highlight the role of capitalization
errors due to shift and caps-lock mistakes during password entry.
The key-press representation of a string is defined as follows. First, recall that
our standard alphabet includes upper- and lower-case letters, numbers, symbols,
and the space character. We define a key-press alphabet that includes only the
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keys on a standard US keyboard: lower-case letters, numbers, symbols that can be
entered without shift (such as the period), the caps-lock key denoted by 〈c〉, and
either shift key represented by 〈s〉. Then, we convert each password and submitted
string from the MTurk study to a key-press string by replacing characters omitted
from the key-press alphabet by appropriate combinations of 〈s〉 or 〈c〉 tokens and
tokens for keys in the key-press alphabet. We heuristically assume any sequence
of 3 or more capital letters was entered using caps lock and singleton or doubles
using a shift key. So for example, the string “Password” would be converted to the
string “〈s〉-p-a-s-s-w-o-r-d” over our new alphabet, and likewise “ABC12!@” would
be converted to “〈c〉-a-b-c-〈c〉-1-2-3-〈s〉-1-〈s〉-2”. As seen in this last example, in
our conversion we insert a 〈s〉 token for each character modified by it (despite the
fact that the user may hold it down for the duration).
To gain insight into what kinds of typos the workers made, we constructed
a confusion matrix in which rows represent the true keys that should have been
pressed, and columns represent the keys that were actually pressed. We filled this
matrix in the following way. For each pair of prompted password and submitted
string, we find an optimal alignment of the corresponding key presses that mini-
mizes the total cost of the edit operations. We can extract an optimal alignment in
the process of computing the minimum edit distance using a dynamic programming
algorithm approach proposed in [94]. We then counted the frequency of c → c′
pairs, where c is the key in the given password and c′ is the key which is typed.
We allowed c to take on a placeholder value [ins] signifying when c′ was inserted
into a password, and c′ to take on a placeholder value [del] to denote that c was
deleted from a password. We omitted the case c = c′ from our tabulation, as it
represents no typographical error.
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For example, consider if the prompted password was the string “Password”, (or
“〈s〉-p-a-s-s-w-o-r-d” in key-press representation) and the study participant sub-
mitted the string “passw0rd1” (or “p-a-s-s-w-0-r-d-1” in key-press representation).
Our algorithm would increment the counts for 〈s〉 → [del], o → 0, and [ins] → 1.
The corresponding typos are: forgetting 〈s〉 to capitalize the first letter, changing
an ‘o’ to ‘0’, and adding a (spurious) ‘1’ at the end.
The histogram resulting from doing this for all submitted passwords is shown
as a heatmap in Figure 3.1. Darker colors signify higher counts. The keys are
sorted according to a standard US keyboard layout.
Several common typographical errors stand out:
• Insertion and deletion of shift and caps-lock keys : In the right bottom corner
appears a dark patch of 3×3 squares. This reflects the frequency of erroneous use
or lack of use of shift and caps lock—equivalently, incorrect insertion or deletion
of the 〈s〉 and 〈c〉 tokens. These typos will switch the case of the password if it
contains English letters as well as changing the shift status of digits and symbols
(e.g., 4→ $).
• Keyboard proximity errors : The slightly darker cells near the diagonal represent
typos due to mistakenly pressing a neighboring key to the left or right of the
intended key. We found more generally that there are a significant number of
typos for which a key is replaced by an adjacent one (left, right, above, or below).
We collectively refer to these as proximity errors.
• Number-to-number errors : We see a square cluster of moderately high-frequency
errors in the top left that represent digit-to-digit typos. Some of these are
proximity errors, but many such errors confuse widely separated numbers, e.g.,
3→ 9.
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Figure 3.1: Heatmap showing the counts of edits that arose in computing edit distance
from the key-press sequence of the submitted passwords to the key-press sequence of
the prompted passwords. The color in row c and column c′ indicates how often the edit
c → c′ was observed across all distance calculations. The darker the color the higher
the count. Labels [ins] and [del] denote insertion (character mistakenly inserted) and
deletion (failure to type a character). Tokens , 〈s〉, and 〈c〉 respectively denote the and
space-bar, shift, and caps lock.
• Insertions and deletions : There are throughout a large number of insertion
(third row from the bottom) and deletion (third column from the right) errors.
Deletions are slightly more common.
• Transcription errors : The heatmap has sporadic dark cells, including
(l,1), (o,0), (0,o), (l,i). These represent transcription errors due to a worker
confusing similar-looking characters. We presume that the prevalence of read-
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ing errors are an artifact of the experiment design, and will be less frequent for
entry of memorized passwords. Nevertheless, such errors could arise for users
that write down their passwords to remember them.
Our analysis suggests that a large fraction of common typos fall into a few classes.
A subset of these are what we refer to as “easily correctable,” as we discuss shortly.
3.3.3 Touchscreen Keyboards
We performed a smaller, but similar, study in which workers were required to use
touchscreen keyboards. The hypothesis here is that the distribution of typos may
differ due to keyboard type. We submitted 24,000 passwords drawn from RockYou
across 1,987 HITs using the same methodology of approximately normalizing effort
by restricting total character counts to be less than 110. Workers were given 300
seconds to perform a HIT. We restricted workers to using touchscreen keyboards
by checking the user-agent string of the worker’s browser.
Unlike the desktop user experiment earlier in this section, we did not need to
adjust for the caps lock propagation error on touchscreen devices. This was because
of the fact that in touch screen devices the caps lock key is auto reset every time the
focus shifts from one input field to the other. We performed an analysis that was
otherwise similar to the analysis used above for the general MTurk experiment. To
calculate proximity errors, we used the Android keyboard layout, which we believe
is a sufficiently good proxy for all touch screen keyboards.
The probability of a typo here was 9.0%, an increase over the 4.5% for unre-





Case of all letters flipped swc-all 10.9 8.3
Case of first letter flipped swc-first 4.5 4.7
Added extra character to end rm-last 4.6 0.9
Added extra character to front rm-first 1.3 0.5
Missed shift for symbol at end n2s-last 0.2 0.1
Proximity errors n/a 21.8 29.6
Transcription errors n/a 3.0 3.3
Other errors n/a 53.6 52.7
Figure 3.2: The top categories of typos observed in our MTurk experiments. The “Cor-
rector” column identifies an (easily applied) function that corrects the typo. The “Any”
column is percentage of typos by category for the initial MTurk study in which work-
ers could have used any browser. Of 97,632 passwords drawn from RockYou, 4,364
were mistyped. The “Mobile” column is the same for the 23,098 submitted passwords
collected from devices with mobile browsers. Of these, 2,075 had a typo.
3.3.4 Easily-Correctable Typo Classes and Correctors
Using all the data above we manually enumerate a set of common typo types, or
classes. The resulting classes are detailed in Figure 3.2, and shown for both the
first general MTurk experiment and the touchscreen-restricted experiment. The
column labeled “Corrector” identifies the function that can be used to correct
the corresponding typos: swc-all switches the case of all letters in a password,
swc-first switches the case of the first letter, rm-last removes the last character,
rm-first removes the first character, and n2s-last changes the last character to its
equivalent character under the shift-key modifier (e.g., ‘1’ becomes ‘!’, ‘a’ becomes
‘A’, etc.). The correctors mentioned above are mutually exclusive, that is, any
two correctors, when applied to an input password of length larger than one,
will produce two different passwords (assuming at least one of the correctors is
applicable).
As can be seen, the distribution of typos is non-uniform. A few typo classes
account for a large proportion of mistakes made. Caps-lock errors alone represent
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9.2% of all mistakes made in our general MTurk experiments, and proximity errors
for another 21.8% of all mistakes. For mobile, we see a proportionally larger
number of keyboard proximity typos.
If a class of typo has a uniquely determined associated corrector, we refer to it
as easily correctable. The typo that produces a flipped case in the first letter is an
example: The corresponding corrector just flips the case of the first letter. Not all
easily correctable typos have involutory correctors (the typo and corrector are the
same function): consider the case of adding a character to the end of a password
which is corrected by removing a character.
In contrast to easily correctable typos, a proximity error is hard to correct.
Given a password with a proximity error, correction would require identification of
the erroneous character as well as identification of the nearby character that was
the original, true one. Thus the space of possible correctors for a proximity error is
generally large. As we shall see later, both security and performance are adversely
impacted by searching large spaces of correctors.
Our exploration culminates in the following two key results: (1) Some typos
are significantly more common than others and (2) Many common typos are easily
correctable. In the next section, we report on experiments at Dropbox that verify
that common, easily correctable typos arise frequently in practice.
3.4 Experiments at Dropbox
Our Mechanical Turk experiments in the last section show that there exists a
small set of frequently observed typos. Those experiments, which asked users to
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type in passwords provided to them, may not simulate the kinds of typos users
make when using their own passwords. We therefore turn to investigating typos
in the production password authentication environment used at Dropbox. We
will also assess the impact of typos on user experience. We emphasize that our
experiments here did not change the effective login checks at Dropbox, but only
recorded information about the frequency of typos.
The Dropbox authentication system. Dropbox is a file hosting service for
consumers and enterprises with hundreds of millions of users. Each user must se-
lect a password during registration. Dropbox uses zxcvbn [95], a password strength
estimator, to guide the user in choosing a strong password. The system requires
that users choose a password of at least six characters, but it does not explicitly
forbid users from choosing passwords that are considered to be weak by zxcvbn.
Passwords are submitted over a standard HTTPS POST interface when logging
in via the website or from within one of the native Dropbox applications. We call
the submission of a password by a user a password submission. If the password is
accepted by the Dropbox server, we call it a successful password submission, oth-
erwise it is called a failed password submission. On a failed password submission,
the user may resubmit his/her password. A login attempt is a sequence of password
submissions by a user that either culminates in a successful login, in which case the
login attempt is considered successful, or accumulates login failures until the study
ends. If the user does not succeed in logging in during the scope of our study, we
consider her sequence of password submissions to be a failed login attempt.
Dropbox, like most modern web companies, uses a number of fraud detection
mechanisms in order to filter out spurious login attempts even before checking
the password. An example of such fraud detection mechanisms is to refuse login
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attempts from IP addresses that appear on a blacklist for known bots. While some
spurious login submissions may make it through these filtering mechanisms, we
assume for simplicity below that our instrumentation is only monitoring legitimate
login attempts. Note that this is a conservative assumption: if the data we collected
contains illegitimate login attempts, then the true rate of correctable typos for
legitimate users would be even higher. Our security analyses (Section 4.5) will not
make such assumptions.
Instrumentation. We modified the Dropbox password checking code to per-
form additional checks on all legitimate login attempts on the web interface. This
provided a vast amount of data, and it eliminated biases that could arise from
selecting some small percentage of accounts. This also made visible multiple pass-
word submissions from a single user, which was necessary for timing re-tries.
During the period of measurement, every password submission was processed
as follows. If the password check passed, do nothing. Otherwise, if it failed,
apply one or more typo corrections from some predefined corrector function set
C = {f1, f2, . . . , fc} where corrector functions were defined in the last section. We
used slightly different sets of correctors in different experiments, as discussed below.
One or more of the corrected version(s) of the password are checked. For failed
login attempts, a log entry was generated that contained a time stamp, whether
login would have been successful with a correction of the password, the type of
correction fi that was successful (if applicable), and the user agent string.
We emphasize that in our experiments login is not allowed based on the cor-
rected passwords. We did not modify Dropbox’s effective login checks; we only
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collected the data needed to evaluate whether doing so would be beneficial.
Typos and login failure rates. In an initial experiment we set out to mea-
sure the incidence rate of the top five corrections seen in the MTurk study of
Section 4.6.1. Thus for this experiment the set of corrector functions is Ctop5 =
{swc-all, swc-first, rm-last, rm-first, n2s-last}. For each instrumented failed password
submission, one correction from Ctop5 was chosen uniformly at random and applied
to the submitted password. The reason is that, in the current implementation,
only sequential code is easily supported, and the password hashing scheme used
at Dropbox is (by design) slow to compute. It was unclear a priori exactly what
overhead the additional checks would have on Dropbox infrastructure, and so we
conservatively only performed one additional check at a time. The success of this
initial experiment suggested the performance impact was low, and later experi-
ments applied multiple corrections (see below). We collected information over a
24-hour period.
We cannot report on the exact number of login attempts during this period, as
this is considered confidential information by Dropbox. We will therefore report
only rates of success and failure. In the following, we let cf denote the number of
times a corrector f was applied to an incorrect password during an experiment. We
let rf be the number of times f successfully corrected an incorrect password during
the experiment. The ratio rf/cf gives the percentage of login failures correctable
by f .
Figure 3.3 reports the measured ratios rf/cf for each corrector in Ctop5 in during
the 24-hour period. This reveals that 9.3% of failures are due to typos correctable
by Ctop5, suggesting that typos indeed account for a significant number of failed
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Figure 3.3: The fraction of failed logins correctable by Ctop5 in a 24-hour study at
Dropbox.



























(a) Performance of Ctop5 on mobile ver-
sus desktop. For each corrector in Ctop5
we plot the fraction of failures for each
































(b) CDF of time delay (in seconds) be-
tween the first failed login due to a typo
and first successful login. Included are
only users that had a failed login at-
tempt and later a successful one.
Figure 3.4: Results from the data collected by instrumenting Dropbox account.
(legitimate) password submissions3. By correction type, we see that the most
common correction (switching the case of the first character) accounts for 60%
of these, and the first three (switching the case of all characters, just the first
character, dropping the last character) account for over 90% of these. Apparently
capitalization errors are a significant source of errors, which provides evidence for
why Facebook accepts these typos.
Some disparity with the MTurk results is apparent. While the top three of
3We can add the fractions of typos because our correctors are mutually exclusive.
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these five correctors are the same, the ordering is distinct, with caps-lock errors
proportionally higher in MTurk then here. We believe this is due to the MTurk
experiment design, and that the Dropbox numbers more accurately reflect rates in
operational environments.
While collecting this data, we recorded the user agent for all password submis-
sions, so we were able to analyze the performance of typo correction on mobile
platforms versus desktop platforms. We found that the estimated correction rate
for mobile was slightly higher at 10.5%, compared to 9.3% for desktop (calculated
here with the denominator being the number of rejected password submissions for
mobile and desktop, respectively). We show, in Figure 3.4a, the estimated cor-
rection rates for each user agent broken down by corrector function. We see that
n2s-last is a significantly more effective correction on mobile, which may be because
mobile keyboards require switching to an alternate keyboard to reveal symbols. We
also see that swc-all is a more effective correction on desktop, most likely because
it’s easier to leave caps lock enabled on conventional keyboards.4 This dichotomy
suggests the potential merit of applying different correction policies on the server
based on the user agent. We leave the further analysis of this for future work.
Utility of the top three corrections. We perform a second study that restricts
attention to just the overall top three correctors Ctop3 = {swc-all, swc-first, rm-last}
observed in the previous study (and, in turn, the MTurk experiments). For this
experiment, the instrumentation applied all three correctors to any password that
failed to exactly match the registered password. So, now cf is the number of failed
login attempts for every f ∈ Ctop3. As before, we recorded data for 24 hours.
4On Android devices, enabling caps lock requires pressing and holding the shift button, and
on iPhone devices one has to double press the shift button to enable caps lock.
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We additionally recorded the time duration for a login attempt to succeed. That
is the time lag between the first failed submission and the first successful submission
by each user in this 24-hour period. (Because Dropbox uses session cookies most
users typically need to successfully login only once per 24-hour period.) This
allowed us to quantify the time delay between failures and successes, a measure of
how much utility is lost due to usability issues such as typos.
As we would expect, the success rate of corrections closely matched the re-
sults of the previous 24-hour experiment. Specifically, typos correctable by Ctop3
accounted for 9% of failed password submissions. This also attests the stability of
these percentages over time.
We show in Figure 3.4b a CDF of the delay in logging in over all users who
eventually succeeded at logging in (within the 24-hour period). Note that some
small fraction of users did not log in for a very long time, suggesting they gave up
and came back hours later. Even so, almost 20% of users that experienced a failed
login would have been logged in a minute earlier should typo-tolerant checking
have been enabled. Aggregated across all failed login attempts, typo-tolerance
here would have increased logged in time by several person-months just for this
24-hour experiment. This represents a significant impact on user experience and a
clear pain point for companies keen on making it easy for their users to log in.
In aggregate, of all users who attempted to log into Dropbox within the 24-
hour measurement period, we discovered that 3% were turned away even though
at least one of their submitted passwords was correctable by one of the correctors
in Ctop3. This also represents a significant impact on user experience, with users
being prevented from using the service.
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3.5 Typo-tolerant Checking Schemes
In previous sections, we saw that typos account for a large fraction of login failures
and that a simple set of typo corrector functions could significantly improve user
experience. A natural follow-on question is whether we can achieve typo-tolerance
in password authentication systems without a significant security loss. We address
that question here.
We will show, by introducing what we call the “free corrections theorem,”
that for all natural settings there exist typo-tolerant checking schemes that correct
typos with no security loss relative to exact checking for optimal attackers that
(unrealistically) have exact knowledge of the distribution of passwords. We will
also specify the optimality of the scheme underlying this theorem, i.e., showing
that it achieves the maximum utility possible with no security loss.
We will define the notion of a “natural” setting formally below. Intuitively, it
corresponds to the highly non-uniform, sparse (in the space of all strings) pass-
words chosen in practice. The schemes we analyze formally are not readily applied
as is in practice because, among other things, they require exact knowledge of
password and typo distributions. Nevertheless, combing our measurement stud-
ies with a theoretical perspective guides us towards the design of several concrete
typo-tolerant checking schemes for which we give empirical security estimates in
Section 4.5.
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3.5.1 Password and Typo Settings
Let S be a set of all possible strings that could be chosen as passwords, e.g., ASCII
strings up to some maximum length. We associate to S a distribution p that models
the probability of user selection of passwords; thus p(w) is the probability that some
user selects a given string w ∈ S as a password. We let P ⊆ S be the set of possible
passwords, which is formally just the support of p. We write p(P ) to denote the
aggregate probability on a set P ⊆ S of strings. Following prior work (c.f., [7]),
this model assumes for simplicity that the distribution of passwords is independent
of the user selecting them, and that passwords are independently drawn from p.
A key feature of our formalization approach is that we do not appeal to a spe-
cific lexicographic notion of distance (e.g., Levenshtein distance) to model typos.
Instead, we directly model typos as probabilistic changes to strings. Specifically,
let τw(w˜) denote the probability that upon authenticating, a user with password
w types the string w˜. Thus τ is a family of distributions over S, one distribution
for each w ∈ P . If w˜ , w then w˜ is a typo; τw(w) is the probability that the user
makes no typo. Note that w˜ may or may not itself be a password possibly chosen
by a user, i.e., it may not be in P . We say that w˜ is a neighbor of w if τw(w˜) > 0.
For all w ∈ P , then, τw(·) defines a probability space over S. That is, τw(w˜) ∈
[0, 1] for any w˜ and
∑
w˜∈S τw(w˜) = 1. In practice, generally τw(w) > 0, i.e., users
will sometimes enter passwords correctly. Also, it will most often be the case that
τw(w˜) , τw˜(w) for w , w˜. For example, a user may mistype her password w =
“unlockme1” as w˜ =“unlockme” as a result of accidentally dropping the last 1,
while a user whose password is w˜ =“unlockme” is less likely to type a 1 at the end
of his password.
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In our model we assume that typos depend only on a user’s password w and
not, for example, on the user that typed them, the time of day, or other factors. As
we will see, this assumption simplifies operationalization of typo tolerance models.
As one example, modeling individual users’ typo habits would require a server
to record the user’s typo history. While higher-accuracy correction for the user
might then be possible, this feature would, of course, result in a more complex
system. It could also leak password information: recording the fact that a user
fails to capitalize the first character in her password leaks the fact that character
is a letter. From now on, a password and typo setting, or simply setting, is a pair
(p, τ ).
3.5.2 Password checkers
A password checker scheme consists of two algorithms:
 Reg is a randomized password registration algorithm. It takes as input a
password w and outputs a string s that may, for example, be the output of a
password hashing scheme like scrypt. These are randomized since one must
choose a random salt value for each registration.
 Chk is a (possibly randomized) password verification algorithm. It takes as
input a string w˜ and a stored string s, and outputs a Boolean value, either
true or false.
In a modern, real-world service such as Dropbox, Chk is one input in a complex
authentication system that combines multiple contextual, potentially probabilistic
signals to make an authentication decision. A typo-tolerant checker could return a
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probabilistic estimate and/or combine with other contextual signals, but we focus
our analysis only on deterministic checkers. Our techniques extend in natural ways
to confidence values (e.g., by returning an estimate of τw(w˜)). In such a scenario,
the security impact of a typo-tolerant Chk will be even lower. We also consider
only complete checkers, meaning that for all w, Chk(w,Reg(w))⇒ true.
An exact checker is one which never outputs true if w˜ , w. In practice of course,
exact checkers actually have a non-zero, but cryptographically small probability of
false acceptance (for typical hash-function-based checkers, this small probability is
equal to the probability of having found a collision in the hash function). We will
throughout ignore this false acceptance probability. We will use ExChk to denote
some secure exact checker, and assume the existence of one compatible with all
password settings of interest.
Typo-tolerant checkers. We will focus our attention on building typo-tolerant
checkers that relax the checks made by an existing exact checker construction.
Let Reg, ExChk be the algorithms of an exact checker. Then an associated relaxed
checker has the same registration algorithm, but a different checking algorithm
Chk , ExChk. Specifically, our approach will be to design relaxed checkers that
enumerate some number of strings as candidates for the password and checks each
with an exact checker.5 The ball of a submitted string w˜ is the set B(w˜) ⊆ S of
checked strings.
If balls are well constructed, the hope is that it often happens that when the
user makes a typo, the true password w lies in the ball around the user submitted
string w˜, and thus the typo can be corrected.
5We note that this can be viewed simply as the standard brute-force construction of an error
correction code from an error detection code.
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Relaxing an exact checker is a desirable approach to typo-tolerance for two
main reasons. The first is legacy compatibility. Modifying a system to become
typo-tolerant just requires deploying a new checking algorithm that works with
previously registered passwords. For example, registration may use a password
hashing scheme like scrypt [96] or argon2 [97], or a password onion construction
that combines password hashing with an off-system crypto service [80].
Second, relaxed checking offers no security loss against oﬄine, brute-force at-
tacks when the exact checker has, underlying it, a secure hash function. A com-
promise of the system or leak of the password hash database gives an attacker the
registered string s, just as in the case of the exact checking system. When s is
computed by applying a secure password hashing algorithm (e.g., [35, 96, 97]), an
oﬄine attacker’s goal is to perform brute-force attacks to recover a password. Here
one may worry that the attacker’s goal is easier as it requires simply inverting s
to a point that is in the ball of the target password, but for secure hash functions
nothing will be revealed about the target password by s until the target password
is found exactly. Thus, for a given user account, either an adversary: (1) Cracks
a password hash and submits the correct password, in which case she obtains no
advantage in an online attack from typo-tolerance or (2) Fails to crack a password
hash, in which case she gains no benefit from her oﬄine attack in mounting an
online attack. Of course, should the typo-tolerant Chk algorithm be very com-
plex to implement, it might increase the likelihood of software implementation
vulnerabilities. For this reason, we consider simple-to-implement relaxed checkers.
Security degradation in a relaxed checker may still arise in online attacks. A
poorly conceived relaxed checking system could diminish system security against















i← i + 1
b← Chk(w˜, s)
If (b = true) and
(i ≤ q) then
win← true
Ret b
Figure 3.5: (Left) Experiment for defining acceptance utility for a checking scheme
Reg,Chk. (Right) Security game for online guessing attacks against a checking scheme
Reg,Chk in whichAmay make q calls to its oracle Check. Both experiments are implicitly
parameterized by a password and typo setting (p, τ ).
Before doing so, we note that relaxing an exact checker does circumscribe the
space of possible checker designs. In particular, the size of a feasibly searchable
ball B(w˜) is necessarily somewhat small: ExChk is designed to be computationally
expensive to thwart oﬄine brute-force guessing attacks, and relaxed checking in-
volves running it for each string in B(w˜). Our measurement results in the prior
sections show that even for balls of size three or four, however, significant utility
improvements are possible.
Acceptance utility. We measure utility of a relaxed checker by the probability
that the checker outputs true for entered passwords even when the submitted string
is a typo of the true password. Formally, the acceptance utility is defined to be
Utility(Chk) = Pr[ACC(Chk) ⇒ true], where the event captures the probability that
the experiment of Figure 3.5 outputs true. There ←p means sampling from the set
according to p, and ←w means sampling from the set according to τw. The game
is (implicitly) parameterized by the registration algorithms and the distribution
pair (p, τ ), and models a user’s choice of password and first attempt to enter it.
The acceptance utility of an exact checker is Utility(ExChk) = E [ τw(w) ] where
the expectation is over w←p P . For any non-trivial distribution τ , i.e., assuming
a non-zero typo probability for some password, Utility(ExChk) < 1.
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3.5.3 Security definitions
As discussed above, since we focus on relaxed checkers, attacks due to compromise
of an authentication server are not affected by a shift to typo-tolerance. The
critical question is the effect of typo-tolerance on online guessing attacks.
Let us precisely define the notion of an online attack. In Figure 3.5 we give a
simple guessing game played between an adversary A and a checker. The game
GUESS is implicitly parameterized by p and the checker Reg,Chk. The success
rate of the adversary A in guessing the password is measured as AdvChk,A, q) =
Pr[GUESS(Chk,A, q)⇒ true]. This security game models a vertical attack, where
the attacker tries to compromise a randomly chosen user account; changing this
security game to model horizontal attacks is straightforward and our results extend
to this setting as well.
Measuring security by this definition is quite conservative because it ignores the
many countermeasures used in practice to thwart online guessing attacks. Most
companies implement anomaly detection mechanisms that would, for example,
block attackers that query too quickly, that use a known cracking tool or pass-
word leak to generate guesses, or that mount attacks from suspicious-looking IP
addresses (those in the wrong country or on a botnet blacklist). Thus our evalu-
ations here and in the remainder of the chapter should be considered pessimistic
upper bounds on true success rates.
Optimal and greedy attacks. Let w1, w2, . . . be a non-increasing order on
passwords by probability, i.e., p(w1) ≥ p(w2) ≥ p(w3) ≥ . . .. If a checker ExChk is
exact, then Adv(ExChk,A, q) ≤ λq for any A making at most q queries and where
λq =
∑q
i=1 p(wi). Often λq is called the q-success rate. It was first defined as a
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measure of the unpredictability of a password distribution by Boztas [98].
Now consider a relaxed, deterministic checker. Let B(w˜) be the ball of a string
w˜ for a checker Chk, which is the set of all passwords for which Chk will accept w˜.
In submitting a guess w˜, an attacker induces checking on all of the strings in B(w˜).
The adversary knows the design of the checker and so too can determine what ball
will be associated with any given string submitted to the checking oracle.




The dependence of λfuzzyq on Chk is left implicit in our notation but will be clear from
context later. For q = 1, λfuzzy1 = argmaxw˜∈P p(B(w˜)). An optimal attacker simply
guesses the password w˜ whose ball has the highest aggregate probability. This
guessing strategy is analogous, in an exact-checking setting, simply to guessing
the most probable password w1. We observe that λ
fuzzy
1 as defined here coincides
conceptually with the fuzzy min-entropy notion of Fuller et al. [99], hence the fuzzy
superscript in λfuzzyq .
It turns out that implementing an optimal attack is, in general, NP-hard: find-
ing the optimal set of queries is an instance of the weighted max cover problem.
The formal reduction is shown in Appendix B.5. This is good news for security:
it means that attackers cannot in general compute the optimal queries to make.
That said, there exists a conceptually simple greedy algorithm that we now give.
Consider the following greedy adversary A∗. At each step, it guesses the pass-
word w˜ whose residual ball B(w˜) has the highest aggregate probability. This ball
is the one that maximizes p(B(w˜) ∩ P ), where P is the set of residual passwords,
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those not yet checked by Chk as a result of previous adversarial queries.
More precisely, A∗ does the following. Initialize a set P = P of possible
passwords. Then repeat the following q times. Guess a string w˜ that maxi-
mizes p(B(w˜) ∩ P ). If the query succeeds, then the game is won; otherwise
set P ← P \ B(w˜) and repeat. Let λgreedyq = Adv(Chk,A∗, q). As by the reduc-
tion of this problem to max cover we can claim using the classic result [100], that
λgreedyq ≥ (1−1/e)λfuzzyq . Furthermore, Feige [101] has shown that this performance
is indeed optimal, and no polynomial time approximation algorithm outperforms
the performance of greedy.
All this gives us a way to measure security of a relaxed checker given an estimate
of the password distribution p: simply compute λgreedyq for the threshold q on online
queries relevant to ones’ system. This gives one, in all likelihood, the best attacker
one will face in practice. One can also obtain a worst-case bound of λfuzzyq by the
formula above.
Computing even λgreedyq in the most obvious way—a naive execution of A∗—
has time complexity on the order of |S| times the average ball size, and so will
generally itself be intractable. We propose an alternative approach to restrict the
search space and allow one to compute λgreedyq for relevant q efficiently. The details
appear in Appendix B.5.
Security loss. The above gives us a way to bound absolute security, but our
concern will primarily be the gap between the security of today’s current practice
of exact checkers and the security of relaxed versions of them. This clearly depends
on the password distribution and typo setting. We measure loss relative to the
greedy attacker by ∆greedyq = λ
greedy




q − λq. As λfuzzyq ≤ ee−1 ·λgreedyq , we can bound ∆q ≤ ee−1 ·∆greedyq + λqe−1 ≈
1.582∆greedyq + 0.582λq.
By definition, λfuzzyq ≥ λq, meaning that ∆q ∈ [0, 1). Moreover it holds that
λfuzzyq ≤ cλq for any tolerant checker that checks at most c strings for any input
string w˜, i.e., |B(w˜)| ≤ c for all w˜. This inequality is in fact an equality for some
settings. Consider when p is uniform over S and that Chk is such that |B(w˜)| = c
for all w˜. Then moving to the typo-tolerant checker will increase the probability
of success of the optimal online brute-force attacker by a factor of c. Formally,
λfuzzyq = cλq whenever q ≤ |S|/c.
This example seems to underlie the intuition for why typo-tolerance has been
criticized as a security issue [77, 79]. Indeed, it is tempting to conclude that typo
tolerance will always result in a factor c decrease in security. But this conclusion
is too hasty: p is not uniform in reality and, in particular, passwords with high
mass are sparse in the universe S. Sparsity matters since a high λfuzzyq depends
intimately on finding strings whose balls include many passwords with high mass
under p. In fact, we show next that for most natural settings one can actually
obtain no security loss relative to an exact checker.
3.5.4 Free corrections theorem
We would ideally like to have typo-tolerant checkers that enjoy free corrections.
This means that its security is equivalent to the security of an exact checker and
so ∆q = 0 for any reasonable q. It is easy to come up with artificial distributions
which admit free corrections of all typos. Specifically, a distribution for which no
password’s neighbor is in the ball of another password.
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Unfortunately, just as the uniform setting, the dense setting discussed above
is artificial, this completely sparse setting is also not realistic. For example, in
the RockYou password leak and taking Ctop5 as the set of corrections to apply,
one has significant overlap even among the top 50 passwords. We therefore ask:
for the password distributions seen in practice, can one achieve checkers with free
corrections? The answer is yes.
An optimal relaxed checker. We first give a construction of a relaxed
checker that achieves free corrections for any given set of corrector functions
C = {f0, f1, . . . , fc} one wants to consider, where f0(w˜) = w˜ is the identity function.
It achieves best-possible acceptance utility and no security loss relative to the best
possible attack, assuming the checker has exact knowledge of the distribution pair
(p,τ).
Fix some query budget q and recall that p(wq) is the probability mass of the
qth most probable password. Then let OpChk be the typo-tolerant checker that
works as follows. Upon input w˜, generate a list of candidate typo corrections
Bˆ(w˜) = {w′ |w′ ← fi(w˜), fi ∈ C, and p(w′) · τw′(w˜) > 0}. After this OpChk solves





p(w′) · τw′(w˜) /* Utility */
subject to p(w˜) > 0⇒ w˜ ∈ B, /* Completeness */
p(B) ≤ p(wq) or |B| = 1, /* Security */
and checks all the passwords in B using ExChk. We let B(w˜) denote the solution
of the optimization problem induced by the checker OpChk on input string w˜.
Observe that in addition to completeness, the constraints in the optimization
problem enforce the condition that p(B(w˜)) > p(wq) only if |B(w˜)| = 1. Thus,
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OpChk ensures that the only balls with aggregate probability exceeding p(wq) are
singletons (containing one high-probability password). The intuition here is that
if we never allow a query to cover more probability mass than that of the qth most
popular password, then adversary A∗ must select as its q queries the passwords
{w1, w2, . . . , wq}. As these passwords define singleton balls, it follows that A∗ will
achieve exactly the same success probability as it would for an exact checker, and
thus λfuzzyq = λq.
We now give theorem statements showing that OpChk is indeed optimal in
the sense that: (1) It achieves free corrections, meaning ∆q = 0 and, equivalently,
λfuzzyq = λq, for suitable q, and (2) Over all checkers with ∆q = 0, it achieves optimal
utility, i.e., the highest possible probability of correcting a typo. The proofs of the
following theorems appear in Appendix B.6.
Theorem 3.5.1 (Free Corrections Theorem) Fix some password distribution
p with support P, a typo distribution τ , 0 < q < |P| and an exact checker ExChk.
Then for OpChk with any set of correctors C, it holds that λfuzzyq = λq.
Theorem 3.5.2 (Optimality of OpChk) Fix q > 0, a distribution pair (p, τ ),
and a corrector set C. Define OpChk to work over C and let Chk work for a set of
correctors C ′ ⊆ C. If ∆q(Chk) = 0, then Utility(Chk) ≤ Utility(OpChk).
The free correction theorem applies with respect to an optimal attacker. We
caution that it does not imply that for any attacker there is no security loss. Rather
it is easy to give examples of password settings for which there exists some attack
that achieves a speed-up due to tolerance. This attack, whatever it may be, cannot
perform better than the optimal one. Finding good analogs to OpChk and the
104
free correction theorem for non-optimal attackers is an interesting, open research
problem. We empirically investigate in the next section the relative performance
of some non-optimal attacks, showing that these achieve no meaningful speed-up
due to typo tolerance.
3.6 Practical Typo-Tolerant Checkers and their Security
In the previous section, we presented an optimal checker OpChk that achieves the
maximum acceptance utility that is achievable with no loss in security (relative
to optimal attacker). Unfortunately, OpChk is hard in general to implement, as
it requires exact knowledge of the distribution pair (p, τ ), which is not practically
obtainable in most settings.
Here, we explore checkers that do not rely on exact distribution knowledge and
are simple to implement. The first tries all corrections in some checker set. The
latter two incorporate heuristics to try to avoid balls with high aggregate mass;
these are directly inspired by the results regarding OpChk. As we show experi-
mentally, our checkers can achieve high acceptance utility with minimal security
degradation, and the heuristics help reduce security loss even against adversaries
with exact knowledge of the probability distribution p. We also investigate the
security of these checkers against more realistic adversaries that must themselves
estimate the distribution p. For these adversaries our results here suggest that
typo tolerance does not really help adversaries at all because of the difficulty of
getting estimates right.
The tolerant checkers. For the following, let w˜ denote the input to the checker
and Bˆ(w˜) the ball of potential passwords to check as defined by the set of correctors
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C for the checker. Presented in increasing order of sophistication (and similarity
to OpChk), the checkers are:
• Check-always construction (Chk-All): This checker checks all passwords in Bˆ(w˜).
Among the three checkers presented here, it achieves the greatest acceptance
utility—and, conversely, the largest potential security degradation.
• Blacklist construction (Chk-wBL). This checker uses a blacklist L of (ostensibly
high-probability) passwords. It checks w˜ and every other password w ∈ Bˆ(w˜)
such that w < L. Blacklisting in Chk-wBL aims to prune or eliminate non-
singleton balls with high aggregate probability (as OpChk does). In our experi-
ments, we use for the blacklist the 1,000 most popular passwords in RockYou,
although one could use other blacklists as well, such as Twitter’s banned pass-
word list [102].6
• Approximately optimal construction (Chk-AOp). This checker heuristically ap-
proximates OpChk. It estimates the distribution p of passwords using the empir-
ical distribution of the RockYou password leak, and the distribution τ of typos
using the empirical distribution learned from our MTurk study (see Figure 3.2).
We denote these empirically derived distributions respectively by p˜ and τ˜ .
Chk-AOp computes B(w˜) using the constraints used by OpChk (see the last sec-
tion), but under the empirical distribution pair (p˜, τ˜ ), rather than the (generally
unknown) true distribution pair (p, τ ). We set q = 103 for our experiments with
Chk-AOp. We note that for the correction set sizes we consider, c ≤ 5, solv-
ing the optimization problem is fast, as only 2c possibilities for B(w˜) must be
considered.
We will investigate these checkers for typo correction sets Ctop2 = {swc-all, swc-first},
6We emphasize that the blacklist is only used for typo corrections: we do not assume users
are restricted from registering blacklisted passwords.
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Ctop3 = Ctop2 ∪ {rm-last} and Ctop5 = Ctop3 ∪ {rm-first, n2s-last}. In terms of utility,
we know from the second Dropbox study (Section 3.4) the improvements obtained
when using Chk-All with Ctop3. The other two constructions will obtain slightly less
utility due to the fact that some corrections will not be checked.
Our preliminary analysis, however, suggests that this utility reduction will be
slight: both strategies, by design, prevent corrections only to popular passwords,
which are rarely induced by typos in the first place (see Section 4.6.1). For exam-
ple, we can simulate acceptance utility for a given checker as defined in Section 3.5
by letting p be defined to be the RockYou empirical distribution and τ to be the
empirical frequencies of typo types observed. Then for Ctop3 we have that the black-
list and approximately optimal strategies only reduce utility by 0.03 percentage
points and 0.08 percentage points, respectively.7
Implementation considerations. The checkers above are all easy to implement,
but care must be taken to optimize performance and ensure timing attacks do not
arise. Generally, each checker should first run ExChk(w˜) since this must always
be computed. If that fails, then a constant-time check of the remainder of the
ball should be performed. This involves running ExChk for the maximum number
of checks that could occur for any w˜, i.e., |C|. If implemented in this manner,
timing and other side-channels will only potentially leak that a user made a typo,
but nothing else about their password. Users that correctly input their passwords
experience no performance degradation compared to existing systems.
If one instead does not use a constant time implementation, for example just
7The absolute acceptance utilities for Ctop3 in these simulations are 0.9628, 0.9625, and 0.9620.
But the low overall rate of typos in the MTurk experiments means that exact checking here
obtains 0.9564 acceptance utility already, which is significantly less than what is implied by our
Dropbox measurements.
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running a check for each string in B(w˜), then timing side channels will arise that
leak partial information about a user’s password. For example, checking a single-
ton ball (which is induced by some inputs and not other inputs for Chk-wBL and
Chk-AOp) would be faster than checking a ball with multiple passwords. Thus the
side-channel would reveal whether the user entered a high-probability password.
Security evaluation. In the remainder of this section we evaluate the security
of our schemes against two types of attacker:
(A) Exact-knowledge attackers: We start by evaluating security of the con-
structions in the face of attackers that (unrealistically) know the precise dis-
tribution from which passwords are drawn. We will use a range of simulated
password distributions and adversarial query budgets.
(B) Estimating attackers: We will then turn to more realistic attackers that do
not have exact knowledge of the password distribution. Our evaluations will
show that in this context an attacker attempting to take advantage of tolerant
checking, even when they know the precise checker, can be quite error-prone:
attackers can even do worse than naive approaches that just guess the most
probable passwords in order.
Our approach for these analyses will be to utilize different password leaks to simu-
late true password selection. We will use the RockYou, phpBB, and Myspace leaks
for these purposes. These leaks contain respectively the passwords of more than
32 million, 255,421, and 41,545 users of three different websites. Below when we
say the RockYou, phpBB, or Myspace distribution we mean sampling according
to the empirical distribution given by the indicated leak. Note that this means
for some analyses we will use RockYou both within the designs of Chk-wBL and
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Chk-AOp as well as to test those designs’ security, optimistically modeling that a
“best-case” estimate of the distribution is known to the checker. While we could
use a holdout set (sampled from RockYou without replacement, for example) to be
more realistic, we instead simply perform analyses using the independent Myspace
and phpBB data sets and report all of them for completeness.
3.6.1 Security against exact-knowledge attackers
We now evaluate the security of our constructions against attackers that have exact
knowledge of the password distribution. Thus in this section we assume that the
adversary knows not only the exact functioning of the checker being used (i.e., what
typos it corrects for any submitted password), but also the precise distribution of
passwords. The latter is a conservative assumption. Attackers in practice will lack
such knowledge and we are therefore measuring worst-case security from this point
of view.
We will focus on the greedy success rate increase λgreedyq − λq for various values
of the query budget q. We will also report on λq to put loss in context. To compute
these values, we use the RockYou, Myspace, and phpBB distributions as a stand-
ins to simulate a challenge distribution p. Since the optimal attacker is assumed
to know the distributions exactly, in the exact checking setting she will simply
guess the most probable q passwords. Here λq is straightforwardly computable
(just sum the probabilities of the top q passwords in the challenge distribution).
In the typo-tolerant settings, the attacker will construct a sequence of queries that
achieves λgreedyq using the algorithm given in Appendix B.5.
We start by comparing security for attackers given q = 1, 000 queries across the
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Challenge q = 10 q = 100 q = 1000
Dist. Set All wBL AOp Ex All wBL AOp Ex All wBL AOp Ex
RockYou





11.23Ctop3 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.56 0.14 0.00 1.41 0.86 0.00
Ctop5 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.63 0.18 0.00 1.57 0.87 0.00
phpBB





12.71Ctop3 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.28 0.04 0.01 1.01 0.60 0.42
Ctop5 0.20 0.03 0.01 0.31 0.05 0.02 1.13 0.72 0.47
Myspace





9.54Ctop3 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.62 0.46 0.32 2.46 2.21 1.59
Ctop5 0.27 0.15 0.04 0.87 0.68 0.52 3.00 2.66 1.94
Figure 3.6: Percentage improvements in an exact-knowledge adversary’s success
(λgreedyq − λq) for each setting (corrector strategy and correction set) and each of the
challenge distributions, for q ∈ {10, 100, 1000}.
various distributions, schemes, and corrector sets. We are here being conservative:
a query budget of 1,000 is very generous to an attacker, as many websites will lock
an account after tens of failed requests. Figure 3.6 reports the optimal success
probability λq against an exact checker for each setting, as well as the improvements
λgreedyq − λq for each typo tolerant checker, correction set pair. All numbers are
reported as percentages. The worst degradation occurs for correcting all top five
errors in the Myspace setting, where the attacker’s success probability increases
by 3% (from 9.5% to 12.5%). To put this worst-case in perspective, consider
the naive (and incorrect) assumption that seems to underlie the criticism of typo
tolerance [77]: it suggests instead a fivefold increase in attacker success when
correcting five errors and thus an increase to 47.5% in the Myspace setting.
Elsewhere the increase is much smaller. For example, with Rockyou, one can
always correct all top five errors with increase only 1.6%: an attacker’s probability
of success goes from 11.2% to 12.8%, a small improvement. This means that the
adversary’s first 1,000 guesses against a typo-tolerant checker do not benefit much
from high-probability balls.
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Moving from Ctop2 to Ctop3 can result in a relatively big jump in security loss.
The reason is that the rm-last typo corrector admits many higher-mass balls than
only correcting the considered capitalization errors. For example, adding a char-
acter to many popular passwords results in another popular password: password
and password1, abc123 and abc1234. Fewer such pairs exist for capitalization
errors since fewer users choose passwords with capital letters. Indeed in the worst
case for Ctop2 we see a just a 0.5% improvement in adversarial success compared
to the 2.42% worst-case jump for Ctop3. It is no coincidence, perhaps, that Face-
book’s policy seems to align with Chk-All for Ctop2. Our measurements are the first
reported validation of this policy.
Even though security loss is low for Chk-All, one may want to do better. The
blacklist and approximately optimal checkers help. When the challenge distri-
bution is RockYou the approximately optimal checker Chk-AOp is, in this case,
actually optimally secure by construction, hence it suffers no security loss at all.
Also note that Chk-wBL may benefit unduly by knowing exactly the top 1,000
passwords from RockYou. Thus the more important analyses are when tested on
independent distributions. Here we see some loss as one would expect given that
the attacker in these cases has, after all, more information about the challenge
distribution than the checker. But now the loss is small, and Chk-AOp reduces the
security loss compared to Chk-All by 0.53% on average over the Myspace and ph-
pBB settings. Chk-wBL also reduces loss compared to Chk-All by 0.27% on average
over Myspace and phpBB, but never improves security more than Chk-AOp.
We now turn to what happens as q varies. In Figure 3.6 shows the attack
success increases for the q = 10 and q = 100 cases. We note that the most realistic
in practice is q = 10, since companies often will raise alarms after 10 consecutive
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failed login attempts. Here we see that attackers benefit little from typo-tolerance,
and our Chk-AOp reduces loss to 0.04% or less. Often it is zero.
It is concievable that in some settings an attacker might be able to make more
than q = 1, 000 queries, which implies that our checker assumed too low of a bound
on q. We focus for simplicity on Ctop2, a choice we expect many deployments to
utilize, and show in Figure 3.7a the security loss using RockYou as the distribution
for a range of q ∈ {1, 100, 200, 300, . . . , 10,000}. We have drawn a vertical dotted
line at q = 1, 000, which was used by Chk-AOp as the expected query budget. As
before, Chk-AOp has no loss below q = 1, 000, and only after the attacker gets
more than 1,000 queries does the attacker obtain an improvement over the exact
checking case. Figure 3.7b shows the same type of chart but now for phpBB. This
distribution leads to security loss seeing big discrete jumps for larger q, suggesting
that at certain points the attacker can take advantage of new balls that just come
in to play as higher mass than individual passwords. A chart for Myspace would
exhibit similar trends as the one for phpBB, we omit it for the sake of brevity.
Observe that as q gets larger, the improvement λgreedyq − λq flattens out in
both charts. The attacker in the typo-tolerant cases runs out of heavily-weighted
balls to take advantage of and ends up just querying passwords that cover only one
(high-probability) guess. For RockYou, we see that the improvement is never more
than 1% and, for phpBB, never more than 0.8%. This all suggests that even as q
grows to values unlikely ever to arise in practice, typo-tolerance nevertheless does
not improve the attacker’s rate of success by much. We note that our blacklisting
and approximately optimal checkers can be made even more conservative should
one desire, by blacklisting more passwords or setting q larger, respectively.
As noted in the previous section, the greedy algorithm is known to provide
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(a) The security loss as a function of q
for challenge distribution RockYou and
Ctop2.























(b) Difference in exact-knowledge ad-
versary success against typo-tolerant
schemes and exact checking, as a func-
tion of q for challenge distribution ph-
pBB and Ctop2.
Figure 3.7: The security loss of typo-tolerant password checking with different values of
q for perfect knowledge attacker (3.7a) and imperfect knowledge attacker (3.7b).
a good approximation for the weighted max coverage problem. Given that the
password probabilities range over a very dense space, and our correction sets are
quite small, we expect λgreedyq ≈ λfuzzy. We do not have any theoretical proof for
this claim, and leave analysis as an important question for future work. We can of
course always bound the actual value of ∆q via ∆q ≤ 1.582∆greedyq +0.582λq. So, for
example with the RockYou challenge distribution, q = 10, and the Ctop5 corrector
set we have that ∆q ≤ 0.0153 as compared to λgreedyq − λq = 0.0063. We expect
this three-fold decrease in relative security to be quite pessimistic: the better the




distribution RockYou phpBB Myspace
ExChk
RockYou 11.23 3.21 9.34
phpBB 8.10 12.71 1.81
Myspace 3.57 3.32 9.54
Chk-All
RockYou +0.51 +0.28 +0.25
phpBB +0.25 +0.38 +0.11
Myspace -0.15 -0.02 +0.49
Chk-wBL
RockYou +0.32 +0.11 +0.20
phpBB +0.06 +0.19 +0.05
Myspace -0.26 -0.20 +0.46
Chk-AOp
RockYou 0.00 0.00 0.00
phpBB -0.11 +0.15 -0.04
Myspace -0.27 -0.14 +0.35
Figure 3.8: The top table shows the success rate of an attack against the exact checking
scheme for the attacker-estimated distribution (row) used against the challenge distri-
bution (column). The remaining tables show the difference between success rate of an
attacker against the tolerant scheme and the exact checking scheme, for the indicated
attacker-estimated and actual challenge distribution pairs. All values are in percentages.
3.6.2 Estimating attackers
We have so far considered attackers that have exact knowledge of the password
distribution (even when the system designer may not). In practice such attackers
do not exist, and instead adversaries must try to estimate the distribution of pass-
words. We refer to these as estimating attackers. As before, we assume adversaries
know the exact checking algorithm in use.
We started by considering an adversary that estimates the password distri-
bution using the Weir et al. probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG) [39], a
trained model of password distributions used to build effective crackers. However,
our experiments with this showed that it provides poor efficacy in online guess-
ing attacks, doing significantly worse than the approaches we describe below and,
importantly, it did equally poorly against the typo-tolerant checkers in all settings.
We therefore turn to a different adversarial strategy for estimating the password
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distribution. We measure the success rate of an attacker that uses one of the
password leaks as its estimate of the distribution. This is a typical strategy in
practice. We test these attacks against the other two distributions and for each of
the exact checking, Chk-All, Chk-wBL, and Chk-AOp. The latter three use Ctop2. The
security loss for all combinations are tabulated in Figure 3.8. (Note that the left-
to-right diagonals reflect some of the results already shown for the exact-knowledge
attacker in Figure 3.6.)
The improvement the attacker obtains when one switches to a tolerant checking
system is never greater than 0.28%. More interestingly, in some cases the difference
is negative, which means that the attacker did worse against the typo-tolerant
scheme. This may be counterintuitive, but here the estimates the attacker makes
about the distribution can often be wrong. This can lead her to choose a set of
guesses that maximizes the total success probability according to her estimate but
not according to the challenge distribution. We give an example for the curious
reader in Appendix B.7.
In summary, our simulations here suggest that a carefully designed typo-
tolerant checker will result in little to no security loss against realistic adversaries.
3.7 Conclusion
We presented the first treatment of typo-tolerant password authentication. We
demonstrated, with large-scale, real-world experiments, that password typos are
a real and common source of user errors in authentication systems. We found
that a few types of typo-corrections account for an overwhelming number of pass-
word typos. We provided a formal framework for exploring typo-tolerant password
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checkers, and focused on a class of them called relaxed checkers that are backwards-
compatible with existing password hashing schemes. We showed, via what we call
the free corrections theorem, that there exist relaxed checkers against which the
best attack performs no better than the best attack against an exact checker. Un-
fortunately the construction requires exact knowledge of the password distribution.
We therefore gave a number of practical typo-tolerant checkers inspired by it, and
analyzed their security empirically, showing that one can easily obtain significant
utility improvement with minimal or no security degradation.
In future work, we plan to investigate whether typo-tolerance will actually serve
to improve overall security. Because allowing for password typos increases login
success rates in benign scenarios, it may help to make adversarial login attempts
stick out. This would strengthen the signals used to detect online password attacks
as used in Internet-scale authentication systems.
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CHAPTER 4
THE TYPTOP SYSTEM: PERSONALIZED TYPO-TOLERANT
PASSWORD CHECKING
This chapter was published in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS) in 2017 [31].
4.1 Introduction
Passwords remain the predominant means of authenticating users on both com-
puters and the web — however studies show that users persistently pick weak
passwords [45, 68, 67]. This phenomena is often ascribed to users selecting easy-
to-remember passwords; however a number of studies [75, 74, 72] highlight that
strong passwords are also more difficult to type. To increase password usability,
some companies [76, 77, 78] allow authentication under a small set of common
typos. For example, Facebook permits capitalization errors in the first letter or
accidental caps lock errors.
Motivated by this, Chatterjee et al. [30] recently initiated the academic in-
vestigation of typo-tolerant password checking. In a 24-hour study at Dropbox,
they found that a small set of easy-to-correct typos accounted for over 9.3% of
failed login attempts, and 3% of the total users turned away — underscoring the
burden that typos represent to both users and the companies that ultimately lose
out on user engagement due to them. To increase usability, the authors advocate
an approach they call ‘relaxed checking’. They establish a handful of the most
frequently occurring typos across a user population, and build corrector functions
to rectify those particular typos on behalf of the user at the time of authentication
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(e.g., flipping the case of all letters to correct a caps lock error). The authors show
empirically that for a carefully selected set of correctors, the resulting security
degradation is minimal.
A limitation of this approach is that checking each correction requires applying
a computationally intensive password hashing algorithm; as such the number of
typos one may correct is inherently limited by performance constraints. While cor-
recting the five most prevalent typos accounts for 20% of typos made by users [30],
this still leaves the majority of password typos uncorrectable. Individual users
may be totally neglected, should they frequently make a typo that is rare across
the broader population of users. Users who choose complex, strong passwords are
likely to fall into this neglected group.
We introduce a new approach to password checking: personalized typo-
tolerance. In such a system, the password checking mechanism learns the typos
commonly made by each user over time, storing them in a secure manner. After
learning frequent typos, the system can check to see if a submitted password is
either the one originally registered, or one of the learned variants. By tailoring
typo-tolerance to the individual user, we aim to correct a larger set of typos than
previously possible, while maintaining strong security guarantees.
Building a personalized typo-tolerant checking system requires care. The sys-
tem should not begin accepting arbitrary incorrect passwords that are submitted
— indeed this would enable potentially malicious users to register arbitrary pass-
words which allow access to an account. Therefore we need a policy dictating the
types of errors that can be added to a cache of allowed typos, and a mechanism to
enforce it. We must consider security in the face of remote guessing attacks as well
as compromise of password databases, both being threats that frequently arise in
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practice. This rules out simple schemes in which recent incorrect submissions are
simply stored in the clear. Ideally, a scheme would be as secure as a conventional
password-based checking system, meaning an attacker must perform as much work
to compromise an account as they would have had there been no typo-tolerance.
We overcome these challenges and design a secure personalized typo-tolerant
password checking system that we call TypTop. At a high level, the system works
as follows. It maintains a set of allowed hashes, corresponding to the registered
password and allowed typos of it. The user can successfully login by submitting
either the password or an allowed typo. Initially, this set contains only the salted
hashes of the registered password and some typos of that password that are con-
sidered likely across the population of all users. To personalize, TypTop adapts
this set of typos over time by securely storing incorrect submissions encrypted un-
der a public-key for which the associated secret key is, itself, encrypted under the
registered password and previously allowed typos. Upon a subsequent successful
login, the recent incorrect submissions can be decrypted and checked to see if they
satisfy the policy regarding typos. If so, new salted hashes of the incorrect sub-
missions, now considered as legitimate typos, can be added to the set of allowed
hashes. To ensure the set does not grow too large, less frequently observed typos
can be evicted. Future login attempts that make one of the frequent typos will be
allowed, thereby avoiding the need for the user to retype their password.
Underlying TypTop is therefore a new kind of stateful password-based encryp-
tion scheme that ensures the plaintext state for a user can only be unlocked with
knowledge of the registered password or one of the policy-checked cached variants
of it. We introduce a formal security notion requiring that an attacker learns
nothing about a sequence of password logins (including the number of logins, how
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many variants were entered into the typo cache, or partial information about the
passwords) given the state of the password system, unless the attacker can success-
fully mount a modified form of brute-force guessing attack in which it repeatedly
hashes common passwords or typos of them and checks them against the hashes
stored within the state.
We prove the security of our construction relative to this notion, and go on to
analyze the brute-force guessing game to which we reduce security. We give criteria
on password and typo distributions which, if met, mean that the attacker will gain
no additional benefit by attempting to guess a stored typo. For such settings, we
prove that the optimal strategy is a standard brute-force guessing attack against
the registered password as if there were no additional password hashes of typos
stored. We show empirically that real-world password and typo distributions meet
the required criteria.
To gauge the potential efficacy of TypTop, we conduct a study using Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [91] in which we ask users to perform repeated logins
using a password of their choosing.1 In this way, we can analyze the types of errors
made and the potential benefit of personalization compared to the prior relaxed
checking approach with a fixed set of typo correctors. The analysis reveals that
45% of users would benefit from personalization, a 1.5x improvement over the 29%
of users that benefit from the top 5 correctors from [30].
We implemented a prototype of TypTop for Unix systems including Linux
and Mac OS using the pluggable authentication module (PAM) framework. The
prototype enables typo-tolerance for all password-based authentications managed
by the operating system. We report on the initial deployment with 25 users, and
1All our study designs were reviewed by our university’s IRB.
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while further studies will be needed to assess generalizability of our results, they
so far indicate that TypTop significantly benefits users that often mistype their
passwords in ways not covered by prior correction mechanisms. Our prototype is
open-source and publicly available.2
4.2 Background and Related Work
In traditional password-based authentication schemes (PBAS), a user initially reg-
isters a user name and a password with the system. The password is stored in
some protected form (typically a salted password hash). On subsequent login at-
tempts, the user re-enters their password which is then compared to the stored
password; authentication is granted only if these match. A formal definition of
PBAS schemes is given in Section 5.2.
Password distributions and guessing attacks. Measurement studies [67, 10,
45] and password leaks such as [81] show that users frequently pick weak passwords,
with a large number of users sharing a relatively small set of passwords at the head
of the password distribution. This leaves them vulnerable to guessing attacks (see
Section 5.2).
The reason users persistently pick such weak passwords is often cited as ease
of memorability. However studies by Keith et al. [74, 75] indicate that the rate
at which typos are made approximately doubles for complex passwords; similarly
Mazurek et al. [82] show via a large-scale study that login errors are correlated with
stronger passwords, and suggest that users pick weaker passwords due to their ease
of typing. Work by Shay et al. [71] finds a similar correlation between length and
2https://typtop.info/
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rate of typo occurrence for CorrectHorseBatteryStaple-type passphrases [85]. For
a more detailed discussion of these related works, see Chapter 3.
Typo-tolerant password checking. Several web services [76, 77, 78], allow (or
used to allow) small typographical errors in their passwords. In the Chapter 3,
we provide the first formal treatment of typo-tolerant password checking for user-
selected passwords. To recall, with an experiment conducted on MTurk, we show
that 20% of typos can be corrected by a small set of corrector functions (e.g., ap-
plying caps lock or switching the case of the first letter). We give relaxed checking,
which allows authentication under a small number of easily correctable typos. Now
when a password fails its initial authentication check, a set of (e.g., 5) corrector
functions representing common typos are applied to the entered string; the user is
allowed to authenticate if any of these corrections matches the registered password.
Relaxed checking with a carefully chosen set of corrector functions can achieve a
significant improvement in utility with minimal degradation in security.
While relaxed checking allows for the secure correction of 20% of typos, this
still leaves the majority of typos uncorrected. Furthermore, the corrector functions
utilized are based on common typo behavior across the population of users, as
opposed to that of the individual. In this chapter, we explore a new approach —
personalized typo-tolerance — which allows us to correct a greater proportion of
typos by tailoring typo-tolerance to the individual user.
4.3 Personalized Typo Tolerance
We introduce personalized typo-tolerant password checking which adapts, over
time, to correct the specific typos made by an individual user. We begin by defining
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the abstract components of such a scheme, as well as the utility and the security
goals.
Passwords and typos. We let S denote the set of strings which users may
choose as passwords (e.g., the set of ASCII strings up to some maximum length,
say ` ). We let p be a distribution which models user selection of passwords, so p(w)
denotes the probability that w is the password chosen by a user, and let P denote
the support of p, which represents the set of user passwords. We let w1, w2, . . .
denote the passwords in P ordered in descending order of probability.
A typo-tolerant PBAS which allows authentication under any string is clearly
insecure. As such we need a means to distinguish legitimate user typos from
unrelated strings. We first convert both the password w and possible typo w˜ into
their key press representation [30], and then compute the Damerau-Levenshtein
distance [86, 87] of these representations, which we denote DL(w, w˜). We view w˜
as a legitimate typo of w if this distance is at most some small fixed parameter
δ; here we set δ = 2. We let {τw} be a family of distributions over typos for each
password w, so τw(w˜) is the probability that the password w ∈ P is typed as w˜ ∈ S.
Note that τw(w) denotes the probability that w is typed correctly. Together these
components (p, τ ) define an error setting.
Looking ahead, we will conservatively assume that an attacker has precise
knowledge of the underlying error setting when we analyze the security of TypTop
with respect to guessing attacks. In practice, TypTop uses a state of the art
password strength estimator, zxcvbn [103], to estimate password guessability.
Adaptive checkers. An adaptive password checker Π is a stateful PBAS — that
is to say Π = (Reg,Chk) is a pair of algorithm defined as follows:
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• Reg is a randomized algorithm which takes as input a password w, and outputs
an initial state s0 for Π.
• Chk is an algorithm (possibly randomized) which takes as input a string w˜ and
a state s, and outputs a bit b and an updated state s′. An output b = 1 means
authentication is granted.
Our definition is analogous to the formalization of standard (non-adaptive) PBAS
given in Chapter 3; their definition may be recovered by keeping the state constant
across invocations of Chk. We call a non-adaptive PBAS an exact checker if it
outputs b = 1 only if the correct password is entered exactly.
We require that a password checker is complete, which is to say that the prob-
ability that a user successfully authenticates when he enters his correct password
is one. Additionally we desire our typo-tolerant checker to authenticate under as
many typos made by a legitimate user as possible (subject to security constraints).
We will measure the utility of a typo-tolerant PBAS in terms of the fraction of
typos accepted by the password checker across all users. By this measure, the
utility of an exact checker is always 0.
Guessing attacks. Guessing attacks against PBAS schemes come in two key
flavors: online and oﬄine attacks. In the former, an attacker uses the login API
of the system to submit different password guesses in an attempt to impersonate
a user. The attacker might target a specific user in what is known as a vertical
attack, or may try common passwords against the accounts of many users (known
as a horizontal attack). Various countermeasures can be deployed to mitigate
these attacks, including locking the account after a number of (e.g., 10) incorrect
password submissions, and slowing down responses for login attempts that ap-
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pear unsafe based on contextual information (for example, those originating from
suspicious IP addresses).
In oﬄine attacks we assume that the attacker has compromised the database
of stored PBAS states, and attempts to brute-force guess the underlying values.
In contrast to online attacks, the number of guesses made by an oﬄine attacker is
limited only by the computational power they are willing to expend. We analyze
the security of TypTop in the face of both forms of attack in Section 4.5.
4.4 The TypTop Design
We first give an overview of TypTop, and then detail its components more fully.
TypTop uses a typo cache and an encrypted wait list. The typo cache securely
stores the set of strings under which the user is allowed to authenticate; namely
their registered password plus a number of previously accepted typos of that pass-
word. The wait list is a public-key encryption of recent incorrect password sub-
missions that were not the registered password or one of the typos already in the
typo cache. The secret decryption key for the wait list is, in turn, encrypted using
the registered password and (separately) under each of the cached typos. When
a login attempt’s password submission is accepted — either it was the registered
password or one of the previously accepted typos — the wait list can be decrypted
and processed according to some typo cache policy. The latter defines which in-
correct submissions should be allowed into the typo cache. A diagrammatic view
of TypTop’s Chk procedure is given in Figure 4.1.
Underlying components. We begin by defining the primitives utilized by





















Figure 4.1: Diagram showing TypTop’s approach to personalized typo-tolerant password
checking.
of algorithms. The key generation algorithm K takes random coins as input and
outputs a public / secret key pair (pk, sk)←$K. The randomized encryption algo-
rithm E takes as input a public key pk and a message m ∈ME (whereME denotes
the message space), and outputs a ciphertext c←$ Epk(m). We let CE denote the
ciphertext space. The deterministic decryption algorithm D takes as input a se-
cret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a message m˜ ∈ ME ∪ {⊥}. We use
a PKE scheme with perfect correctness, meaning that the probability an honestly
generated ciphertext decrypts to the correct message is one.
A password-based encryption (PBE) scheme PBE = (E,D) is a pair of algo-
rithms defined as follows. The randomized encryption algorithm E takes as input
a password w ∈ P (the set of all allowed passwords) and a message m ∈ ME
(the message space), and outputs a ciphertext c←$ Ew(m), where we let CE denote
the ciphertext space. The deterministic decryption algorithm D takes as input a
password w and a ciphertext c and outputs a message m˜ ∈ME∪{⊥}. We require
PBE to be perfectly correct. A conventional symmetric encryption scheme is the
same as a PBE scheme, except that it assumes uniform bit strings of some length
κ as keys.
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We let PBE[SH, SE] = (E,D) denote the canonical PBE scheme that works as
follows. The scheme utilizes a random oracle with signature SH : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ
and a conventional symmetric encryption scheme SE = (E,D) that uses keys of
length κ bits. Then E(w,m) first chooses a fresh salt sa←$ {0, 1}`salt for some
suitably large `salt, computes c = E(SH(sa‖w),m), and outputs (sa, c). Decryption
works in the obvious way.
Later, we will assume the message space associated to a PKE scheme unam-
biguously supports passwords of length up to some parameter ` (passwords will be
unambiguously padded to this max length), a distinguished empty string symbol
ε, and the state space of the caching scheme. We assume that encryptions of pass-
words and the empty string are of equal length. We assume PBE has a message
space containing a typical representation of the PKE scheme’s secret keys.
Finally, we let Perm(t) denotes the set of all permutations on Zt. Looking
ahead, we shall set t to be the number of typos stored in the typo cache, and
regularly apply a random permutation to randomize the order of elements in the
cache. For our scheme, t will be small, making random permutations on Zt easily
sampleable and representable.
The details. A pseudocode description of TypTop’s adaptive typo-tolerant pass-
word checking scheme Π = (Reg,Chk) appears in Figure 4.2. TypTop uses a
caching scheme to determine which entries in the wait list are integrated into the
cache. In the figure we detail a probabilistic least frequently used (PLFU) caching
scheme, but TypTop works modularly with other caching schemes as discussed
later in this section.





For i = 1, . . . , t do T[i]←$ CE
For j = 1, . . . , ω do W[j]←$ Epk(ε)
(S0,U0)←$ CacheInit(w)
c←$ Epk(S0)
For (w˜, i) ∈ U0 do T[i]←$ Ew˜(sk)
γ←$ Zω ; s← (pk, c,T,W, γ)
Return s
Chk(w˜, s):
Parse s as (pk, c, γ,T,W)
b← false
For i = 0, . . . , t do
sk ← Dw˜(T[i])
If sk , ⊥ then
b← true; pi←$ Perm(t); S← Dsk(c)
For j = 1, . . . , ω do w˜j ← Dsk(W[j])
(S′,U)← CacheUpdt(pi, S, (w˜, i), w˜1, . . . , w˜ω)
c′←$ Epk(S′)
For (w˜′, j) ∈ U do T[j]←$ Ew˜′ (sk)
For j = 1, . . . , t do T′[pi[j]]← T[j]
For j = 1, . . . , ω do W[j]←$ Epk(ε)
s← (pk, c′, γ,T′,W)
If b = false then
W[γ]←$ Epk(w˜); γ′ ← γ + 1 mod ω
s← (pk, c, γ′,T,W)
Return (b, s)
CacheInit(w):




CacheUpdt(pi, S, (w˜, i), w˜1, . . . , w˜ω):
Parse S as (w,F)
If i > 0 then F[i]← F[i] + 1
For j = 1, . . . , ω do
If valid(w, w˜j) = true then
M[w˜j]←M[w˜j] + 1
Sort M in decreasing order of values
For each w˜′ s.t. M[w˜′] > 0 do
k ← argminj F[j]
ν ←M[w˜′]/(F[k] +M[w˜′])
d←ν {0, 1}
If d = 1 then
F[k]← F[k] +M[w˜′]
U ← U ∪ {(w˜′, k)}




Figure 4.2: Our adaptive password checking scheme Π = (Reg,Chk) using a modified
least-frequently used caching policy. The latter uses a function valid that checks whether
a string should be considered for entry into the typo cache (e.g., checking whether a
string lies within an edit distance threshold of the true password).
encryption of the caching scheme’s (plaintext) state S, a typo cache T, an encrypted
wait list W, and an index γ which is a pointer to the next wait list entry that should
be used. The typo cache consists of up to t PBE encryptions of the secret key sk
corresponding to pk, where t is a parameter of the scheme. The typo cache is
initially filled with random ciphertexts, unless otherwise indicated by the caching
scheme in use (e.g., one may want to warm up the cache with possible typos as
discussed below). The wait list consists of up to ω PKE encryptions of incorrect
password submissions. For the wait list we use a simple least-recently entered
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eviction policy, accomplished by having index γ wrap around. To force a wrap
around would require ω incorrect submissions before a correct one, so in practice
we can set ω to be equal to a lockout threshold (such as 10). The wait list is
initialized with encryptions of the empty string symbol ε, and cleared in the same
manner. The index γ is initialized to a random value in Zω.
After every change to the typo cache, a random permutation pi←$ Perm(t) is
used to permute the order of the cached typos. This is to ensure that even if an
adversary knows the typos likely to be made by a user, he will not know at which
position each typo lies in the cache. This will have ramifications for oﬄine security,
making the guessing game harder for particular distributions. See Section 4.5.
Caching schemes. TypTop maintains a set of cached typos which evolves over
time based on the users’ login attempts and the caching policy in use. We require
that the set of cached typos are distinct, and that the real password is never cached
as a typo; this maximizes the number of typos we can tolerate for a given cache
size. We abstract out the process of initializing and updating the typo cache via
a stateful caching scheme Cache = (CacheInit,CacheUpdt) defined as follows. The
algorithm CacheInit takes as input a password w, and outputs an initial state for
the caching scheme S0 and a set U0 of typo / index pairs (w˜, i), indicating that
the typo w˜ should be stored at the ith position in the initial cache. The algorithm
CacheUpdt takes as input the caching scheme state S and a list (w˜1, . . . , w˜ω) of
candidate replacement typos (in our case, drawn from the wait list) plus any other
information required to implement the caching policy (e.g., their frequencies). It
outputs an updated state S′ and a set U indicating the replacements to be made.
The checker Π is designed so that any caching scheme of choice may be dropped
in. The set of caching schemes we consider is given in Figure 4.3. The simplest
129
Scheme Replacement Policy
LRU Replace least recently used typo with w˜n
LFU Replace least frequently used typo and associated frequency with (w˜n, fw˜n )




MFU Make necessary replacements to ensure t most frequently used typos lie in cache
Best-t Initialize cache with t most probable typos based on typo model; never replace
Figure 4.3: Table summarizing the caching schemes considered. Here w˜n denotes the
wait list typo being considered for inclusion in the cache, f denotes the frequency count
of the typo in subscript, and t denotes the cache size.
is a least recently used (LRU) caching scheme CacheLRU = (InitLRU,UpdateLRU)
which maintains a list of typo cache indices ordered by how recently they were
entered by the user; when we update the cache, the last (and least recently used)
entry in the cache is evicted and replaced with the most frequently observed entry
in the wait list. LRU ignores the frequency with which a user authenticates under
a cached typo.
We consider three other strategies that take this frequency into consideration.
The simplest scheme is the LFU policy, which performs cache updates by replacing
the least frequently used cache typo with the most frequently observed wait list
entry. The newly added typo has its frequency set to the number of times it
appeared in the wait list.
A potential drawback of this approach is that we replace a cached typo each
time we update, and so may inadvertently replace a typo that the user makes rea-
sonably often (and is thus good to keep in the cache) with an anomalous typo from
the wait list which they are unlikely to use again. We therefore give a probabilistic-
LFU (PLFU) scheme, which performs cache updates as follows. First the frequen-
cies of the least frequently used typo in the cache w˜o and the most frequently
observed typo in the wait list w˜n are compared, and we replace the former with
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the latter with probability ν = fw˜n/(fw˜n + fw˜o), where f denotes the frequency
count of the typo in subscript in the wait list (for w˜n) or the typo cache (for w˜o).
If such an update occurs, the frequency of the newly cached typo is set to fw˜n+fw˜o .
This process is repeated for each of the unique typos in the wait list in descending
order of their frequency. This both serves to decrease the probability that a use-
ful cached typo is replaced unnecessarily, and increases the likelihood that typos
which are observed repeatedly in low frequencies over different login attempts are
cached; we give a detailed discussion in Appendix C.1.
The above schemes require |S| ∈ O (() t) space for caching; desirable in our
construction since storing more data in the state of Π could negatively impact
efficiency. In settings where this is less of a concern (e.g., authentication to personal
devices) and we can afford to maintain a larger state, we can employ a most
frequently used (MFU) caching policy which records the frequency of all valid
typos made by a user so far. The t most frequent typos are maintained in the
cache.
As a benchmark against which to compare the utility benefit of adaptive check-
ing, we also consider a static caching policy Best-t: fill the cache of a given password
w with its t most likely typos according to some typo model, and then never up-
date the cache. Looking ahead, we will build a typo model from measurements of
typos made by users.
Admissible typos. As discussed in Section 5.2, care must be taken when deciding
which typos are cached. As such we use a procedure valid to test whether an entry
in the wait list should be input to CacheUpdt as a candidate for inclusion. Our
policy applies three restrictions. Firstly, we set a threshold d, and only consider
a typo w˜ of a password w for inclusion if DL(w, w˜) ≤ d. For TypTop we use
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d = 1 unless stated otherwise, allowing us to capture the caps lock errors, single
substitutions, deletions and transpositions which studies indicate account for 46%
of typos made by users [30].
Secondly, we wish to avoid including easily guessable typos in the cache which
may speed up guessing attacks — for example Password1# may be mistyped
as Password1, but the latter requires only 8 attempts to guess as opposed to
nearer 1,000 for the former (as estimated by zxcvbn [103]). As such we impose
two password strength checks with associated thresholds m,σ. For a typo w˜ of a
password w to be considered admissible, w˜ must be such that both µw˜ ≥ m and
µw˜ ≥ µw − σ, where µ denotes the strength estimate of the password / typo in
subscript. The first condition ensures that the most easily guessed typos are never
cached, while the second prevents the caching of typos significantly more guessable
than the real password. We will use m = 10 and σ = 3 unless otherwise specified;
a justification for these parameter choices is given in Section 4.6.1. To estimate
guessability, we use zxcvbn due to its accuracy and ease of deployment; one could
also use other strength estimators such as those based on neural networks [104].
Warming up caches. For all of the adaptive caching schemes described above,
the user must make a typo at least once before it is considered for inclusion in the
cache — for example, when the typo cache is “cold” immediately after registration,
no typos will be tolerated. As such we consider initializing the typo cache T with
probable typos of the registered password; a process we call “warming up” the
cache. We build an empirical typo distribution using data collected via an MTurk
study (detailed in Section 4.6.1), and the data released with [30]. We then fill
the cache of a given password with its t most likely typos as indicated by the
typo distribution, with their frequency counts set to 0. In contrast to relaxed
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checking, these cached typos are chosen on a per password basis (as opposed to
using population-wide corrector functions). We will always warm up the cache
unless otherwise specified.
4.5 Security of TypTop
In this section, we analyze the security of TypTop within the two main threat
models for password checking schemes described in Section 5.2: oﬄine and online
attacks.
In the oﬄine setting an attacker gains access to the state of the checker, so
we first analyze TypTop from a cryptographic viewpoint, showing that the state
does not leak additional information about the user’s password and login history.
We give a formal security notion that captures this requirement, and provide a
reduction showing that an attacker obtaining access to the state of TypTop learns
nothing about the user’s login behavior (including partial information about the
password) unless they are able to brute-force guess the password or one of the
typos active in the cache. With this in place, we consider the success probability
of an attacker in such a brute-force attack. We show that for certain classes of
error settings, the maximum advantage of an attacker against TypTop is no greater
than that of an optimal attacker against the exact checker (who must brute-force
guess the exact password in order to succeed).
We then analyze the online setting, which will be similar to the security analysis
of the relaxed checking approach introduced by Chatterjee et al. [30]. The results
indicate that security loss in the face of online attacks is minimal, with less security
degradation than the prior approach [30].
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In both online and oﬄine settings, our analyses are with respect to an attacker
who we conservatively assume has precise knowledge of the password distribution.
In practice, where precise knowledge is unlikely, security will be even better than
our analyses predict.
4.5.1 Cryptographic Security
Our security notion formalizes the following intuition. Consider an adversary that
can obtain the state of a password checking system after registration plus some
sequence of login attempts by a user. Then the adversary should not be able to
distinguish this real state from one drawn at random from the state space of the
checker S, unless they are able to brute-force guess one of the passwords or typos
allowed by the checking system at the point of compromise.
To this end we introduce some additional notation that will make defining
security and our subsequent analysis simpler. For a given error setting (p, τ ),
we define an associated login transcript generator T to model a user’s sequence
of login attempts. Formally a login transcript generator T is defined to be a
randomized algorithm that takes no input and outputs a sequence of passwords
and typos which represent a user’s selection of their password (the first password
in the sequence) and subsequent login attempts, all sampled according to the
appropriate distributions. A transcript checker associated to an adaptive password
checker Π = (Reg,Chk) (see Section 5.2) is an algorithm Checker[Π] that takes
as input a sequence of passwords and outputs a state value. The canonical such
transcript checker, on input w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n, runs s0←$ Reg(w0), and then computes
si←$ Chk(w˜i, si−1) iteratively for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It then outputs the final state sn.
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OFFDISTAΠ,T :
(w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)←$ T
s0n←$ Checker[Π](w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)
s1n←$ S ; b←$ {0, 1} ; b′ ← A(sbn)




for i = 1, . . . , t do ki←$ {0, 1}κ
b←$ {0, 1} ; b′←$ BRoR
Return (b′ = b)
RoR(i,m)




(w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)←$ T
s¯n←$ PChecker[Π](w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)
parse s¯n as (S,T,W, γ)




If (T[i] = w˜) and (r ≤ q) then
win← true
Return true
r← r + 1
Return false
Figure 4.4: Cryptographic security games for adaptive password checking schemes, oﬄine
guessing attacks, and multi-key real-or-random symmetric encryption security.
Let Π = (Reg,Chk) be an adaptive password checker and let T be a transcript
generator. Consider the game OFFDIST of Figure 4.4. We define the oﬄine
distinguishing advantage of an adversary A against Π, T to be
AdvoffdistΠ,T (A) = 2 ·
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [ OFFDISTAΠ,T ⇒ true ]− 12
∣∣∣∣∣
where the probability is over the random coins used in executing the game. We
will not provide strict definitions of security (e.g. using asymptotics), but rather
measure concretely the advantage of adversaries given certain running times and
query budgets.
The security model proposed here coincides with a one-time compromise of the
system. A stronger model would perhaps allow adaptive compromises, observing
multiple instances of the password checking state over time. We conjecture that
Π meets such a definition but leave the analysis to future work.
Preliminaries. Before our analysis, we fix a number of further definitions that
will be needed in the proofs.
We implement TypTop with the canonical PBE scheme
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PBE[SH, SE] = (E,D) as described in Section 4.4 which utilizes a symmetric encryp-
tion (SE) scheme SE and random oracle SH; adversaries in security games against
this implementation of TypTop are given access to the random oracle accordingly.
We now define two security notions which we will require for the underlying
SE scheme. The first is a multi-key real-vs-random security notion for symmetric
encryption under chosen plaintext attack. Let SE = (E,D) be a SE scheme with
associated ciphertext space CE. The pseudocode description of the security game
MKRORB,t
SE
appears in Figure 4.4. This game tasks the attacker with determining
whether it is receiving encryptions of a (chosen) message, or a random ciphertext,
in a multi-key setting. We define the distinguishing advantage of an adversary B
as
AdvmkrorSE (B, t) = 2 ·
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [ MKRORB,tSE ⇒ true ]− 12
∣∣∣∣∣ .
The security game for the familiar single-key real-vs-random security notion,
which we denote SKRORBSE, is obtained by setting t = 1 in the above defini-
tion. A straightforward hybrid argument shows that for any symmetric encryp-
tion scheme SE and adversary B in game MKRORB,t
SE
running in time T , there
exists an adversary B′ in game SKRORBSE running in time T ′ ≈ T such that
AdvmkrorSE (B, t) ≤ t · AdvskrorSE (B′). By T ′ ≈ T (which we will also use in theorem
statements below), we mean that the running time of B′ is the same as that of
B plus some qualitatively inconsequential overheads that can be derived from the
proof.
We need one additional security property from our SE scheme: that of ro-
bustness, which ensures that no computationally efficient adversary can find two
keys that both decrypt the same ciphertext. The notion of robustness for PKE
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schemes was introduced by Abdalla et al. [105], and later extended in [106, 107].
Security notions and constructions for robust SE schemes are given by Farshim et
al. [108]. We use a variant of their full robustness notion that is strictly weaker
than full robustness, but which suffices for our purposes. Formally, let ROBRSE be
the game that works as follows. The adversary R runs with no inputs and outputs
(k, k′,m), i.e., a pair of keys and a message. The game then computes c←$ E(k,m)
and m′ ← D(k′, c). The game outputs true if k , k′ and m′ , ⊥. We define the





Finally we require a more standard real-vs-random ciphertext notion of security
for a PKE scheme PKE = (K, E ,D) with associated ciphertext space CE . The game
RORCPKE (not shown) first generates a key pair (pk, sk)←$K and a random bit b.
It then runs adversary C(pk), who is given access to an oracle RoR to which it
may query messages m. The oracle computes c1←$ E(pk,m) and c0←$ CE and
returns cb. Finally C outputs a bit b′, and the game returns (b = b′). We define the
distinguishing advantage of an adversary C as
AdvrorPKE(C) = 2 ·
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [ RORCPKE ⇒ true ]− 12
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Oﬄine guessing attacks. With this in place, we now define the eventual target
of our reduction: a guessing game in which the adversary obtains an oracle to make
guesses against the password and its t cached typos. Observe that for the canonical
transcript checker Checker[Π], the eventual entries in the typo cache (and wait list)
associated to sn depend not only on the input transcript w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n but also
on whether a ciphertext in the typo cache is erroneously decrypted to something
besides ⊥ when using the wrong password. We can, however, rule out such an
event using the robustness of the SE scheme (see definition above).
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In order to simplify the subsequent analysis, we define a modified transcript
checker PChecker[Π] that evolves the state of Π using only plaintext values. Cru-
cially, rather than relying on a successful decryption to determine whether a pass-
word / typo lies in the cache, we may now simply compare the input to the plain-
text cache values, thereby eliminating the negligible probability of erroneous state
updates. The pseudocode for PChecker[Π] is given in Figure 4.5.
The game OFFGUESSG,q
Π,T is given in Figure 4.4. The guessing advantage of
an adversary G who makes at most q queries to the Test oracle is defined as
Advoffguess
Π,T (G, q) = Pr[OFFGUESSG,qΠ,T ⇒ true]. The transcript generator and plain-
text checker are first used to sample a set of cache values; the adversary succeeds
if he can guess any password or typo which lies in the cache. Note that this game
requires the adversary to specify which password each guess should be checked
against. We measure the complexity of guessing adversaries in terms of the num-
ber of Test queries they make.
We assume without loss of generality that all adversaries make legitimate
queries in their respective games (i.e., with values inside the appropriate domains,
and with an index in the range [0, t] for MKROR and OFFGUESS).
The analysis. Let Π = (Reg,Chk) denote TypTop’s password checker, and fix
some transcript generator T . Our analysis will show that the OFFDISTΠ,T security
of Π reduces to the guessing game OFFGUESSΠ,T . We note that this analysis is
independent of the specific caching scheme used by TypTop; the effect on security
of different such schemes will be surfaced in Section 4.5.2 when we bound the
success probability of an attacker in game OFFGUESSΠ,T .
As the first step in our reduction, we introduce PChecker[Π] into game
138
OFFDISTΠ,T , via an intermediate game OFFDISTΠ,T defined to be identical ex-
cept we replace Checker[Π] with PChecker[Π], and then use the values in the final
plaintext state s¯n = (S,T,W, γ) to compute the final (encrypted) challenge state
sn as specified by the scheme. We bound the transition between the games by
invoking the following lemma, which is implied by a reduction to the robustness
of SE. We give the full proof in Appendix C.3.
Lemma 4.5.1 Let (p, τ ) be an error setting with associated transcript generator
T , and let Π = (Reg,Chk) be TypTop’s password checker, with associated plain-
text checker PChecker[Π]. Let Π be implemented using the canonical PBE scheme
PBE[SH, SE] = (E,D) where SE is a symmetric encryption scheme and SH is a
random oracle. Then for any adversary A running in time T and making at most
q queries to SH, there exist adversaries A′, R such that
AdvoffdistΠ,T (A) ≤ AdvoffdistΠ,T (A′) + 2 · AdvrobSE (R) +
(t · (n + 1) + 1)2
2(κ−1)
,
and, moreover, A′ and R run in time T ′ ≈ T , and A′ makes at most q queries to
SH. Here t denotes the cache size, SE takes as keys uniform bit strings of length
κ, and n denotes the length of the transcript.
We now state our main theorem in which we upper bound the advantage of an
attacker A in game OFFDISTΠ,T .
Theorem 4.5.1 Let (p, τ ) be an error setting with associated transcript generator
T , and let Π = (Reg,Chk) be TypTop’s password checker with associated plain-
text checker PChecker[Π]. Let Π be implemented using the canonical PBE scheme
PBE[SH, SE] = (E,D) where SE is a symmetric encryption scheme and SH is a
random oracle. Then for any adversary A running in time T and making at most
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PChecker[Π](w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)
γ←$ Zω ; (S0,U0)←$ CacheInit(w0) ; T[0]← w0
For (w˜, i) ∈ U0 do T[i]← w˜
For k = 1, . . . , n do
b← 0
For i = 0, . . . , t do
If w˜k = T[i] then
b← 1 ; pi←$ Perm(ω)
(Sk,Uk)←$ CacheUpdt(pi, Sk−1, (w˜k, i),W[1], . . . ,W[ω])
For (w˜′, j) ∈ Uk do T[j]← w˜′
For j = 1, . . . , t do T′[pi[j]]← T[j]
For j = 1, . . . , ω do W[j]← ε
If b = 0 then W[γ]← w˜k ; γ ← γ + 1 mod ω
s¯n ← (S,T,W, γ)
Return s¯n
Figure 4.5: The plaintext transcript checking scheme associated to Π with caching scheme
Cache = (CacheInit,CacheUpdt). All entries of tables T and W are initially set to ⊥ and
ε, respectively.
q queries to SH, there exist adversaries B, C,R,G such that
AdvoffdistΠ,T (A) ≤ AdvoffguessΠ,T (G, q) + 2 · AdvmkrorSE (B, t) +
(t + 1)2
2`salt
+ 2 · AdvrobSE (R) + 2 · AdvrorPKE(C) +
(t · (n + 1) + 1)2
2(κ−1)
,
and, moreover, B, C,R,G run in time T ′ ≈ T . Here t denotes the cache size,
SE takes as keys uniform bit strings of length κ, and n denotes the length of the
transcript. The salts used to derive keys for the canonical PBE scheme are of
length `salt. Adversary B makes t queries to its encryption oracle, and C makes
ω + 1 queries to its encryption oracle, where ω is the length of the wait list.
The above theorem shows that the distinguishing advantage of an attacker in game
OFFDISTΠ,T is upper bounded by the probability that they can guess either the
real password or a cached typo (which comprises the first term of the right hand
side of the above equation) plus the remaining terms which, for the appropriate
choice of cryptographic components and key sizes, can be assumed to be negligibly
small. This implies that an attacker who compromises the state of the adaptive
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checker in an oﬄine attack learns no information about the underlying password
and the login pattern, unless they can guess one of the cached values. We will
analyze the probability that this occurs in Section 4.5.2.
We sketch the proof here and defer a detailed treatment to Appendix C.3. We
first apply Lemma 4.5.1 to transition to game OFFDISTΠ,T and thereby introduce
the plaintext checker. We then argue by a series of game hops, beginning with the
cache state sn as in game OFFDISTΠ,T with challenge bit b = 0. We then modify
the PBE scheme to sample salts without replacement; this will ultimately be used
to ensure that the attacker has to submit guesses to distinct cache positions when
we reduce to game OFFGUESSΠ,T . With this in place, we further set a flag which
is set only if the attacker queries one of the cached values to his random oracle,
allowing us to eventually reduce to the success probability of OFFGUESSΠ,T . Fi-
nally we use the real-or-random ciphertext security of the SE and PKE schemes to
replace all of the real ciphertexts in the state of the checker with random cipher-
texts, thus transforming the state into a random one as per game OFFDISTΠ,T
with challenge bit b = 1.
On the use of PBKDFs. Above in our analysis we have abstracted away the
details of the slow hash SH and modeled it simply as a random oracle. This allows
accounting for queries to SH as unit cost, which will suffice for our analysis. One
can go further, however, replacing SH with a true password-based key derivation
function and converting the unit cost to that of computing the hash function (e.g.,
the cost of c applications of a standard hash function, in the case that SH is replaced
by a hash chain construction such as PKCS#5). See for example [35, 97, 96] for a
discussion of relevant results.
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4.5.2 Security Against Oﬄine Guessing Attacks
Having reduced the oﬄine security of TypTop to the guessing game OFFGUESS,
we now upper bound the success probability of an attacker in this game. Recall
that p denotes the distribution of passwords chosen by users, P denotes the support
of p, and τ denotes the family of typo distributions for each password w ∈ P .
When TypTop is used in a given error setting, the probability that a typo lies
in the cache of a given password depends inherently on the caching policy in use.
For an error setting and instantiation of TypTop, we let τ˜ denote the induced cache
inclusion function where τ˜w(w˜) denotes the probability that w˜ is included in the
typo cache of password w. We provide a general security analysis of TypTop in
terms of τ˜ , then concretize our analysis by empirically modeling τ˜ for a real world
error setting and a number of caching policies. Letting T [j] denote the distribution
of the typo at position j in the cache, the fact that the set of cached typos are
distinct and randomly permuted implies that Pr[T [j] = w˜ |T [0] = w] = 1
t
· τ˜w(w˜),
for all 0 < j ≤ t.
We would like to establish a class of typo distributions for which adding typo-
tolerance via TypTop offers no security degradation over an exact checker. Since
an exact checker accepts the correct password only, the analogous guessing game
has the adversary attempting to guess a user’s password with a budget of q guesses,
and we denote the success probability achieved by an optimal attacker as λq. It
is easy to see that the attacker’s best strategy is to guess the q most probable
passwords according to the distribution, so it follows that λq =
∑q
i=1 p(wi), where
w1, w2, . . . denote the passwords in P sorted in decreasing order of their probability.
We define the edge-weight of a typo w˜ under the induced cache inclusion func-
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tion τ˜ to be bτ˜ (w˜) =
∑
w∈P τ˜w(w˜). Notice that for a given typo w˜, we have that
τ˜w(w˜) ∈ [0, 1] for each password w, so in theory the edge-weight could be very
large. We say that an error setting is t-sparse with respect to TypTop with cache
size t and a particular caching scheme, if for all w˜ ∈ M it holds that bτ˜ (w˜) ≤ t.
In the following theorem, we show that if an error setting is t-sparse then there is
no speedup in an optimal oﬄine attack against TypTop as opposed to an optimal
oﬄine attack against an exact checker ExChk.
Theorem 4.5.2 Let (p, τ ) be an error setting with associated transcript generator
T , and let Π = (Reg,Chk) be TypTop’s password checker with typo cache size t.
Then if the error setting is t-sparse with respect to Π, then for any adversary G, it
holds that
Advoffguess




The full proof is given in Appendix C.4; we provide a brief sketch here. We begin
by splitting the set of guess / index pairs output by G into two exclusive sets — a
set Z0 consisting of guesses at the real password in cache position T[0], and a set
Z1 consisting of guesses at the cached typos in positions T[j] where 0 < j ≤ t. The
success probability induced by the former set is simply
∑
w∈Z0 p(w). The success
probability contributed by the latter set is the expectation — over all passwords
not already accounted for by the guesses at the real password in Z0 — that one of
these cache typo guesses succeeds. We show — via a general result which allows
us to succinctly upper bound a certain class of summations in which this latter
success probability lies — that the t-sparsity of the error setting implies that the
guessing advantage arising from both sets is upper-bounded by λq, as required.
Are real world error settings t-sparse? It remains to establish whether real
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Figure 4.6: The change in the maximum edge-weight for different number of passwords
considered from RockYou leak.
world error settings are t-sparse; if so, then Theorem 4.5.2 shows that we can enjoy
the typo-tolerance offered by TypTop with no loss in oﬄine security compared to
an exact checker. It is easy to see that not every error setting is t-sparse; e.g.,
imagine (p, τ ) such that all passwords are mistyped to the same typo, with no
other typos possible. This one typo will lie in the cache of every password with
probability close to 1, greatly degrading security and pushing the maximum edge-
weight well above t.
In this section we use simulations to show that real world error settings (p, τ )
are indeed t-sparse. We model the password distribution p using password data
observed in the RockYou password leak [81], which consists of 14 million unique
passwords from 32 million users. We sanitized the Rockyou data by removing
passwords longer than 50 characters (as these are unlikely to be human chosen
passwords) and shorter than 6 characters (as per common password policy rec-
ommendation), and set p equal to the resulting distribution. We model the typo
distribution τ using data on user’s password typing habits gathered via an MTurk
experiment (see Section 4.6.1), and the data released with [30]. We describe how
we built this model in Appendix C.2.
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To compute the induced cache inclusion function τ˜ for (p, τ ) and TypTop with
a given caching policy, we simulate the associated transcript generator T using
the password distribution p and the typo distribution τ . For each password w, we
sample n strings w˜1, . . . , w˜n according to τw. This captures a user with registered
password w who makes a series of login attempts including some typos. We run
PChecker (with default parameters) on input (w, w˜1, . . . , w˜n, w), where the final
correct password entry is included to ensure at least one cache update occurs. We
ran the simulation m times for each password w, and set τ˜w(w˜) to be the fraction of
these m runs that the typo w˜ lies in the final cache of the password w. We repeat
this process for all four caching policies described in Section 4.4. Via preliminary
simulations on a small subset of randomly sampled passwords with different values
of m and n, we found that τ˜w changed very little for n ≥ 1000 and m ≥ 200;
therefore we set n = 1000 and m = 200 for our full simulation.
Running the simulation for each of the passwords in the RockYou leak would be
very slow, so we estimate τ˜w using the k most probable passwords in the RockYou
leak for k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} × 104. With this in place, we compute the edge-weight
bτ˜ (w˜) =
∑
w τ˜w(w˜) for each possible typo w˜, and report the maximum observed
edge-weight for each k and caching policy in Figure 4.6.
For all four caching policies, we found that τ˜w comfortably satisfies the desired
5-sparsity condition (recall that we implement TypTop with cache size t = 5)
for all k ≤ 105. The largest observed edge-weight was 4.2 for the MFU caching
policy, with a maximum edge-weight of only 3.2 for the PLFU policy which we
shall ultimately choose for deployment (see Section 4.6).
Moreover, we find that the maximum edge-weight increases minimally in the
range 5× 104 ≤ k ≤ 105 for all caching policies considered. This, coupled with the
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fact that the maximum edge-weights are well below the required threshold of 5.0
for all k considered, indicates that if we were able to perform simulations on the
entire password distribution, we would still find the error setting to be 5-sparse as
required.
The top 105 passwords in the RockYou leak share some structural similarities
(e.g., 90% of these passwords contain only letters and numbers, and only 5% are
more than 10 characters in length). To check that these similarities are not biasing
our results, and to gain further support for our conclusion that the simulated error
setting (p, τ ) is 5-sparse, we repeat the above experiment using two different sets of
passwords to estimate τ˜w and the corresponding edge-weights. The first set consists
of k passwords chosen randomly from the support of p, and the second consists of
the k most probable passwords when the top one million passwords are excluded
from consideration. As before, we consider all values of k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} × 104.
We observed similar trends to those displayed in Figure 4.6, except that in
these two experiments the maximum observed edge-weights are even better (in
terms of security) at 2.8 and 3.0 respectively for the MFU caching scheme, and
less for all other caching policies. This is likely to be because passwords which are
distinct in structure induce more diverse sets of typos. This results in fewer typos
being shared between multiple passwords, which in turn decreases their observed
edge-weights.
To assess the benefit of the admissible typo policy described in Section 4.4, we
additionally repeated the above experiments with these restrictions removed one
at a time. We found that the error setting (p, τ ) no longer remains 5-sparse if any
of the three restrictions are removed. These simulations emphasize the importance
of the admissible typo policy for security.
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4.5.3 Security Against Online Attacks
We briefly discuss TypTop’s resistance to online guessing attacks, in which an
attacker attempts to impersonate a user via the login API of the system. The
main difference between online and oﬄine attacks against TypTop is that in the
former, each guess the attacker makes is checked against every entry in the cache,
whereas in the latter it is only checked against the specific cache slot guessed. We
provide full details of these notions and our analyses in Appendix C.5
To estimate the decrease in the online security of TypTop compared to an exact
checker, we approximate the success probability of an optimal online attacker using
a greedy algorithm similar to that used by Chatterjee et. al. in [30], and data from
real world password / typo distributions. We show that security loss is minimal for
all caching schemes (namely a loss of 0.2% for the MFU policy, and less than 0.1%
for all others, including the PLFU caching scheme which we ultimately choose
for deployment). We also describe a simple blacklisting strategy, in which a small
subset of the typos most beneficial to an attacker are excluded from the typo cache,
and prove that this reduces the security loss to zero.
Another variety of online attack against adaptive checkers considers an adver-
sary who is able to interleave his guesses with correct password submissions by the
legitimate user. For TypTop these correct submissions trigger cache updates, so
it is possible that one of the attacker’s guesses, stored in the wait list, is allowed
into the cache.
Recall that we set TypTop’s admissible typo policy so only typos within DL
distance one of the real password are allowed in the cache. This in itself provides
a degree of protection against these interleaving attacks. We additionally propose
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a simple countermeasure which virtually eliminates them. We can associate an
origin tag (such as an IP in the web login setting, or TTY id in an SSH login)
to each entry in the wait list; only entries originating from destinations at which
the user has successfully authenticated are allowed to enter the cache. This may
exclude the occasional typo made by a legitimate user from a new location; we
defer a detailed treatment of this attack and countermeasures to future work.
4.6 Evaluating Utility
In this section, we investigate how successful TypTop is at correcting user’s pass-
word typos under different parameter settings and ultimately select the best per-
forming ones for real world deployment. To gather data about user’s password typ-
ing patterns, we conducted an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
We define the utility of a typo-tolerant PBAS to be the fraction of typos ac-
cepted by the checker taken across the population; formally the utility of a PBAS
Π is defined Utility(Π) = # (typos accepted by Π) / # (typos observed). The same
utility metric is used by Chatterjee et al. in [30], allowing for a direct comparison
of results.
4.6.1 Data Collection From MTurk
Our study — designed to capture the password typing behavior of a user who first
registers a password with a service, and then reenters this password to authenticate
himself at subsequent logins — asks an MTurk worker to choose a password and
type it repeatedly over a period of time. The design is similar to that of Komanduri
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et al. in [109], and has two stages: registration and login. Registration consists
of a single MTurk HIT (Human Intelligence Task) in which we ask the worker to
choose a password that is at least 8 characters long, as if they were registering
with an email provider. They are encouraged to choose a password which is strong
and distinct from any of their existing passwords, and are informed that they
must memorize this password for future logins. As with many registration forms,
they must type the password twice. The user then fills in a short survey (1–2
questions) as means of distraction, and then is instructed to attempt to login with
their registered password via a login form. The worker has to type the password
correctly to be able to submit the HIT. An option for a “forgotten password” link is
provided; however this link delays the HIT by 20 seconds, discouraging them from
clicking it frequently. We informed workers that they must type their passwords
manually and avoid browser auto-fills. We recorded every keypress made inside the
password boxes and used heuristics to reject any submissions that did not appear
to have been typed in.
After this registration step is complete, we create a sequence of 50 user-specific
HITs for the worker, which they alone may view and complete; this allows us to
track individual user’s typing habits over different login attempts, while keeping
their chosen password confidential. Each HIT consists of the same login form
used in the final step of the registration stage. The user must complete the login,
then answer a few questions on their demographics or password typing behavior.
New HITs are created an hour after the submission of the last HIT to prevent
workers from completing them back-to-back; we notify the workers when a new
HIT is available. The workers are paid $0.05 for each HIT they complete, with an
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additional bonus of $0.04 for completing every five HITs.
Data cleansing and demographics. Due to various incompatibility issues
with rare browser versions and submissions which appeared to have been auto-
filled, data from 42 workers had to be discarded. Of the remaining 438 workers,
271 (61.9%) made at least 10 login attempts. In all subsequent analysis, we only
consider the data from these 271 workers. Based on the demographics survey, we
found that 48% of the 271 workers are males and 52% female; only 35 (13%) of the
users are left handed with the rest right handed. 117 (43%) of the users belong to
the age group 18–30, 108 (40%) belong to the age group 31–45, 30 (11%) to the
age group 46–60, and 16 (6%) are above the age of 60.
4.6.2 Analysis of Passwords and Typos
All of the passwords chosen by the MTurk workers were unique, with a median
and average length of 10 and 10.9 characters respectively, and average estimated
zxcvbn strength of 31.5 bits. Most passwords included special characters, numbers
and different case letters. Overall the passwords chosen by MTurk workers were
stronger than those seen in most password leaks (e.g., passwords in the RockYou
leak have a median password length of 7 characters and average zxcvbn entropy
of 14.2 bits). While we expect our results to hold for weaker password choices,
further studies will need to be performed to confirm this.
The workers made a median of 30 login attempts per person and 8,739 login
attempts in total; 491 (5.6%) of these contained at least one incorrect password
submission. Within the login attempts, there were a total of 9,440 password sub-
missions; of these 701 (7.4%) were incorrect, with 484 (70%) of these incorrect
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Typo Category % of Typos % of Users
Caps Lock 14 21
Shift first char 4 7
One insertion 12 28
One deletion 12 25
One replacement 31 47
Transposition 4 7
Two insertions 3 5
Two deletions 3 5
Two replacements 10 20
Other 8 16
Figure 4.7: Categorization of typos observed in the MTurk study. The middle column
gives the percentage of observed typos which were of each category. The rightmost
column gives the percentage of users who made a typo of that category.
submissions lying within DL distance 2 of the real password — as per the dis-
cussion in Section 5.2, we classify these 484 incorrect submissions as typos, and
therefore eligible for typo-tolerance in our subsequent analysis. A classification of
typos into exclusive categories is shown in Figure 4.7; our study finds similar user
typo behavior to that observed by Chatterjee et al. in [30]. Looking ahead, we
will calculate the utility of a given implementation of TypTop to be the fraction
of these 484 typos accepted by that implementation.
A graph depicting the DL distances of incorrect password submissions is given
in Figure 4.9a (the blue line). In total, 366 separate login attempts (4.2%) required
at least one password resubmission due to a typo. We found that 167 users (62%)




We perform simulations using the data from our MTurk study to evaluate the
utility of various combinations of cache sizes, caching schemes, and typo admission
policies. In more detail, we consider:
• Cache size: While a larger cache allows us to accept more typos and increases
utility, this benefit needs to be weighed up against the greater computational
power required to process larger caches, and the potential degradation in online
security from allowing more typos to authenticate. We consider caches of size t
for t ∈ {2, 3, 5} in our simulations.
• Caching Schemes: We consider all of the caching schemes discussed in
Section 4.4: LRU, LFU, PLFU, MFU, and Best-t. To see how TypTop compares
with the relaxed checking approach of Chatterjee et al., we also run simulations
for the relaxed checker using the Top-t corrector functions as per [30], which in
order of their efficacy are: flipping the case of all characters, flipping the case
of the first character, removing the last character, removing the first character,
and applying shift to switch the last digit to a symbol.
• Typo admission policy: As discussed in Section 4.4, admissible typos must
satisfy three criteria:
(1) DL(w, w˜) ≤ d; (2) µw˜ > m; and (3) µw˜ > µw − σ. We investigated all
combinations of the values d ∈ {1, 2}, m ∈ [0, 40], and σ ∈ [0, 9].
• Warming up the cache: Since warming up the cache allows us to tolerate
typos from the very first login, it can only increase utility. Additionally our se-
curity simulations in Section 4.5, which were all performed with warmed caches,
indicate that this practice does not negatively impact security. As such we
warm caches with the t most probable typos according to our typo model (see
152
CP
d = 1 d = 2
t=2 t=3 t=5 t=2 t=3 t=5
LFU 18 21 26 19 24 31
PLFU 19 22 27 22 26 32
MFU 18 21 26 19 25 30
LRU 17 21 27 19 25 32
Best-t 16 19 23 16 19 23
Top-t 18 19 22 18 19 22
Figure 4.8: The utility of different caching policies (CP), cache sizes (t) and edit distance
cutoff (d) for admissible typos, when applied to the login transcripts of all MTurk workers
who made at least one typo. We impose no guessability restrictions on admissible typos.
Appendix C.2).
For each set of parameter choices in the scope of the above, we simulate
each worker’s login behavior by replaying their password submissions to the pass-
word checker being evaluated. We report the utility for each of these configu-
rations below; recall that the utility of a checker Π is defined to be Utility(Π) =
# (typos accepted by Π) / # (typos observed), where both numerator and denom-
inator are taken across all users.
4.6.4 Results
Caching policies and cache sizes. We first compare the efficacy of different
caching schemes, cache sizes t, and DL distance thresholds d. For these simulations,
we impose no guessability restrictions on admissible typos, setting m = 0 and
σ =∞, as this will maximize the number of admissible typos. The utility of each
strategy is shown in Figure 4.8. We see that larger cache sizes (which allow us
to cache and tolerate more typos) correspond to an increase in utility. Similarly
increasing the DL distance threshold (and with it the set of typos considered for
inclusion in the cache) also increases utility. However, we conjecture that allowing
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Figure 4.9: (a) CDF of fraction of incorrect password submissions within a given DL
distance of the real password. (b) CDFs of zxcvbn strength of real passwords compared
to typos in the MTurk study. (c),(d) The change in utility for different absolute
guessability thresholds (m) and relative guessability thresholds (σ). The values of other
parameters are specified above each chart.
typos with DL distance 2 will degrade security enough to outweigh the utility
benefits (e.g., the resulting error settings are less likely to be t-sparse), so we select
t = 5 and d = 1 for further analysis and deployment.
For caching schemes, perhaps unsurprisingly, the utility of relaxed checking
with Top-t correctors is very similar to that of the static policy Best-t — the
former performs better for t = 2, while the latter performs better for t = 5.
This is because in our unoptimized typo model, the common error of flipping
154
the case of the first character often does not appear among the two most probable
typos for a given password, whereas it does get corrected by Top-2 correctors; the
resulting typos missed by Best-2 allows Top-2 to outperform it. However for t = 5,
the benefit of the password-specific typo correction offered by Best-5 emerges,
catching typos that the Top-5 correctors (which are chosen based on population-
wide analysis) cannot correct. With more data about typos and future refinement
of the parameters should overcome this small difference.
Because each individual worker made only a small number of incorrect sub-
missions in our study, the choice of caching policy had little observable impact on
utility for cache sizes t ≥ 3. However the variation is more noticeable for cache size
t = 2. As anticipated LRU performs less well than the frequency based caching
policies. Among the latter set, PLFU performs the best. Surprisingly, we also see
that MFU underperforms PLFU; however this could be due to the fact that we
did not receive enough incorrect submissions to see the benefit of MFU emerge,
and conjecture that in a longer term study, MFU may outperform PLFU.
Due to strong performance for utility and security (as discussed in Section 4.5),
and the cache size restraints, (which make MFU unsuitable for practical purposes),
we choose PLFU as the caching policy for deployment, with a cache size of t = 5
and DL distance threshold d = 1.
Different guessability restrictions. Next we investigate the impact of dif-
ferent admissible typo parameters m and σ on utility (recall that for typo w˜ to
be considered for inclusion in the cache of password w, it must be the case that
µw˜ > m, and µw˜ > µw − σ). We begin by considering the guessability cutoff pa-
rameter m ∈ {0, . . . , 40}. We perform simulations for TypTop implemented with
cache size t = 5, edit distance threshold d = 1, but without any relative guessabil-
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ity cutoff imposed (σ = ∞). We compute utility for all guessability cutoff values
m ∈ {0, . . . , 40} and all caching policies; the results are shown in Figure 4.9c. As
expected, utility decreases as the guessability cutoff increases and fewer typos are
considered for inclusion in the cache. Notably, we see the utility decrease rapidly
for m > 10. This is because, as shown in Figure 4.9b, nearly 5% of the observed
typos have an estimated security strength of less than 10 bits, indicating that set-
ting m = 10 gives the maximum security benefit without significantly degrading
utility.
We then investigated the effect on utility of different relative guessability cutoff
parameter settings σ. We perform simulations with the same parameter settings
as above, except we now fix m = 10. We compute utility for all relative guess-
ability cutoff parameters σ ∈ [0, 9] and all caching policies; the results are shown
in Figure 4.9c. For most of the caching policies, we found no significant improve-
ment on utility for σ > 3. This is to be expected, given that the guessability of
passwords and typos are very similar (as shown in Figure 4.9b). Since increasing
the guessability cutoff further increases the possibility that a significantly more
guessable string enters the cache with minimal benefit to utility, we choose σ = 3
to optimize the balance between utility and security.
Users and logins benefited. Among the 167 users who made at least one
typo during their submission (recall, here a typo is an incorrect submission within
edit distance 2 of the real password), 75 users (44.9%) would benefit by having at
least one of their typos accepted by TypTop with the PLFU caching policy and
the parameter setting described above. In contrast, only 49 users (29.3%) would
receive this benefit from the relaxed checker of [30] implemented with the Top-5
correctors. Of the 366 login attempts containing at least one typo, 106 (29%) of
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these would require at least one less password resubmission if TypTop were used
as the password checker. This saves an average of 5 seconds per login attempt for
the users making at least one typo, and an average of 12 seconds for the users who
made two typos in two different logins. In our small MTurk study (271 users), we
find that TypTop would save 23 person-minutes of login time, and with larger user
populations expect to see this time saved grow to several person-months.
We test the null hypothesis that TypTop (with the parameters decided above)
does not outperform relaxed checking with Top-t correctors in tolerating typos for
a randomly chosen user using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test [110]. We found that
we can reject the null hypothesis with p-value < 0.001.
4.7 A case study with TypTop
Password authenticated personal device logins are a key scenario in which users
may benefit from the typo-tolerance offered by TypTop. In this section we discuss
how to build TypTop for typo-tolerant device logins in Mac OS X and Linux based
systems. We deploy this prototype on 25 volunteers’ machines, obtaining data on
their password typing behaviors, and report on the performance of TypTop in a
real world deployment.
Implementation of TypTop. We build TypTop as a pluggable authentication
module (PAM) [111] for Unix based systems. The state of TypTop for each user is
stored in a separate file with the same permissions as the /etc/shadow file, which
is used to store users’ password hashes and is readable only by the root. The
Chk procedure is implemented in C++ and installed with similar file permissions
to passwd, a Linux utility tool which is used to update a user’s password. Via
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modifying the PAM configuration files, we set TypTop to be engaged on almost all
applications which require password based authentication. TypTop is very simple
to install, but requires root privileges.
As detailed in Section 4.6, we implement TypTop with parameters:
{CP=PLFU, t=5, d=1, m=10, σ=3}. There is currently no option to customize
the parameters; we plan to introduce restricted control for system admins in the
next version.
We tested the computational overhead of TypTop in an Ubuntu 14.04 laptop
with Intel Core M processor and 8 GB of memory. The size of the state-file is 13KB.
The average turnaround time is 110 milliseconds for a successful authentication
(i.e., the correct password or a cached typo is entered), and 250 milliseconds for
an incorrect submission. For traditional Ubuntu logins (e.g., with su), login takes
less than 1 millisecond.
The main computational overhead incurred by TypTop is due to our use
PBKDF2 [35] with 20,000 iterations of SHA-256 for each computation of the hash
function SH, while (somewhat surprisingly) a default Ubuntu laptop uses only 1
iteration of SHA-256 for its hash computation. Current standards [35, 112] rec-
ommend using at least 5,000 iterations of SHA-256 to hash passwords.
Chk will always perform the maximum number of hashes for an incorrect sub-
mission, which is why we see a longer turn around time for failed authentications.
However, this overhead is well below the noticeable limit for users. To avoid timing
side channels, we might want to compute the maximum number of hash computa-
tions for every login attempt (successful or failed) to make these turnaround times
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constant.
Pilot deployment of TypTop. To gather data on TypTop’s efficacy, we mod-
ify the implementation of TypTop slightly to allow confidential logging of users’
password typing behavior.
The logging module works as follows. During password registration, two ran-
dom 16-byte strings are generated and stored in the state of TypTop; the first is
used as an HMAC key to compute a unique identifier for each submitted pass-
word (or typo), while the second is used as a user-device identifier. With every
password submission, we log the HMAC identifier of the submission, along with
the DL distance from the real password, the relative guessability, and whether
the typo could have been corrected using Top-5 correctors (to form a comparison
between TypTop and relaxed checking). This allows us to learn the transcript of
password and typo submissions — and thus simulate a run of TypTop — while
never learning the actual strings entered. Some of these values (e.g., DL distance)
require both the underlying password and the typo to process; we back-fill these
values after a successful authentication when the encrypted caching scheme state
and wait list are decrypted. To simulate the Best-5 static caching scheme, we also
log the identifiers of the five most probable typos of the password.
The log and corresponding user identifier are uploaded to a server via an
HTTPS post request every 10 logins, after which the uploaded log is deleted from
the user’s laptop. The key used to generate the HMAC identifiers is never up-
loaded, making it impossible to brute-force recover passwords given the informa-
tion uploaded. Users can disable the logging and / or uploading feature at any
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time during the study without any effect on the functionality.
Data collection and analysis. We initially advertised our study via two uni-
versity mailing lists and a number of social media groups. However, we received
a lower response rate than anticipated, as users were initially reluctant to run re-
search code as their primary mode of authentication. Therefore, while not optimal,
we used snowball sampling [113] to increase participation in our study.
Study participation is anonymous: we do not know the exact set of volunteers
who installed TypTop, although we can deduce the number of distinct machines
on which TypTop was installed from the logs generated. In subsequent analysis,
we assume that each user installed TypTop on only one machine. We collected
data from 25 users over a period of 22–100 days (different users have varying data
collection periods depending on when they joined the study, and how long they
chose to participate for). TypTop was used for a median of 27 days.
We observed a total of 4,563 password submissions during the study, with a
median of 103 submissions per user. The average user types their password more
than five times a day, and incorrectly 15% of the time. We found that 93% of these
incorrect submissions are within DL distance two of the real password and thus
are classified as typos. The fraction of incorrect submissions that constitute typos
is larger than that observed in the MTurk study (70%); this is probably because
MTurk workers created their ‘passwords’ for the study, and so were more likely to
make high DL distance errors due to misremembering them.
In total we observed 501 typos, of which 316 (63%) are tolerated by TypTop.
This is significantly higher than the 122 (22%) that would be tolerated by the
relaxed checker with Top-5 correctors. However the benefit of typo correction
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varies across users. We observed 2 users who received an especially great benefit
from TypTop. They used TypTop for over 45 days, during which they typo-
ed their password 24% of the time — we found TypTop corrected 85% of their
typos, whereas the Top-5 corrector functions corrected virtually none. For the
remainder of the participants, we found that TypTop and the Top-5 correctors
performed roughly the same. We believe this is because personal machines in
university settings tend to have very lenient password policies (if any policy at all),
meaning users pick simpler passwords whose typos are more likely to be among
those corrected by the Top-5 correctors. We expect to see the performance benefit
of TypTop emerge in settings where users must pick stronger and less readily
correctable passwords (e.g., over 12 characters), and lock / unlock their computers
many times a day. We simulated other caching policies on the collected data, and
observed roughly the same performance.
These results suggest that personalized typo-tolerance may be very beneficial
to users who are especially typo-prone, and that this benefit increases the longer
the system is used. The sample size of our initial pilot deployment is too small to
allow us to draw more general conclusions at this stage; as such we are planning a
study with more participants and which runs for a longer period of time. We will
be publishing TypTop as a public, open-source project to facilitate a study with
a broader set of participants.
4.8 Conclusion
We introduce the notion of personalized typo-tolerant password checkers, which
adapt over time to correct the typos made most frequently by the individual user.
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We design and build an adaptive password checking scheme called TypTop, which
securely caches incorrect password submissions that pass a policy check on what
forms of typos to allow. We formalize a cryptographic security notion for such
schemes, and show a formal reduction of our scheme’s security to the difficulty of
brute-force cracking attacks against the registered password or the typos entered
into the typo cache. We give simple criteria that, if met, ensure no security loss in
oﬄine attack and negligible security loss in online attack, and empirically verify
that real world password and typo distributions satisfy this requirement. Simula-
tions conducted with data gathered via a study on Amazon MTurk suggest that
TypTop will outperform existing approaches to typo-tolerant password checking,
and a small pilot deployment suggests that TypTop can provide a substantial
usability benefit to especially typo-prone users.
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CHAPTER 5
PROTOCOLS FOR CHECKING COMPROMISED CREDENTIALS
This chapter is under submission to ACM Conference on Computer and Commu-
nication Security (CCS), 2019 [32].
5.1 Introduction
Password database breaches have become routine [114]. Such breaches enable
credential stuffing attacks, in which attackers try to compromise accounts by sub-
mitting passwords that were leaked from another website. To counter credential
stuffing attacks, companies and other organizations have begun checking if their
users’ passwords appear in breaches, and, if so, they deploy further protections
(e.g., resetting the user’s password or otherwise warning the user). Information
on what usernames and passwords have appeared in breaches is gathered either
from public sources or from a third-party service. The latter democratizes access
to leaked credentials, making it easy for others to help their customers gain con-
fidence that they are not using exposed passwords. We refer to such services as
compromised credentials checking services, or C3 services in short.
Two prominent C3 services already operate. HaveIBeenPwned (HIBP) [115]
was deployed by CloudFlare in 2018 and is used by many web services, including
Firefox [116], EVE Online [117], and 1Password [118]. Google released a Chrome
extension called Password Checkup (GPC) [2] in February 2019 that allows users
to check if their username-password pair appears in a compromised dataset. Both
services work by having the user share with the C3 server a prefix of the hash
of their password or the hash of their username-password pair. This leaks some
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information about user passwords, which is problematic should the C3 server be
compromised or otherwise malicious. But until now there has no thorough inves-
tigation into the damage from the leakage of current C3 services or suggestions for
protocols that provide better privacy.
We provide the first formal treatment of C3 services for different settings, in-
cluding exploration of their security requirements. A C3 service must provide
secrecy of credentials provided by the client, and ideally, it should also preserve
secrecy of the leaked datasets held by the C3 server. The computational and band-
width overhead for the client and especially the server should also be low. The
server might hold billions of leaked records, so using existing cryptographic proto-
cols for private set intersection (PSI) [119] to check if the client’s credentials are
present in the server’s dataset will be prohibitively expensive.
Current industry-deployed C3 services therefore reduce bandwidth require-
ments by dividing the leaked data into buckets before performing PSI. The client
shares with the C3 server the identifier of the bucket where their credentials would
be found, if present in the dataset. Then, the client and the server engage in a
private set intersection protocol between the bucket held by the server and the
credential held by the client. In current schemes, the prefix of the hash of the user
credential is used as the bucket identifier. The client shares the hash prefix (bucket
identifier) of their credentials with the C3 server.
Revealing hash prefixes of the credentials may be dangerous. We outline an
attack scenario against such prefix-revealing C3 services. In particular, we consider
a conservative setting where an attacker obtains the hash prefix shared with the
C3 server (possibly by compromising the server) and also knows the username
associated with the queried credential. We rigorously evaluate the security of
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HIBP and GPC under this threat model via a mixture of formal and empirical
analysis.
We start by considering users with a password appearing in some leak and
show how to adapt a recent state-of-the-art credential tweaking attack [120] to
take advantage of the knowledge of hash prefixes. In a credential tweaking attack,
one uses the leaked password to determine likely guesses (usually, small tweaks
on the leaked password). Via simulation, we show that our variant of credential
tweaking successfully compromises 80% of such accounts within 1,000 guesses,
given the transcript of a query made to the HIBP server. This is 28% more than
what an attacker who does not have the hash prefix and simply runs the best
known credential tweaking attack would get.
We also consider user accounts not present in a leak. Here we found that the
leakage from the hash prefix disproportionately affects security compared to the
previous case. For these user accounts, obtaining the query to HIBP enables the
attacker to guess 71% of passwords within 1,000 guesses, which is a 12x increase
over the success with no hash prefix information. Similarly, for GPC, our simu-
lation shows 34% of user passwords can be guessed in 10 or fewer attempts (and
61% in 1,000 attempts), should the attacker learn the hash prefix shared with the
GPC server.
The attack scenarios described are conservative because they assume the at-
tacker can infer which queries to the C3 server are associated to which usernames.
This may not be always possible. Nevertheless, caution dictates that we would
prefer schemes that leak less. We therefore present two new C3 protocols, one that
checks for leaked passwords (like HIBP) and one that checks for leaked username-
password pairs (like GPC). Like GPC and HIBP, we partition the password space
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before performing PIR, but we do so in a way that reduces leakage significantly.
Our first scheme works when only passwords are queried. It utilizes a novel
approach that we call frequency-smoothing bucketization (FSB). The key idea is to
use an estimate of the distribution of human-chosen passwords to assign passwords
to buckets in a way that flattens the distribution of accessed buckets. We show how
to obtain good estimates (using leaked data), and, via simulation, that FSB reduces
leakage significantly. In many cases the best attack given the information leaked
by the C3 protocol works no better than not having the information at all. While
the benefits come with some added computational complexity and bandwidth, we
show via experimentation that the operational overhead for the FSB C3 server or
client is comparable with the overhead from GPC, while also leaking much less
information.
We also present a more secure bucketizing scheme that provides better pri-
vacy/bandwidth tradeoff for C3 servers that store username-password pairs. We
give a simple modification of the protocol used by GPC. We call this IDB, ID-based
bucketization, as it uses the hash prefix of only the user identifier for bucketization
(instead of the hash prefix of the username-password pair as used by GPC). Not
having password information in the bucket identifier hides the user’s password per-
fectly from an attacker who obtains the client queries (assuming that passwords
are independent of usernames). We implement IDB and show that the average
bucket size in this setting for a hash prefix of 16 bits is similar to that of GPC
(around 9,166 entries per bucket).
Contributions. The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
 We provide a formalization of C3 protocols and detail the security goals for
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such services.
 We discuss various threat models for C3 services, and analyze the security
of two widely deployed C3 protocols. We show that an attacker that learns
the queries from a client can severely damage the security of the client’s
passwords, should they also know the client’s username.
 We give a new C3 protocol for checking only leaked passwords (FSB) that
utilizes the knowledge of the human-chosen password distribution to reduce
the leakage.
 We give a new C3 protocol for checking leaked username-password pairs
(IDB) that bucketizes using only usernames.
 We analyze the performance and security of both new C3 protocols to show
feasibility in practice.
We will release as public, open source code our server and client implementations
of FSB and IDB.
5.2 Overview
We investigate approaches to checking credentials present in previous breaches.
Several third party services provide credential checking, enabling users and compa-
nies to mitigate credential stuffing and credential tweaking attacks [120, 121, 122],
an increasingly daunting problem for account security.
To date, such C3 services have not received any analysis, and indeed their design
rationale has only been discussed in blog posts [1, 123]. We start by describing the











Figure 5.1: A C3S service allows a client to ascertain whether a username and password
appear in public breaches known to the service.
5.2.1 C3 settings.
We provide a diagrammatic summary of the abstract architecture of C3 services
in Figure 5.1. A C3 server has access to a breach database S˜. We can think of
S˜ as a set of size N , which consists of either a set of passwords {w1, . . . , wN} or
username-password pairs {(u1, w1), . . . , (uN , wN )}. This corresponds to two types
of C3 services — password-only C3 service and username-password C3 service. For
example, HIBP [1] is a password-only C3 service,1 and Google’s service GPC [2] is
an example of username-password C3 service.
A client has as input a credential s = (u,w) and wants to determine if s is at
risk due to exposure. The client and server therefore engage in a set membership
protocol to determine if s ∈ S˜. Here, clients can be users themselves (query C3
service using, say, a browser extension), or other web services can query the C3
service on behalf of their users. Of course, clients may make multiple queries to
the C3 service, though the number of queries might be rate limited.
1Actually HIBP also allows checking if a user identifier (email) is leaked with a data breach.
For the purpose of this study, however, we only focus on the above mentioned two C3 services.
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The ubiquity of breaches means that, nowadays, the breach database S˜ will
be quite large. A recently leaked compilation of previous breached data contains
1.4 billion username password pairs [124]. The HIBP database has 501 million
unique passwords [1]. Google’s blog specifies that there are 4 billion username-
password pairs in their database of leaked credentials [123].
C3S protocols should be able to scale to handle set membership requests for
these huge datasets and for millions of requests a day. HIBP reported serving
around 600,000 requests per day on average [125]. The design of C3S should there-
fore not be computationally expensive on the server-side. The number of network
round trips required must be low, and we will restrict attention to protocols that
can be completed with a single HTTPS request. Finally, we will want to minimize
bandwidth usage.
5.2.2 Threat model.
Both the C3 server’s database S˜ and the client’s queried password should be con-
sidered confidential. While breaches are often made public, we prefer to treat S˜ as
confidential even if it consists of only public information. Of course, by querying
on S˜ a malicious client will fundamentally be able to check if values are in the
database. Ideally such a brute-force approach would be the best possible attack.
A malicious C3 server could deviate from its protocol, for example, by lying
to the client about the contents of S˜ in order to encourage them to pick a weak
password. Monitoring techniques might be useful to catch such misdeeds. We do
not consider active attacks further, as we focus instead on the more pressing issue
of not leaking (u,w) to an honest-but-curious server that follows its protocol but
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wants to infer information about the user’s username or password.
An attacker upon compromising the C3 server can observe the query meta-
data (e.g., IP address of the querying user). An attacker can learn the username
corresponding to a query by linking IP addresses to usernames using auxiliary
information. For example, the attacker can send tracking emails to all the leaked
email addresses present in the breach datasets, and if a client clicks on the link
present in the email, the attacker would be able to retrieve the IP address of the
user [126]. Thereby, the attacker can associate the email to queries. Such attack
might be avoidable by using anonymity networks like Tor [127]. Of course, ideally,
a C3 protocol should to not leak the username to the server.
Nevertheless, for the rest of the chapter, we will focus on the threat model
where the attacker knows the querying user’s username, and refer to it as a known-
username attack (KUA). The KUA is targeted; as such, the attacker can take
advantage of the leaked data to find (any) leaked passwords associated to the
target username and tailor its guesses based on them.
For this chapter, we will focus on online attack settings, where the attacker
tries to impersonate a user by guessing their password for other web services online.
These are easy to launch and are one of the most prevalent forms of attacks [14, 28].
However, in an online setting, the web service can monitor the failed login attempts
and lock an account out after too many incorrect password submissions. Therefore,
the attacker gets only a small number of attempts, known as the guessing budget
q of the attack.
Potential approaches. A C3 protocol requires, at core, a secure set mem-
bership query. Existing protocols for private set intersection (a generalization of
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HIBP 20-bits of SHA1(w) 15.9 208 12x
FSB Figure 5.6, q¯ = 102 261 527 2x
(Username, GPC 16-bits of Argon2(u‖w) 606 458 10x
password) IDB 16-bits of Argon2(u) 606 487 1x
Figure 5.2: Comparison of different C3 protocols. HIBP [1] and GPC [2] are two C3
services used in practice. We introduce frequency-smoothing bucketization (FSB) and
identifier-based bucketization (IDB). Security loss is computed assuming query budget
q = 103 for users who has not been compromised before.
set membership) [128, 129, 130, 131] cannot currently scale to the set sizes re-
quired in C3 settings, N ≈ 230. For example, the basic PSI protocol that uses
an oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) [128] computes yi = FK(ui, wi) for
(ui, wi) ∈ S˜ where FK is the secure OPRF with secret key K (held by the server).
It sends all y1, . . . , yN to the client, and the client obtains y = FK(u,w) for its
input (u,w) by obliviously computing it with the server. The client can then check
if y ∈ {y1, . . . , yN}. But clearly for large N this is prohibitively expensive in terms
of bandwidth. One can use Bloom filters to more compactly represent the set
y1, . . . , yN , but the result is still too large. While more advanced PSI protocols
exist that improve on these results asymptotically, they are unfortunately not yet
practical for this C3 setting [128, 119].
Practical C3 schemes therefore relax the security requirements, allowing the
protocol to leak some information about the client’s queried (u,w) but hopefully
not too much. To date no one has investigated how damaging the leakage of
currently proposed schemes is, which we turn to doing next. In Figure 5.2, we




u / U user identifier, e.g. email / domain of users
w / P password / domain of passwords
S domain of credentials
S˜ set of leaked credentials, and |S˜| = N
p distribution of username-password pairs over U × P
pw distribution of passwords over P
pˆs estimate of pw used by C3 server
q query budget of an attacker
q¯ parameter to FSB, estimated query budget of an attack
Figure 5.3: Descriptions of the notation used in the chapter.
5.3 Bucketization Schemes and Security Models
In this section we formalize the security models for a class of C3 schemes that
bucketize the breach dataset into smaller sets (buckets). Intuitively, a straightfor-
ward approach for checking whether or not a client’s credentials are present in a
large set of leaked credentials hosted by a server is to divide the leaked data into
various buckets. The client and server can then perform a private set intersection
between the user’s credentials and one of the buckets (potentially) containing that
credential. The bucketization makes private set membership tractable, while only
leaking to the server that the password may lie in the set associated to a certain
bucket.
We give a general framework to understand the security loss and bandwidth
overhead of different bucketization schemes, and evaluate existing C3 services for
the same.
Notation. For ease of description of the constructions that follow, we fix some
notations. Let P be the set of all passwords, and pw be the associated probability
distribution; let U be the set of all user identifiers, and p be the joint distribution
over U × P . We will use S to denote the domain of credentials being checked,
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GuessA(q)
(u,w)←p U × P
{w˜1, . . . , w˜q} ← A(u, q)
return w ∈ {w˜1, . . . , w˜q}
BucketGuessBβ (q)
(u,w)←p U × P; s← (u,w)
h←$ β(s)
{w˜1, . . . , w˜q} ← B(u, h, q)
return w ∈ {w˜1, . . . , w˜q}
Figure 5.4: The guessing games to evaluate security of different C3 schemes.
i.e., for password-only C3 service, S = P , and for username-password C3 service,
S = U × P . Below we will use S to give a generic scheme, and specify the setting
only if necessary to distinguish. Similarly, s ∈ S denotes a password or a username-
password pair, based on the setting. Let S˜ be the set of leaked credentials, and
|S˜| = N .
Let H be a cryptographic hash function from {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}`, where ` is
a parameter to the system. We use B to denote the set of buckets, and we let
β : S 7→ B∗ \ {∅} be a bucketizing function which maps a credential to a set of
buckets. A credential can be mapped to multiple buckets, and every credential is
assigned to at least one bucket. An inverse function to β is α : B 7→ S∗, which
maps a bucket to the set of all credentials it contains; so, α(b) = {s ∈ S | b ∈ β(s)}.
Note, α(b) can be very large given it considers all credentials in S. We let α˜ be
the function that denotes the credentials in the buckets held by the C3 server,
α˜(b) = α(b) ∩ S˜.
The client sends b to the server, and then the client and the server engage in a
set intersection protocol between {s} and α˜(b).
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5.3.1 Bucketization schemes.
Bucketization is dividing the credentials held by the server into smaller buckets.
The client can use the bucketizing function β to find the set of buckets for a
credential, and then pick one randomly to query the server. There are different
ways to bucketize the credentials.
In the first method, which we call hash-prefix-based bucketization (HPB), the
credentials are partitioned based on the first l bits of a cryptographic hash of
the credentials. GPC [2] and HIBP [1] APIs use HPB. The distribution of the
credentials is not considered in HPB, which causes it to incur higher security loss,
as we show in Section 5.4.
We introduce a new bucketizing method, which we call frequency-smoothing
bucketization (FSB), that takes into account the distribution of the credentials and
replicates credentials into multiple buckets if necessary. The replication “flattens”
the conditional distribution of passwords given a bucket id, and therefore vastly
reduces the security loss. We discuss FSB in more details in Section 5.5.
In both HPB and FSB, the bucketization function depends on the user’s pass-
word. We give another bucketization approach — the most secure one — that buck-
etizes based only on the hash prefix of the user identifier. We call this identifier-
based bucketizing (IDB). The approach is only applicable for username-password
C3 services. We discuss IDB in Section 5.4.
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5.3.2 Security measure.
The goal of an attacker is to learn the user’s password. We will focus on online-
guessing attacks, where an attacker tries to guess a user’s password over the login
interfaces provided by a web service. An account might be locked for too many
incorrect guesses (say, for example, 10), and the attack fails. Therefore, we will
measure an attacker’s success given a certain guessing budget, say q. We will
always assume the attacker has access to the username of the target user.
The security games are given in Figure 5.4. The game Guess models the situ-
ation in which no information besides the username is revealed to the adversary
about the password. In the game BucketGuess, the adversary also gets access to a
bucket that is chosen according to the credentials s = (u,w) and the bucketization
function β.
We define the advantage against a game as the maximum probability that the


















The probabilities are taken over the choices of username-password pairs and the
selection of bucket from the bucketizing function β. Security loss, ∆β(q), of a











Pr [w ∈ A(u, q) ∧ U = u ] .
To maximize this probability, the attacker must pick the q most probable passwords
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Pr [W = wi ∧ U = u ] . (5.1)
In BucketGuessβ, the attacker has access to the bucket identifier, and therefore the
























Pr [W = wi ∧ U = u ]
|β((u,wi))|
The second equation follows because for b ∈ β((u,w)), each bucket in β(w) is
equally likely to be chosen, so
Pr
[
B = b | W = w ∧ U = u ] = 1|β((u,w))| .
The joint distribution of usernames and passwords is hard to model. To sim-
plify the equations, we divide the users targeted by the attacker into two groups:
compromised (users whose previously compromised accounts are available to the
attacker) and uncompromised (users for which the attacker has no information
other than their usernames).
We assume the there is no direct correlation between the username and pass-
word.2 Therefore, an attacker cannot use the knowledge of only the username
to tailor guesses. This means that in the uncompromised setting, we assume
Pr
[
W = w | U = u ] = Pr [W = w ]. Assuming independence of usernames and






Pr [W = wi ] . (5.2)
2Though prior work [122, 132] suggests knowledge of only username can improve efficacy
of guessing user passwords, the improvement is minimal. See Appendix D.2 for more on this
analysis.
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We give analytical and empirical analysis of security in this setting, and show
that the security of uncompromised users is impacted by existing C3 schemes much
more than that of compromised users.
In the compromised setting, the attacker can use the username to find other
leaked passwords associated with that user, which then can be used to tailor
guesses [120, 122]. Analytical bounds on the compromised setting are less in-
formative, so we evaluate this setting empirically in Section 5.6.
Bandwidth. The bandwidth required for a bucketization scheme is determined
by the size of the buckets. The maximum size of the buckets can be determined
using a balls-and-bins approach [133], assuming the client picks a bucket randomly
from the possible set of buckets β(s) for a credential s, and β(s) also maps s to a
random set of buckets. In total m =
∑
s∈S˜ |β(s)| credentials (balls) are “thrown”
into n = |B| buckets. If m > |B| · log |B|, then following the seminal results on
balls-and-bins game [133], we can show the maximum number of passwords in a









≤ 2 · m
n
. We
will use this formula to compute an upper bound on the bandwidth requirement
for specific bucketization schemes.
5.4 Hash-prefix-based Bucketization
Hash-prefix-based bucketization (HPB) schemes are a simple ways to divide the
credentials stored by the C3 server. In this scheme, a prefix of the hash of the
credential is used as the criteria to group the credentials into buckets — all cre-
dentials that share the same hash-prefix are assigned to the same bucket. The
total number of buckets depends on l, the length the hash-prefix. The number of
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credentials in the buckets depends on both l and |S˜|. We will use H(l)(·) to denote
the function that outputs the l-bit prefix of the hash H(·). The client shares the
hash prefix of the credential they wish to check with the server. While a smaller
hash-prefix reveals less information to the server about the user’s password, it also
increases the size of each bucket held by the server, which in turn increases the
communication overhead.
Hash-prefix-based bucketization is currently being used for credential checking
in industry: HIBP [1] and GPC [2]. We introduce a new HPB protocol called IDB
that achieves zero security loss for any query budget. Below we will discuss the
design details of these three C3 protocols.
HIBP [1]. HIBP uses HPB bucketization to provide a password-only C3 service.
They do not provide compromised username-password checking. HIBP maintains a
database of leaked passwords, which contains more than 501 million passwords [1].
They use the SHA1 hash function, with prefix length l = 20; the leaked dataset
is partitioned into 220 buckets. The prefix length is chosen to ensure no bucket
is too small or too big. With l = 20, the smallest bucket has 381 passwords,
and the maximum bucket has 584 passwords [134] . This effectively makes the
user’s password k-anonymous. However, k-anonymity provides limited protection,
as shown by numerous prior works [135, 136, 137] and by our security evaluation.
The passwords are hashed using SHA1 and indexed by their hash prefix for
fast retrieval. A client computes the SHA1 hash of their password w and queries
HIBP with the 20-bit prefix of the hash; the server responds with all the hashes
that shares the same 20-bit prefix. The client then checks if the full SHA1 hash
of w is present among the set of hashes sent by the server. This is a weak form
of PSI that does not hide the leaked passwords from the client — the client learns
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the SHA1 hash of the leaked passwords and can perform brute force cracking to
recover those passwords.
HIBP justifies this design choice by observing that passwords in the server side
leaked dataset are publicly available for download on the Internet. Therefore, HIBP
lets anyone download the hashed passwords and usernames. This can be useful
for parties who want to host their own leak checking service without relying on
HIBP. However, keeping the leaked dataset up-to-date can be challenging, making
a third-party C3 service preferable.
HIBP trades server side privacy for protocol simplicity. The protocol also
allows utilization of heavy caching on content delivery networks (CDN), such as
Cloudflare.3 The caching helps HIBP to be able to serve 8 million requests a day
with 99% cache hit rate (as of August 2018) [138]. The human-chosen password
distribution is “heavy-headed”, that is a small number of passwords are chosen by
a large number of users. Therefore, a small number of passwords are queried a
large number of times, which in turn makes CDN caching much more effective.
GPC [2]. Google provides a username-password C3S, called Password Checkup
(GPC). The client — a browser extension — computes the hash of the username
and password together using the Argon2 hash function with the first l = 16 bits to
determine the bucket identifier. After determining the bucket, the client engages
in a private set intersection (PSI) protocol with the server. The full algorithm
is given in Figure 5.5. GPC uses an OPRF-based PSI protocol. Let F(·)(·) be a
key-homomorphic pseudo-random function (PRF) such that Fa(·)× Fb(·) = Fab(·).
Under the hood, F calls the hash function H on u‖w, and then maps the hash
output onto the elliptic curve point for further computation.
3https://www.cloudflare.com/
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Precomputation by C3 Server
Let S˜ = {(u1, w1), . . . , (uN , wN )}
∀j ∈ [0, . . . , 2l − 1]
zj ←
{




FK(ui‖wi) |H(l)(u) = j)
}
Client C3 server









Return x˜ ∈ zb
Figure 5.5: Algorithms for GPC, and the change in IDB given in the box. F(·)(·) is a
PRF.
The server has a secret key K which it uses to compute the yi = FK(ui‖wi).
The client shares with the server the bucket id b and the PRF output of username-
password pair x = Fr(u‖w), for some randomly sampled r. The server returns the
bucket zb = {yi |H(ui‖wi) = b} and y = FK(x). Finally, the client completes the
OPRF computation by computing x˜ = F 1
r
(y) = FK(u‖w), and checking if x˜ ∈ zb.
The GPC protocol is significantly more complex than HIBP, and it does not
allow easy caching by CDNs. However, it provides secrecy of server side leaked
data — the best case attack is to follow the protocol to brute-force check if a
password is present in the leak database.
Bandwidth. HPB assigns every credential to only one bucket, therefore, m =∑
w∈S˜ |β(w)| = |S˜| = N . The total number of buckets n = 2l. Following the
discussion from Section 5.3, maximum bandwidth for a HPB C3S should be no
more than 2 · m
n
= 2 · N2l .
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We experimentally verified the bandwidth value, and the sizes of the buckets
for HIBP, GPC, and IDB are given in Section 5.7.
Security. HPB schemes like HIBP and GPC expose a prefix of the user’s password
(or username-password pair) to the server. As discussed earlier, we assume the
attacker knows the username of the target user. In the uncompromised setting
— where the user identifier does not appear in the leaked data available to the
attacker, we show that giving the attacker the hash-prefix with a guessing budget
of q queries is equivalent to giving as many as q · |B| queries (with no hash-prefix)
to the attacker.
Theorem 5.4.1 Let βHPB : S 7→ B be the bucketization scheme that, for a cre-
dential s ∈ S, chooses a bucket that is a function of H(l)(s), where s contains the




(q) ≤ Advgs(q · |B|) .
Proof: First, note that |βHPB(·)| = 1, as every password is assigned to exactly one
of the buckets. Following the discussion from Section 5.3, assuming independence
of usernames and passwords in the uncompromised setting, we can compute the











Pr [W = wi ] ≤ Advgs(q · |B|)
We relax the α(b) notation to denote set of passwords (instead of username-
password pairs) assigned to a bucket b. The inequality follows from the fact that
each password is present in only one bucket. If we sum up the probabilities of the
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top q passwords in each bucket, the result will be at most the sum of the proba-
bilities of the top q · |B| passwords. Therefore, the maximum advantage achievable
is Advgs(q · |B|).
Theorem 5.4.1 only provides an upper bound on the security loss. Moreover,
for the compromised setting, the analytical formula is less informative. So, we
use empiricism to find the effective security loss against compromised and uncom-
promised users. We report all security simulation results in Section 5.6. Notably,
with GPC with hash prefix length l = 16, an attacker can guess passwords of
60.5% of (previously uncompromised) user accounts in fewer than 1000 guesses, a
10x increase from the percent it can compromise without access to the hash prefix.
(See Section 5.6 for more results.)
Identifier-based bucketization (IDB). As our security analysis and simula-
tion show, the security degradation of HPB is dismal. The main issue with those
protocols is that the bucket identifier is a deterministic function of the user pass-
word. We give a new C3 protocol that uses HPB style bucketing based on only
username. We call this identifier-based bucketization (IDB). IDB is defined for
username-password C3 schemes.
IDB is a slight modification of the protocol used by GPC— we use the
hash-prefix of the username, H(l)(u), instead of the hash-prefix of the username-
password combination, H(l)(u‖w), as a bucket identifier. The scheme is described
in Figure 5.5, using the changes in the boxed code. The bucket identifier is com-
puted completely independent of the password (assuming username is independent
of the password). Therefore, the attacker gets no additional advantage for knowing
the bucket identifier.
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Because IDB uses the hash-prefix of the username as the bucket identifier, two
hash computations are required on the client side for each query (as opposed to one
for GPC). With most modern devices, this is not a significant computing burden,
but the protocol latency may be impacted, since we use a slow hash (Argon2). We
show experimentally how the extra hash computation affects the latency of IDB
in Section 5.7.
Since IDB does not use the user’s password to determine the bucket identifier,
there is no security loss.




We provide the proof of this theorem in Appendix D.3. Because the bucket iden-
tifiers are chosen independent of the passwords, the conditional probability of the
password given the bucket identifier remains the same as the probability without
knowing the bucket identifier.
Overall, we can use a form of HPB to create a username-password C3S scheme
with no security loss, but the password-only C3S schemes constructed using HPB
lead to significant security loss. In the next section we solve this problem by
introducing a more secure password-only C3S scheme.
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5.5 Frequency-Smoothing Bucketization
In the previous section we show how to build a username-password C3 service that
does not degrade security. However, many services, such as HIBP, only provide
a password-only C3 service. HIBP does not store username-password pairs so,
should the HIBP server ever get compromised, an attacker cannot use their leak
database to mount credential stuffing attacks. Moreover, IDB cannot be extended
in any useful way to protect password-only C3 services.
Therefore, we introduce a new bucketization scheme to build secure password-
only C3 services. We call this scheme frequency-smoothing bucketization (FSB).
FSB assigns a password to multiple buckets based on its probability — frequent
passwords are assigned to many buckets. Replicating a password into multiple
buckets effectively reduces the conditional probabilities of that password given a
bucket identifier. We do so in a way that makes the conditional probabilities of
popular passwords similar to those of unpopular passwords to make it harder for
the attacker to guess the correct password. FSB, however, is only effective for
non-uniform credential distributions, such as password distributions.4 Therefore,
FSB cannot be used to build a username-password C3 service.
Implementing FSB requires knowledge of the distribution of human-chosen
passwords. Of course, obtaining precise knowledge of the password distribution
can be difficult, therefore, we will use an estimated password distribution, denoted
by pˆs. Another parameter of FSB is q¯, which is an estimate of the attacker’s query
budget. We show that if the actual query budget q ≤ q¯, FSB has zero security loss.
Larger q¯ will provide better security; however, it also means more replication of the
4Usernames (e.g., emails) are unique for each users, so the distribution of usernames and










If s + γ < |B| then
r ← [s, s + γ − 1]
Else
r ← [0, s + γ − 1 mod |B|]
r ← r ∪ [s, |B| − 1]
Return r
α˜FSB(b) :
/* returns {w ∈ S˜ | b ∈ β(w)} */
A← Pq¯
For w ∈ S˜ \ Pq¯ do
If b ∈ βFSB(w) then
A← A ∪ {w}
return A
Figure 5.6: Bucketizing function βFSB for assigning passwords to buckets in FSB. Here
pˆs is the distribution of passwords; Pq¯ is the set of top-q¯ passwords according to pˆs; B is
the set of buckets; f is a universal hash function f : W 7→ Z|B|; S˜ is the set of passwords
hosted by the server.
passwords and larger bucket sizes. So, q¯ can be tuned to balance between security
and bandwidth. Below we will give the two main algorithms of FSB scheme: βFSB
and α˜FSB, followed by bandwidth and security analysis for FSB.
Bucketizing function (βFSB). To map passwords to buckets, we use an universal
hash function f : P 7→ Z|B|. The algorithm for bucketization βFSB(w) is given
in Figure 5.6. The parameter q¯ is used in the following way: β replicates the
most probable q¯ passwords, Pq¯, across all |B| buckets. Each of the remaining
passwords are replicated proportional to their probability. A password w with




times, where wq¯ is the q¯
th most
likely password. Exactly which buckets a password is assigned to are determined
using the universal hash function f . Each bucket is assigned an identifier between
[0, |B| − 1]. A password w is assigned to the buckets whose identifiers fall in the
range [f (w), f (w) + γ − 1]. The range can wrap around. For example, if f (w)+γ >
|B|, then the password is assigned to the buckets in the range [0, f (w) + γ − 1
mod |B|] and [f (w), |B| − 1].
Bucket retrieving function (α˜). Retrieving passwords assigned to a bucket is
challenging in FSB. An inefficient — linear in N — implementation of α˜ is given
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in Figure 5.6. Storing the contents of each bucket separately is not feasible, since
the number of buckets in FSB can be very large, |B| ≈ N . To solve the problem,
we utilize the structure of the bucketizing procedure where passwords are assigned
to buckets in continuous intervals. This allows us to use an interval tree [139] data
structure to store the intervals for all of the passwords. Interval trees allow fast
queries to retrieve the set of intervals that contain a queried point (or interval) —
exactly what is needed to instantiate α˜.
This efficiency comes with increased storage cost. To store N entries in a
interval tree, we require O (N logN ) storage. The tree can be built in O (N logN )
time, and each query takes O (logN + |α˜(b)|) time. The big-O notation only hides
small constants.
Estimating password distributions. To construct the bucketization algorithm
for FSB, the server needs an estimate of the password distribution (pw). This
estimate will be used by both the server and the client to assign passwords to
buckets. One possible estimate is the histogram of the passwords in the leaked
data S˜. Histogram estimates are typically accurate for popular passwords, but
such estimates are not complete — passwords that are not in the leaked dataset will
have zero probability according to this estimate. Moreover, sending the histogram
over to the client is expensive in terms of bandwidth and security critical. We
also considered password strength meters, such as zxcvbn [103] as a proxy for a
probability estimate. However, this estimate turned out to be too coarse for our
purposes. For example, more than 105 passwords had a “probability” of greater
than 10−3.
We build a 3-gram password model pˆn using the leaked passwords present in S˜.
Markov models or n-gram models are shown to be effective at estimating human-
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chosen password distributions [41], and very fast to train and run (unlike neural
network based password distribution estimators, such as [104]). However, we found
the n-gram model assigns very low probabilities to popular passwords. The sum
of the probabilities of the top 1,000 passwords as estimated by the 3-gram model
is only 0.0012, whereas in practice the top 1000 passwords are chosen by 5.6% of
users.
We therefore use a combined approach that uses a histogram model for the
popular passwords and the 3-gram model for the rest of the distribution. Such
combined techniques are also used in practice for password strength estima-
tion [103, 104]. Let pˆs be the estimated password distribution used by FSB. Let
pˆh be the distribution of passwords implied by the histogram of passwords present









Bandwidth. We use the formulation provided in Section 5.3 to compute the
bandwidth requirement for FSB. In this case, m = |B| · q¯ + |B|
pˆs(wq¯)
+ N , and n =







. The details of this analysis are given in Appendix D.1.
In practice, we can choose the number of buckets to be such that |B| = N .
Then, the number of passwords in a bucket depends primarily on the parameter
q¯. Note, bucket size increases with q¯.
Security analysis. We show that there is no security loss in the uncompromised
setting for FSB when the actual number of guesses q is less than the parameter q¯,
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and we give an upper bound for the security loss when q exceeds q¯.







, then for the uncompromised users,
(1) Advb-gs
FSB
(q) = Advgs(q) for q ≤ q¯, and
(2) for q > q¯ ,
λq − λq¯
2
≤ ∆q ≤ (q − q¯) · pˆs(wq¯)− (λq − λq¯)
The full proof is included in Appendix D.4. Intuitively, since the top q passwords
are repeated across all buckets, having a bucket identifier does not allow an attacker
to easily guess these q passwords. Moreover, the conditional probability of these
q passwords given the bucket is greater than that of any other password in the
bucket. Therefore, the attacker’s best choice is to guess the top q passwords,
meaning that it does not get any additional advantage when q¯ ≤ q, leading to part
(1) of the theorem.
The proof of part (2) follows from the upper and lower bounds on the number
of buckets each password beyond the top q is placed within. The bounds we prove
show that the additional advantage in guessing the password in q queries is less
than the number of additional queries times the probability of the q¯th password
and at least half the difference in the guessing probabilities λq and λq¯ (defined
in (5.2)).
Note that this analysis of security loss is based on the assumption that the FSB
scheme has access to the precise password distribution, pˆs = pw. We empirically
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analyze the security loss in Section 5.6 for pˆs , pw, in both the compromised and
uncompromised settings.
5.6 Empirical Security Evaluation
In this section we empirically evaluate and compare the security loss for different
password-only C3 schemes we have discussed so far — hash-prefix-based bucketi-
zation (HPB) and frequency-smoothing bucketization (FSB).
We focus on known-username attacks (KUA), since in many deployment set-
tings a curious (or compromised) C3 server can figure out the username of the
querying user. We separate our analysis into two settings: previously compromised
users, where the attacker has access to one or more existing passwords of the target
user, and previously uncompromised users, where no password corresponding to
the user is known to the attacker (or present in the breached data).
Recall, according to our threat model, we assume the adversary has knowl-
edge of all the leak dataset C3 is using. This situation is realistic, since many
password breaches are readily available for download online. For each setting the
attacker also knows the bucketizing algorithm. The attacker obtains (possibly by
compromising the C3 service) the bucket identifier that the client queried, as well
as the user’s username or email. Our analysis will also show what an honest-but-
curious C3 server would learn about the passwords of a user who participated in
the protocol.
First we will look into the unrestricted setting where no password policy is
enforced, and the attacker and the C3 server have the same amount of information
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S˜ T T ∩ S˜ Tsp Tsp ∩ S˜
# users 383.2 7.5 5.6 (76%) 4.8 3.7 (77%)
# passwords 255.2 5.4 3.6 (67%) 4.0 2.4 (60%)
# user-pw pairs 748.9 7.5 2.8 (37%) 4.9 1.8 (37%)
Figure 5.7: Number of entries (in millions) in the breach dataset S˜, test dataset T , and
the site-policy test subset Tsp. Also reported the intersection (of users, passwords, and
user-password pairs, separately) between the test dataset entries and the whole breach
dataset that the attacker has access to. The percentage values refer to the fraction of
the values in each test set that also appear in the intersections.
about the password distribution. In the second experiment, we analyze the effect
on security of giving the attacker more information compared to the C3 server
(defender) by having a password policy that the attacker is aware of but the C3
server is not.
Password breach dataset. We used the breach dataset used in [120]. The
dataset was derived from a previous breach compilation [124] dataset containing
about 1.4 billion username-password pairs. The data was cleaned by removing non-
ASCII characters and passwords longer than 30 characters. The authors of [120]
also joined accounts with similar usernames and passwords using a method they
called the mixed method. The usernames with only one email and password were
removed, which in total removed 650 million username-password pairs. We ob-
tained this joined and filtered dataset from the authors and performed our empir-
ical analysis on that dataset. Removal of the 650 million pairs for users with only
one password can only affect the experiment on the security for uncompromised
users. Given the large size of the dataset, we expect our results on attack success
are not impacted in any significant way by the removal of those accounts.
The final dataset consists of about 756 million username-password pairs.5 We
remove 1% of username-password pairs to use as test data, denoted as T . The
5Note, there are duplicate username-password pairs in this dataset.
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remaining 99% of the data is used to simulate the database of leaked credentials
S˜. For the experiments with an enforced password policy, we took the username-
password pairs in T that met the requirements of the password policy to create
Tsp. We use Tsp to simulate queries from a website which only allows passwords
that are at least 8 characters long and are not present in Twitter’s list of banned
passwords [102]. For all attack simulations, the target user-password pairs are
sampled from the test dataset T (or Tsp).
In Figure 5.7, we report some statistics about T , Tsp, and S˜. Notably, 5.6
million (76%) of the users in T are also present in S˜. This is likely because users
in the joined breach compilation dataset have at least two passwords. If the 650
million singleton users had not been removed, we expect that this number would
be smaller. Among the username-password pairs, 2.8 million (37%) pairs in T
are also present in S˜. This means an attacker will be able to compromise 37% of
the accounts (which is 50% of the previously compromised accounts) trivially with
credential stuffing. In the site-policy enforced test data Tsp, a similar proportion
of the users (77%) and username-password pairs (37%) are also present in S˜.
Experiment setup. We want to understand the impact of revealing a bucket
identifier on the security of uncompromised and compromised users separately.
As we can see from Figure 5.7, a large proportion of users in T are also present
in S˜. We therefore split T into two parts: one with only username-password
pairs from compromised users, Tcomp (users with at least one password present
in S˜), and another with only pairs from uncompromised users Tuncomp. We take
two sets of random samples of 5000 username-password pairs6, one from Tcomp,
and another from Tuncomp. For each pair (u,w), we run the games Guess and
6There was a low standard deviation between results for different random samples of 5000
pairs.
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BucketGuess as specified in Figure 5.4. We record the results for guessing budgets
of q ∈ {1, 10, 102, 103}. We repeat each of the experiments 5 times and report the
averages in Figure 5.8.
For HPB, we compared implementations using hash prefixes of lengths l ∈
{12, 16, 20}. We use the SHA256 hash function with a salt, though the choice of
hash function does not have a noticeable impact on the results.
For FSB, we used interval tree data structures to store the leaked passwords
in S˜ for fast retrieval of α˜(b). We used |B| = 230 buckets and the hash function
f is set to f (x) = H(30)(x), the 30-bit prefix of the (salted) SHA256 hash of the
password.
Attack strategy. The attacker’s goal is to maximize its success in winning the
games Guess and BucketGuess. In (5.1) and (5.2) we outline the advantage of
attackers against Guess and BucketGuess, and thereby specify the best strategies
for attacks. Guess denotes the baseline attack success rate in a scenario where
the attacker does not have access to bucket identifiers corresponding to users’
passwords. Therefore the best strategy for the attacker A is to output the q most
probable passwords according to its best knowledge of the password distribution.
The optimal attack strategy for B in BucketGuess will be to find a list of pass-








W = wi | U = u ]
|β((u,wi))| ,
where the bucket id b and user identifier u are provided to the attacker.
This is equivalent to taking the top-q passwords in the set α(b) ordered by
Pr
[
W = w | U = u ] /|β((u,w))|.
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We compute the list of guesses outputted by the attacker for a user u and bucket
b in the following way. For the compromised users, i.e., if (u, ·) ∈ S˜, the attacker
first considers the list of 104 targeted guesses generated based on the credential
tweaking attack introduced in [120]. If any of these passwords belong to α(b) they
are guessed first. This step is skipped for uncompromised users.
For the remaining guesses, we first construct a list of candidates L. L consists
of 106 most frequent passwords in S˜ and 500× 106 passwords generated from the
3-gram password distribution model pˆn. Each password w in L is assigned a weight
pˆs(w)/|β((u,w))| (See Section 5.5 for details on pˆs and pˆn). The list L is pruned to
only contain unique guesses. Note L is constructed independent of the username
or bucket identifier, and it is reordered based on the weight values. Therefore, it
is constructed once for each bucketization strategy. Finally, based on the bucket
identifier b, the remaining guesses are chosen from {α(b) ∩ (u,w) | w ∈ L} in
descending order of weight.
For the HPB implementation, each password is mapped to one bucket, so
|β(w)| = 1 for all w. For FSB, |β(·)| can be calculated using the equation
in Theorem 5.5.1.
Results. We report the success rates of the attack simulations in Figure 5.8.
The baseline success rate (first row) is the advantage Advgs, computed using the
same attack strategy stated above except with no information about the bucket
identifier. The following rows record the success rate of the attack for HPB and
FSB with different parameter choices. The estimated security loss (∆q) can be





Avg max q = 1 q = 10 q = 102 q = 103
Baseline N/A N/A N/A 0.6 1.3 2.5 5.9
HPB
l = 20‡ 244 303 33.7 49.7 63.0 71.0
l = 16† 3,896 4,138 18.3 34.3 47.6 60.5
l = 12 62,309 63,173 8.4 18.0 31.6 45.1
FSB
q¯ = 1 76 112 0.6 5.7 69.9 71.0
q¯ = 10 908 1,010 0.6 1.3 5.5 70.0
q¯ = 102 5,635 5,876 0.6 1.3 2.5 9.4
q¯ = 103 21,107 21,550 0.6 1.3 2.5 5.8
Protocol Params
Bucket size Compromised
Avg max q = 1 q = 10 q = 102 q = 103
Baseline N/A N/A N/A 37.4 50.4 51.4 52.6
HPB
l = 20‡ 244 303 64.9 71.8 76.6 79.9
l = 16† 3,896 4,138 58.2 65.0 71.1 75.7
l = 12 62,309 63,173 53.5 58.2 63.9 70.0
FSB
q¯ = 1 76 112 51.3 53.3 79.4 79.9
q¯ = 10 908 1,010 51.1 51.6 53.3 79.5
q¯ = 102 5,635 5,876 50.7 51.5 52.1 54.7
q¯ = 103 21,107 21,550 50.4 51.5 52.1 53.3
‡ HIBP uses l = 20 for its password-only C3 service.
† GPC uses l = 16 for username-password C3 service.
Figure 5.8: Comparison of attack success rate given q queries on different password-only
C3 settings. All success rates are in percent (%) of the total number of samples (5,000).
Bucket size, the number of passwords associated to a bucket, is measured on a random
sample of 10,000 buckets.
The security loss from using HPB is devastating, especially for previously un-
compromised users. Accessibility to the l = 20-bit hash prefix, used by HIBP [1],
allows an attacker to compromise 34% of previously uncompromised users in just
one guess. In fewer than 103 guesses, that attacker can compromise more than
70% of the accounts (12x more than the baseline success rate with 103 guesses).
Google Password Checker (GPC) uses l = 16 for its username-password C3 service.
Against GPC, an attacker only needs 10 guesses per account to compromise 34%
of accounts. Reducing the prefix length l can decrease the attacker’s advantage.
However, that would also increase the bucket size. As we see for l = 12, the average
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bucket size is 62,309, so the bandwidth required to perform the credential check
would be high.
FSB resists guessing attacks much better than HPB does. For q ≤ q¯ the at-
tacker gets no additional advantage, even with the estimated password distribution
pˆs. The security loss for FSB when q > q¯ is much smaller than that of HPB, even
with smaller bucket sizes. For example, the additional advantage over the baseline
against FSB with q = 100 and q¯ = 10 is only 3%, despite also having smaller
bucket sizes than HPB with l = 16. Similarly for q¯ = 100, ∆103 = 3.6%. This is
because the conditional distribution of passwords given an FSB bucket identifier
is nearly uniform, making it harder for an attacker to guess the correct password
in the bucket α(b) in q guesses.
For previously compromised users — users present in S˜ — even the baseline
success rate is very high: 37% of account passwords can be guessed in 1 guess and
53% can be guessed in fewer than 1,000 guesses. The advantage is supplemented
even further with access to the hash prefix. As per the guessing strategy, the
attacker first guesses the leaked passwords that are both associated to the user
and in α(b). This turns out to be very effective. Due to the high baseline success
rate the relative increase is low; nevertheless, in total, an attacker can guess the
passwords of 80% of previously compromised users in fewer than 1,000 guesses.
For FSB, the security loss for compromised users is comparable to the loss against
uncompromised users for q ≤ q¯. Particularly for q¯ = 10 and q = 100, the attacker’s
additional success is only 1.9%. Similarly, for q¯ = 100 an attacker gets at most
2.1% additional advantage for a guessing budget of q=1,000. Interestingly, FSB
performs significantly worse for compromised users compared to uncompromised
users for q = 1. This is because the FSB bucketing strategy does not take into
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account targeted password distributions, and the first guess in the compromised
setting is based on the credential tweaking attack.
In our simulation, previously compromised users made up around 76% of the
test set; it is unclear what is the actual proportion would be in the real world, so
we do not combine results from the uncompromised and compromised settings.
As we can see, since the bucket sizes for FSB with q¯ = 100 and HPB with l = 16
are comparable, we will use q¯ = 100 as the parameter for FSB for further security
and performance analysis. Note, GPC has a username-password C3 service and
therefore, its bucket sizes will be larger. (See Figure 5.10.)
Password policy experiment. In the previous set of experiments, we assumed
that the C3 server and the attacker use the same estimate of the password dis-
tribution. To simulate the effect when the attacker has a better estimate of the
password distribution than the C3 server, we simulated a website which enforces
a password policy. We assume that the policy is known to the attacker but not to
the C3 server.
For our sample password policy, we required that passwords have at least 8
characters and that they must not be on Twitter’s banned password list [102]. The
test samples are drawn from Tsp, username-password pairs from T where passwords
follow this policy, and the attacker is also given the ability to tailor their guesses to
this policy. The server still stores all passwords in S˜, without regard to this policy.
Notably, the FSB scheme relies on a good estimate of the password distribution
to be effective in distributing passwords evenly across buckets. Its estimate, when
compared to the distribution of passwords in Tsp, should be less accurate than it




q = 1 10 102 103 q = 1 10 102 103
Baseline 0.1 0.4 1.2 3.1 37.9 46.7 47.0 47.8
HPB (l = 16) 9.6 17.8 27.0 41.2 51.0 55.7 59.5 63.8
FSB (q¯ = 102) 0.1 0.4 1.4 9.6 46.8 47.1 47.3 51.2
Figure 5.9: Attack success rate (in %) comparison for HPB with l = 16 (effectively
GPC) and FSB with q¯ = 102 for password policy simulation. The first row records the
baseline success rate Advgs(q). There were 5,000 samples each from the uncompromised
and compromised settings.
We chose the parameters k = 16 for HPB and q¯ = 100 for FSB, because they
were the most representative of how the HPB and FSB bucketization schemes
compare to each other. These parameters also lead to similar bucket sizes, with
around 5,000 passwords per bucket. Overall, we see that the success rate of an
attacker decreases in this simulation compared to the general experiment (without
a password policy). This is likely due to the fact that after removing popular
passwords, the remaining set of passwords that we can choose from has higher
entropy, and each password is harder to guess. FSB still defends much better
against the attack than HPB does, even though the password distribution estimate
used by the FSB implementation is quite inaccurate, especially at the head of
the distribution. FSB assigns larger probability estimates to passwords that are
banned according to our password policy.
We also see that due to the inaccurate estimate by the C3 server for FSB, we
start to see some security loss for an adversary with guessing budget q = 100. In
the general simulation, the password estimate pˆs used by the server was closer to
p, so we didn’t have any noticeable security loss where q ≤ q¯.
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5.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we implement different approaches to checking compromised cre-
dentials and evaluate their computational overheads. For fair comparison, in ad-
dition to the algorithms we propose, FSB and IDB, we also implement HIBP and
GPC with our breach dataset.
Setup. We build C3 services as serverless web applications that provide REST
APIs. We used AWS Lambda [140] for the server-side computation and Amazon
DynamoDB [141] to store the data. The benefit of using AWS Lambda is it can be
easily deployed as Lambda@Edge and integrated with Amazon’s content delivery
network (CDN), called CloudFront [142]. (HIBP uses Cloudflare as CDN to serve
more than 600,000 requests per day [125].) We used Javascript to implement the
server and the client side functionalities. The server is implemented as a Node-JS
app. We provisioned the Lambda workers to have maximum 3GB of memory. For
cryptographic operations, we used a Node-JS library called Crypto [143].
For pre-processing and pre-computation of the data we used a desktop with
an Intel Core i9 processor and 128 GB RAM. Though some of the computation
(e.g., hash computations) can be expedited using GPUs, we did not use any for our
experiment. We used the same machine to act as the client. The round trip network
latency of the Lambda API from the client machine takes about 130 milliseconds.
Recall that the breach dataset we use contains 255 million unique passwords and
749 million unique username-password pairs. (See Figure 5.7.)
To measure the performance of each scheme, we pick 20 random passwords from
the test set T and run the full C3 protocol with each one. We report the average
time taken for each run in Figure 5.10. In the figure, we also give the break down
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of the time taken by the server and the client for different operations. The network
latency had very high standard deviation (25%), though all other measurements
had low (< 1%) standard deviation compared to the mean.
HIBP. The implementation of HIBP is the simplest among the four schemes.
The set of passwords in S˜ is hashed using SHA256 and split into 220 buckets based
on the first 20 bits of the hash value (we picked SHA256 because we also used
the same for FSB). Because the bucket sizes in HIBP are so small (< 500), each
bucket is stored as a single value in a DynamoDB cell, where the key is the hash
prefix. For larger leaked datasets, each bucket can be split into multiple cells. The
client sends the 20 bit prefix of the SHA256 hash of their password, and the server
responds with the corresponding bucket.
Among all the protocols HIBP is the fastest (but also weakest in terms of
security). It takes only 208 ms on average to complete a query over WAN. Most of
the time is spent in round-trip network latency and the query to DynamoDB. The
only cryptographic operation on the client side is a SHA256 hash of the password,
which takes less than 1 ms.
FSB. The implementation of FSB is more complicated than that of HIBP. Be-
cause we have more than 1 billion buckets for FSB and each password is replicated
in potentially many buckets, storing all the buckets explicitly would require too
much storage overhead. We use interval trees [139] to quickly recover the passwords
in a bucket without explicitly storing each bucket. Each password w in the breach
database is represented as an interval specified by βFSB(w). We stored each node
of the tree as a separate cell in DynamoDB. We retrieved the intervals (passwords)
intersecting a particular value (bucket identifier) by querying the nodes stored in
DynamoDB. FSB also needs an estimate of the password distribution to get the
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interval range for a tree. We use pˆs as described in Section 5.4. The description of
pˆs takes 8.9 MB of space that needs to be included as part of the client side code.
This is only a one-time cost during client installation.
The depth of the interval tree is logN , where N is the number of intervals (pass-
words) in the tree. Since each node in the tree is stored as a separate key-value pair
in the database, one client query requires logN queries to DynamoDB. To reduce
this cost, we split the interval tree into r trees over different ranges of intervals,
such that the i-th tree is over the interval
[
(i− 1) · b|B|/rc , i · b|B|/rc − 1]. The
passwords whose bucket intervals span across multiple ranges are present in all
corresponding trees. We used r = 64, as it ensures each tree has around 4 million
passwords, and the total storage overhead is less than 1% more than if we stored
one large tree.
Each interval tree of 4 million passwords was generated in parallel and took 3
hours in our server. Each interval tree takes 400 MB of storage in DynamoDB,
and in total 25 GB of space. FSB is the slowest among all the protocols, mainly
due to multiple DynamoDB calls, which cumulatively take 273 ms (half of the
total time, including network latency). This can be sped up by using a better
implementation of interval trees on top of DynamoDB, such as storing a whole
subtree in a DynamoDB cell instead of storing each tree node separately. We can
also split the range of the range tree into more granular intervals to reduce each
tree size. Nevertheless, as the round trip time for FSB is small (527 ms), we leave
such optimization for future work. The maximum amount of memory used by the
server is less than 81 MB during an API call.
On the client side, the computational overhead is minimal. The client performs
one SHA256 hash computation. The network bandwidth consumed for sending the
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Protocol
Client Server Total Bucket
Crypto Server call Comp DB call Crypto time size
HIBP 1 205 2 40 – 208 244
FSB 1 524 2 273 – 527 3,086
GPC 47 402 9 71 6 458 9,164
IDB 72 405 10 73 6 487 9,166
Figure 5.10: Time taken in milliseconds to make a C3 API call. The client and server
columns contain the time taken to perform client side and server side operations respec-
tively.
bucket of hash values from the server takes on average 261 KB.
IDB and GPC. Implementations of IDB and GPC are very similar. We used
the same platform — AWS Lambda and DynamoDB — to implement these two
schemes. All the hash computations used here are Argon2id with default parame-
ters, since GPC in [2] uses Argon2. During precomputation, the server computes
the Argon2 hash of each username-password pair and raises it to the power of the
server’s key K. These values can be further (fast) hashed to reduce their repre-
sentation size, which saves disk space and bandwidth. However, hashing would
make it difficult to rotate server key. We therefore store the exponentiated Argon2
hash values in the database, and hash them further during the online phase of the
protocol. The hash values are indexed and bucketized based on either H(l)(u‖w)
(for GPC) or H(l)(u) (for IDB). We used l = 16 for both GPC and IDB, as proposed
in [2].
The server (for both IDB and GPC) only performs one elliptic curve exponen-
tiation, which on average takes 6 ms. The remaining time incurred is from network
latency and calling Amazon DynamoDB.
On the client side, one Argon2 hash has to be computed for GPC and two
for IDB. Computing the Argon2 hash of the username-password pairs takes on
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an average 20 ms on the desktop machine. We also tried the same Argon2 hash
computation on a personal laptop (Macbook Pro), and it took 8 ms. In total,
hashing and exponentiation takes 47 ms for GPC, and 72 ms (an additional 25 ms)
for IDB. The cost of checking the bucket is also higher (compared to HIBP and
FSB) due to larger bucket sizes.
IDB takes only 31 ms more time on average than GPC (due to one extra Argon2
hashing), while also leaking no additional information about the user’s password. It
is the most secure among all the protocols we discussed (should username-password
pairs be available in the leak dataset), and runs in a reasonable time.
5.8 Deployment Discussion
Here we discuss different ways C3 services can be used and associated threats that
need to be considered. A C3 service can be queried while creating a password
— during registration or password change — to ensure the new password is not
present in a leak. In this setting C3 is queried from a web server, and the client
IP is potentially not revealed to the server. This, we believe, is a safer setting to
use than the one we will discuss below.
In another scenario, a user can directly query a C3 service. A user can look for
leaked passwords themselves by visiting a web site or using a browser plugin, such
as 1Password [118] or Password Checkup [2]. This is the most prevalent use case
of C3. For example, the client can regularly check with a C3 service to proactively
safeguard user accounts from potential credential stuffing attacks.
However, there are several security concerns with this setting. Primarily, the
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client’s IP is revealed to the C3 server in this setting, making it easier for the
attacker to deanonymize the user. Moreover, multiple queries from the same user
can lead to a more devastating attack. Below we give two new threat models that
need to considered for secure deployment of C3 services (where bucket identifiers
depend on the password).
Regular password checks. A user or webservice might want to regularly check
their passwords with C3 services. Therefore, a compromised C3 server may learn
multiple queries from the same user, which can enable potentially powerful attacks.
For FSB the bucket identifier is chosen randomly, so knowing multiple bucket
identifiers for the same password will help an attacker narrow down the password
search space and significantly improve attack success.
We can mitigate this problem for FSB by derandomizing the client side bucket
selection using a client side state (e.g. browser cookie) so the client always selects
the same bucket for the same password. We let the c be the client side cookie. To
check a password w with the C3 server, the client picks the jth bucket from the
range β(w), where j ← f (w‖c) mod |β(w)|.
This derandomization ensures queries from the same device are deterministic
(after the cookie is set). However, if the attacker can link queries of the same user
from two different devices, the mitigation is ineffective. If the cookie is stolen from
the client device, then the security of FSB is effectively reduced to that of HPB
with similar bucket sizes.
Similarly, if an attacker can track the interaction history between a user and a
C3 service, it can obtain better insight about the user’s passwords. For example,
if a user who regularly checks with a C3 service stops checking a particular bucket
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identifier, that could mean the associated password may appear in the most up-to-
date leaked dataset, and the attacker can use that information to guess the user’s
password(s).
Checking similar passwords. Another important issue is querying the C3
service with multiple correlated passwords. Some web services, like 1Password, use
HIBP to check multiple passwords for a user. As shown by prior work, passwords
chosen by the same user are often correlated [122, 121, 120]. An attacker who can
see bucket identifiers of multiple correlated passwords can mount a stronger attack.
Such an attack would require estimating the joint distribution over passwords. We
leave analysis of this threat model for future work.
5.9 Related Work
There are existing cryptographic protocols that deal with threat models similar to
ours. There has also been some previous work on distribution-sensitive cryptogra-
phy for encrypted databases.
Private set intersection. Private set intersection (PSI) allows two parties to
find the intersection between their private sets without revealing any additional
information. Kiss et al. proposed an efficient PSI protocol for unequal set sizes
based on oblivious pseudo-random functions (OPRF) [119], which performs well
for sets with millions of elements. However, it is very expensive for larger set sizes
(in the billions) and is therefore not feasible for checking leaked passwords. Other
efficient solutions to PSI [128, 129, 130, 131] are also unable to handle datasets
with billions of leaked passwords. The main overhead comes from the bandwidth
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requirement — the server needs to send data proportional to the size of the leaked
dataset.
Private information retrieval (PIR) [144] is another cryptographic primitive
used to retrieve information from a server. Assuming the server’s dataset is pub-
lic, the client can use PIR to privately retrieve the entry corresponding to their
password from the server. However, most advanced PIR schemes [145, 146] require
exchanging large amounts of information over the network, so they are not useful
for checking leaked passwords. PIR with two non-colluding servers can provide bet-
ter security [147] than the bucketization-based C3 schemes, with communication
complexity sub-polynomial in the size of the leaked dataset. However, deploying a
C3 service with two non-colluding servers would be practically difficult.
Therefore, to circumvent these problems, the leaked dataset is divided into
buckets before performing set intersection — a compromise between security and
efficiency.
Compromised credential checking services. A number of servers are de-
ployed in practice to provide C3 services, besides Google’s Password Checkup [2]
and HIBP [1]. For example, Vericlouds [148] and GhostProject [149] allow users
to register with an email address, and regularly keeps the user aware of any leaked
(sensitive) information associated with that email. Such services send information
to the email address, and the user implicitly authenticates (prove ownership of the
email) by having access to the email address. These services are not anonymous
and must be used by the primary user. Moreover, these services cannot be used
for password-only C3.
Distribution-sensitive cryptography. To build secure password-only C3 ser-
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vice, we proposed FSB. Human-chosen passwords are non-uniformly distributed.
FSB utilizes the knowledge of password distribution to provide better security.
There have been a few works that similarly use knowledge of message distribution
to design more secure protocols. Woodage et al. in [150] introduced secure sketches
for password typos where sketches for popular passwords reveal less information
than the sketches of unpopular passwords. Frequency-smoothing for determinis-
tic encryption in encrypted databases replicates messages proportionally to their
frequencies, and is shown to be effective against frequency attacks [151].
5.10 Conclusion
We explore different settings and threat models associated with checking compro-
mised credentials (C3). The main concern is the secrecy of the user passwords that
is being checked. We show, via simulations, that the existing industry deployed
C3 services (such as HIBP and GPC) do not provide adequate security. Indeed an
attacker who obtains the query to such a C3 service and the username of the query-
ing user can severly damage the secrecy of the password. We give more secure C3
protocols for checking leaked passwords and username-password pairs. We imple-
mented and deployed different C3 protocols on AWS Lambda and evaluated their
computational and bandwidth overhead. We finish with several nuanced threat





Password-based authentication (PBA) systems are by far the most widely deployed
and used authentication mechanism. Passwords are a simple and intuitive way to
authenticate users (if done in the correct way), and they do not require any ad-
ditional hardware. Nevertheless, passwords are also blamed for being the weakest
link in computer security. Repeated calls were made for their demise, but none
of the proposed alternative techniques have so far been able to replace them en-
tirely. Security and usability problems of passwords affect billions of users across
the globe. And despite those problems, passwords will continue to be used for the
foreseeable future. Therefore, improving the state of passwords and PBA systems
is timely and necessary. In this dissertation, I showed how to do so using a novel
approach that combines empirical techniques with analytical methods.
Usability and security of passwords are often thought to be fundamentally at
odds. However, I explained in this dissertation how to rethink this connection
and build next-generation PBA systems that provide better usability and better
security. I used a novel technique, empiricism-informed secure system design, that
combines analytical techniques with empirical tools to analyze and evaluate such
systems, as well as to guide the process of designing and building.
I took advantage of the availability of large leaked password datasets to better
understand human-chosen passwords. Knowledge of password distribution can be
very useful in designing tailored solution for passwords. For example, NoCrack
uses password models built for password cracking to generate decoys; TypTop
uses knowledge of the password distribution to selectively deny typo correction
on typos that would benefit an attacker; FSB replicates passwords based on their
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probability to reduce leakage. I also showed how to instantiate those distribution-
sensitive solutions using estimates of password distribution learned from leaked
password datasets.
One of the core technical challenges in building distribution-sensitive solutions
is that they must be agile to changes in the underlying distribution. A real-world
password distribution might change over time. Also, due to different password poli-
cies, it might vary slightly across different websites. Ideally, it should be quick to
re-parameterize a solution with a new password distribution and to understand its
impact on the security of the system. Here comes the benefit of analytical bounds,
which carefully distill out a clear and easily verifiable set of assumptions about the
distribution, which if met, ensures that the security bounds automatically remain
valid. Empirical methods then can be used to verify those assumptions based on
the available data. This confluence of empiricism and analytical tools turned out
to be very effective in designing better PBA systems, and can also be used for
building other practical secure systems.
Despite the practicality and better security of such systems, one of the key open
challenges is to get these systems deployed in practice. The adoption rate of new
security techniques is very slow; it is even slower for user authentication systems.
For example, despite the introduction of password hashing in the 1980s, several
websites1 can be found even today that do not hash their user passwords. Simi-
larly, password managers, despite being a better solution, have very low adoption
rate [152], because users are unsure about their effectiveness or do not trust their
security. Site administrators might not want to turn on typo-tolerance (or even
if they do, they want to be discrete about it) due to the fear of media backlash
(e.g., [79, 77]): allowing small typos in passwords might seem insecure to some
1http://plaintextoffenders.com/
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users. Lack of adoption of newer and better technologies is hurting both users and
companies. We need to find better ways to communicate research results with the
industry and the users.
Traditionally, users are disproportionately burdened with the security of pass-
words: users should pick strong and unique passwords for each of the accounts
and change those passwords regularly. Often, prior policies require users to change
their behavior (against their natural tendency) to improve security of passwords.
Moving forward, users alone cannot be held responsible for improving security of
passwords. We need to shift the burden onto PBA servers. By rethinking the ten-
sion between usability and security, PBA servers need to focus on how to help users
inculcate and maintain better password habits. For example, allowing users to lo-
gin with some typos might be a great way to encourage users to pick stronger and
longer passwords. In addition to typo-tolerance, the websites should also ensure
that these features are not exploited by attackers. By combining typo-tolerance
with C3 services, the PBA server can defend against credential stuffing attacks
while still allowing legitimate users to log in with small typos. Research should
also look into how to defend typo-tolerant PBA systems from targeted password
guessing attacks [122]2, such as credential tweaking attacks [120].
Finally, large scale PBA systems are typically deployed by industry, and are
often protected, hiding the design details (via so-called security through obscurity).
Most web services consider the authentication logs as sensitive data and do not
share them with academic researchers. Others fear that revealing the details of
their defense mechanism would advantage the attacker and reduce the effectiveness
of their defense. As a result state-of-the art industrial PBA systems are not public,
2In targeted guessing attack, an attacker makes tailored guesses against a PBA systems based
on auxiliary information about the user (such as the user’s other leaked passwords or her personal
information).
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and academic research community might not be always working on problems that
are at the bleeding edge of PBA systems. We need more collaboration between
the academic community and industry to work on authentication related problems




APPENDIX - CRACKING-RESISTANT PASSWORD VAULT
A.1 Constructing a PCFG
For completeness we describe our PCFG construction process, which uses tech-
niques, with a few small embellishments, from prior work [39, 40]. We start by
creating a parser for passwords based on some dictionaries and/or manual tuning.
The parser itself uses a base PCFG. Using it, the passwords in a password leak are
parsed into ‘tokens’ and the frequency of each token and each token combination
is computed to generate a trained PCFG.
The process starts with input a password corpus (a list of passwords selected
by real users in the wild) as well as a source dictionary. The dictionary is a list of
words which we might expect to appear as or within passwords, with accompanying
information about such words’ expected likelyhood of occurrence. We construct
a dictionary from the following two sources. The first, denoted D1, is the Wik-
tionary [153] list of the top 30,000 English words along with their frequency count
as found in books of Project Gutenberg up through April 16, 2006. The second,
denoted D2, is a list of Facebook first and last names and frequencies compiled by
SkullSecurity [154]. After removing names with frequency less than five the final
size of D2 was 1,678,411. The Facebook first and last names capture not only
names, surnames of persons, cities and popular entities but also a comprehensive
list of popular words used by internet users. For example, D2 covers modified
spellings of words like ‘gurl’, acronyms like ‘ciao’ or ‘afaik’, etc.
Of course one could use other dictionaries for different languages, cultures, etc.,
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but we leave the evaluation of such localization to future work.
The base weighted CFG. After manual inspection of the RockYou password
corpus, we constructed an underlying grammar (CFG) for the base CFG of the
following form:
S → W | D | Y | K | R | WW | WD | WY | WYD | WDY | WK | . . .
W → <english-words>T | <names>T




T → Capitalize | ALL-CAPS | all-lower| L33t
where “. . .” signifies all remaining combinations of the non-terminals W, D, Y,
R and K. The variables on the right hand side of each rule written within angle
brackets (<.*>) are terminal place-holders. <english-words> and <names>
are placeholders for sets of non-termanals associated to D1 and D2 respectively,
while the rest of the placeholders are initialized with regular expressions. We ex-
plain the placeholders below in detail. The grammar is ambiguous (i.e., it can
parse a password in multiple ways): ‘password2015’ could be parsed as {‘pass’,
‘word’, ‘2015’} or {‘password’, ‘2015’}. Obviously the latter seems like a more
meaningful parsing. To disambiguate among different parse trees we assign some
heuristic cost to each rule and we used the parse tree that incurs minimal cost.
The costs can be seen as weighting various parsings, which is why we refer to the
resulting CFG as weighted.
For the placeholder <english-words>, we specify a non-terminal rule for
each word in D1. The cost of each rule for X ∈ D1 is 1− fX∑
X fX
, where fX denotes
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the frequency count of X in D1. For the placeholder <names>, the cost function
is defined analogously, but using D2.
For the remaining non-terminals, we created simple regular expressions or rules
that recognizes the underlying languages as closely as possible. Non-terminal
<dates> produces dates in common formats (e.g. ‘08232013’, ‘19790925’, 2008
etc). We created a simple regex to parse dates; we found through hand tuning
that we achieved the most reliable parsing by setting the cost of a date string str
to be
|str|
8 where |str| is the string’s length. The constant 8 was chosen as the most
popular date-based password length in practice and also the maximum length date
that our regex will accept.
The non-terminal <keyboard-sequence> includes patterns of standard US
keyboard sequences (e.g. ‘qwerty’, ‘zxcvbn’ etc). We achieved the most
reliable parsing by setting the cost of a sequence str to be proportional to c|str|
where c is the number of lateral changes in direction performed while typing ‘str’
on a standard US keyboard, a basic metric of typing complexity.
The non-terminal <repeated-characters> tries to predict whether a
string is a sequence of identical characters, such as ‘aaaaaaa’,‘0000000’; we
set the cost of this rule to
(




The non-terminal T leads to one of four special terminals that symbolize trans-
forms applied in a post-processing step to the preceding string str generated by
W. ALL-CAPS capitalizes all letters in the preceding string; Capitalize capital-
izes the first letter; and all-lower sets all letters to lowercase. L33t applies a
number of leetspeak transformations or selected capitalization. The cost for each
of these rules is set to c|str| , where c is 0 for all-lower, 1 for ALL-CAPS and
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Capitalizes, and the number of transformed characters for L33t.
The resulting base weighted CFG permits the parsing of passwords in a pass-
word corpus, yielding insight into the structure of human-generated passwords. We
consider for a given input the parse tree with the lowest cost under the heuristic
explained above (i.e., sum of costs for rules in the parse tree). To identify the
minimum cost parse tree we use a standard bottom-up dynamic programming ap-
proach similar to CYK [155]. Below, the term “parse tree” refers to the parse tree
with minimum cost unless explicitly stated otherwise.
The trained PCFG. We now explain how we train a PCFG on the RockYou
corpus, bootstrapping from the base weighted CFG.
We first fix some definitions used in this process. A production rule l→ r can
be specified as a pair (l, r). Every edge in a parse tree is a rule. A rule set is a
lexicographically ordered set of rules with the same left-hand-side. A rule list is
an ordered list of rules generated by depth-first search of the parse-tree of a string
/ password (with siblings taken in left to right order).
A CFG is completely specified as a set of rule sets. A PCFG is completely
specified by an admissible assignment of probabilities to CFG rules. Let S be a
rule set of size |S| and pS(l → r) be the probability of a rule l → r in S. An
admissible assignment of probabilities has the property that
∑
(l→r)∈S
pS(l → r) = 1.
We refer to the probability distribution over rules in a rule set S for a given
admissible assignment as its induced probability distribution.
To train a PCFG on our training corpus, we first parse each password using
the base weighted CFG to obtain a parse tree for each password. The aggregate
set L = {R1, . . . , Rw} of all rules in all these parse trees specifies a CFG. A rule
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set S in this CFG is simply a set of all rules with a common left-hand side.
To specify a PCFG based on this CFG, we make use of the count of repetitions
of each rule in L to construct an admissible assignment of probabilities. Let fl→r
denote the number of repetitions (the “frequency”) of rule l→ r in L and fS denote
the total number of repetitions of all rules in S. Letting pS(l→ r) = fl→r/fS yields
an admissible assignment. We refer to this PCFG as the trained PCFG.
The non-terminals in the trained PCFG are as in the base PCFG, except that
any special placeholder non-terminals that used post-processing (e.g., L33t) are
at this stage replaced by a concrete (finite) set of non-terminals and/or terminals.
A.2 Securely Encoding Fractions
We have to define an encoding scheme for floating point numbers. We focus on
empirically derived distributions, for which each probability that needs encoding
is a fraction p/q where p is the frequency count and q is some cumulative total
number of values observed. We have that p ≤ q. In such cases, encoding can be
done by choosing a large b-bit number subject to the constraint that it should be
equal to p modulo q. For correctness, b has to be larger than number of bits in the
binary representation of q. Encoding and decoding are defined in Figure A.1
Correctness is straightforward: by construction, 0 ≤ r < 2b and so
r mod q = (x + p− (x mod q)) mod q
= (x mod q) + (p mod q)− (x mod q)
= p mod q .
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encodeq(p):
1. x←$ {0, 1}b
2. r ← x + p− (x mod q)
3. if r ≥ 2b then
4. r ← r − q
5. return r
decodeq(r):
1. p← r mod q
2. return p
Figure A.1: encoding and decoding integer values.
In terms of security of encoding, we want the output values of the encoding scheme
to be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}b when p is uniformly selected from [0, q−1].
Otherwise an adversary can possibly rule out master passwords using the fact that
encoded strings are distributed differently from uniform bits during decryption
(under the wrong master password). Just for convenience we define h = 2b mod q
and l = b 2b
q
c. (Thus, lq + h = 2b.) Now, consider four random variables A,B,C
and D defined as follows: A and B are uniform distributions over {0, 1}b and Zq,
respectively; C = A− (A mod q); and D is the output of the encode function for a
randomly chosen p ∈ [0, q− 1]. Note that D is almost equal to C +B, but for the
potential additional modification made should C + B has value equal to or larger
than 2b (see the conditional of line 3 of encode). Note also that C always takes
values of the form kq for some k ∈ Zl+1. So, we have that the probability mass
function for C is defined by:
Pr [C = kq ] =

q
2b if 0 ≤ k < l
h
2b k = l
Using this, we can see that for D it holds that:
Pr [D = r ] =

1




2bq if r ∈ [(l − 1)q + h, lq)
h
2bq if r ∈ [lq, 2b)

















In a similar way we can show using a union bound that, while encoding m fractions,
together the encoded values deviate from a uniform distribution over such values
by at most mqmax/2b+1, where qmax is the largest q we shall need during encoding
of fractions and 2b  qmax. We found that we never encountered q more than 232,
and do not need m > 104. Setting b = 128, and plugging in qmax = 232 and m = 104
gives that the statistical distance from uniform for m encodings is strictly less than
2−83, which suffices for our purposes.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX - CORRECTING PASSWORD TYPOS
B.1 Secure Sketches
Secure sketches and fuzzy extractors, explored by Dodis et al. [83, 156], are designed
to generate consistent, cryptographically strong keys from noisy secrets, such as
biometric data. They may also be applied to passwords, as typographical errors in
passwords can be modeled as noise. Dodis et al. proposed two ways to construct
secure sketches for the edit-distance metric space; see Section 7 of [83]. They show
how to use a low-distortion embedding for the edit-distance metric given by Ostro-
vsky and Rabani [157], and also describe a relaxed embedding for the edit-distance
metric using c-shingles. The security losses for these constructions, as given in
Proposition 7.2 and Theorem 7.5 of [83], are t(logF )2O
(√





e log(n − c + 1) − (2c − 1)tdlog(F c + 1)e respectively. Here, n is the size of the
password, F is the alphabet size, t is the number of errors/edits tolerated, and c is
a construction parameter denoting the size of the shingles. In our setting, typical
values would be n = 8, t = 1, and F = 96. The value of c, according to Theorem
7.4, should be 1 in our setting (and the loss is an increasing function in c). Given
these parameters, the entropy loss of the two secure sketches would be ≈ 91 bits
and ≈ 31 bits respectively. The min-entropy of real world password distributions is
only about ≤ 8 bits [45]. Thus known constructions provide no security guarantees
in our context, and providing proven constructions that do would seem to require
new techniques.
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B.2 Sanitizing Caps-Lock Errors
As mentioned in the Chapter 3, preliminary analysis of the data revealed that
a large fraction of errors was caused by accidental pressing of the caps-lock key.
Measuring the rate of caps-lock errors is more challenging than for other typos, for
two reasons. First, caps-lock key presses are not recordable via keystroke logging,
and thus not directly detectable remotely. Second, if the user engages the caps-lock
key while typing one password, there’s a chance that it will remain on (erroneously)
while the next one is entered. In MTurk, if an individual worker is to be permitted
to enter more than one password—even across multiple HITs—propagation of caps-
lock typos across passwords is therefore methodologically unavoidable. This second
issue accounts for the (artificially) high rate of caps-lock typos observed in our
experiments. We found that 76 HITs contributed to 1120 caps-lock errors.
To adjust for the effect of such propagation errors in determining the rate of
caps-lock typos, we do the following. We define a caps-lock error as an incorrect
password which, when the cases of all the letters are inverted, becomes correct. In
sequentially processing the passwords in a HIT, we use a variable CL-ERR ∈ {0, 1}
to denote a heuristic determination as to whether the caps lock is in an error state
when the user entered a password in a HIT. (An error state could either be that
caps lock is on and the user should have typed lower-case letters, or caps lock is
off and the user should have typed upper case letters.) We initially let CL-ERR
= 0. When we detect a caps-lock error in a password, we record it and set CL-
ERR = 1. If it is already the case that CL-ERR = 1 when we reach a password
in a HIT, we discard the password. That is, in such cases, we do not count it
in our computation of error rates for any typo. Additionally, for every password
in a HIT, we determine (heuristically) whether the caps lock has been turned off
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during entry of the password. If the password contains at least one letter and the
password was submitted correctly, then we set CL-ERR = 0.
In general, the intuition here is that we keep track heuristically of whether the
caps-lock key appears to be engaged erroneously. If the entry of a password in
a HIT has been affected by the state of the erroneously engaged caps-lock key,
we treat it as “tainted,” and thus discard it from our experiment. (We assume
heuristically that caps-lock errors are independent of other typos. The global
effect of discarding “tainted” passwords and not recording typos they contain in
addition to caps-lock errors is small in any case.)
B.3 Complexity and Typo Likelihood
Our MTurk experiments revealed a significant initial finding regarding the fre-
quency of typos. Typo rates in our study increased under the following three
distinct metrics relating to password complexity.
Lexical diversity in passwords: One might suspect that more lexically diverse
passwords—ones that include symbols, letters with different cases, numbers or
some combination thereof—would be more prone to typos. We define four charac-
ter classes: upper case letters, lower case letters, digits, and symbols. Now, based
on how many of the four classes of characters are present within a password we can
partition passwords into four buckets. For example, passwords containing charac-
ters from only one of the four classes are binned as bucket 1, passwords containing
exactly two different classes of characters are bucket 2, etc. In our first sample
of 100,000 passwords, there were very few lexically diverse passwords. RockYou
has < 0.2% passwords with characters from all of the four character classes. So
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Figure B.1: Three experiments showing typo frequency relative to various partitions of
passwords into buckets. Bucket size is indicated on the left of each figure, and corre-
sponding typo rates on the right. (Left) Passwords are partitioned into four buckets
based on diversity of character types. For each bucket we report the percentage of sam-
ples (blue bars) that fall in that bucket and what fraction of those samples are mistyped
(red line). (Middle) Passwords are categorized into buckets by increasing order of
length. (Right) Passwords are assigned to buckets by decreasing frequency (increasing
unpopularity) in RockYou. Bucket frequency ranges are selected so that each bucket has
roughly an equal number of samples.
we sample with replacement 5,000 passwords for each bucket from the empirical
distribution of passwords in RockYou restricted to the passwords corresponding
to the bucket. We performed the same typing experiment as described before but
with new HITs created from these newly sampled passwords. In the left graph
of Figure B.1, we present the percentage of passwords in each bucket that were
mistyped.
Password length: We divide passwords into five groups based on their lengths,
namely ≤ 5, 6–7, 8–9, 10–11, and ≥ 12. For each class, we compute the percentage
of samples that lie in that class, along with the percentage of passwords in those
samples that were mistyped. In the middle graph of Figure B.1 we show these
numbers for each of the length groups. As one might expect, typo likelihood grows
with password length.
Password popularity: We sort the list of sampled passwords for our MTurk
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experiment based on their frequency counts in the RockYou leak. (Ties were
broken alphabetically.) We then split the passwords into four buckets, adjusting
their corresponding frequency ranges to ensure that buckets are of roughly equal
size. (Some unevenness was unavoidable, as many passwords occur only once in the
Rockyou leak.) For each bucket, we present the number of mistyped passwords in
the right graph of Figure B.1. We can see the clear trend that passwords that are
popular among RockYou users are more likely to be typed correctly. For example,
passwords used by more than 211 users are 1.5 times more likely to mistyped than
those used by only one user.
Discussion: password typing complexity. As noted above, lexical diversity,
length, and popularity are related metrics. Inspection of the passwords within the
various buckets used in the charts of Figure B.1 reveals that there is significant
overlap between them. As one example, 18% of the passwords with lexical-diversity
bucket 4 both have length ≥ 12 and are unpopular (f = 1).
The three metrics together highlight different aspects of the underlying and
intuitive trend: some passwords are more difficult to type than others. It appears,
moreover, that typos are more likely to surface in harder-to-guess passwords. Con-
sequently, typo correction could help encourage users to adopt stronger passwords
by easing the use of such passwords. We leave rigorous study of this hypothesis to
future work, but note that it offers further potential motivation for our work.
B.4 Typist Speed and Typo Rate
As an enhancement of our experimental results in Section 4.6.1, we report on
two experiments that provide further illumination of password features that lead
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Figure B.2: The workers are divided into four quartiles based on their typing speed, and
for each quartile we report the percentage of passwords that were mistyped.
to typos. These experiments further emphasize our observation that typo rates
appear to increase with password complexity.
Typist and typo likelihood. In our MTurk experiments, we timestamped each
character as it was typed during the experiments. We sorted the workers based on
their average typing speed (characters-per-minute) and binned workers into four
quartiles. For each quartile, we consider the subset of passwords that were typed
by the typists whose speed falls in that quartile, and we compute the fraction of
passwords that were mistyped in that subset. The data is reported in Figure B.2.
We found that slow typists make more mistakes than faster typists. It could be
that faster typists are also more skilled and so less likely to make mistakes.
Password entry time. We binned the passwords into four quartiles based on
the time required to type those passwords. The fraction of typos in each of that
quartile is reported in the middle chart of Figure B.3. Passwords that required
more time on average to type are more likely to be mistyped.
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Figure B.3: Passwords are divided into four quartiles based on the amount of time spent
by workers to type them, and then compute the fraction of passwords mistyped in each
quartile.
B.5 Computing λgreedyq
We start by showing that computing the optimal q guesses to make against a
relaxed checker is NP-hard in general. Later, we present an efficient approximate
algorithm for the problem.
Definition 1 Best-q-guess. Given a function B : S → P∗, a password distribu-
tion p over P ⊆ S, and a query budget q, find a q-size subset P ⊆ S, such that∑
w∈C′ p(w) is maximized, where C ′ =
⋃
w˜∈P B(w˜).
Definition 2 Maximum coverage problem. Given a ground set E =
{e1, e2, . . . en}, a collection of m subsets of E, S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}, and a weight
function γ : E → R+ that assigns weights to each element e ∈ E, find a subset




The maximum coverage problem is known to be NP-hard [101]. We can thus
prove the following theorem.
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Theorem B.5.1 If there is a polynomial time algorithm for best-q-guess, there
exists a polynomial time algorithm for maximum coverage problem.
Proof: We shall show a polynomial time reduction from the maximum coverage
problem to the best-q-guess problem. To start with, we are given an instance of
maximum coverage problem with (E, S, γ, k), and we want to construct an instance
of best-q-guess problem. To do so, we set P = E and probability p as proportional
to γ. (We might have to normalize γ to make it a probability distribution.) The
function B : S → P∗ is defined as follows. First add to S a set W ∗ = {w˜∗i }mi=1, with
p(w˜∗i ) = 0, and for each Si ∈ S, set B(w˜∗i ) = Si
⋃ {w˜∗i }. For all other w˜ ∈ S \W ∗,
let B(w˜) = {w˜}. This is a valid instance of the best-q-guess problem, and if we can
find an polynomial time computable solution to this, we can solve the maximum
weighted set cover problem in polynomial time.
Nevertheless, a greedy algorithm can achieve (1 − 1
e
) times the optimal λfuzzy
value and, as shown by Feige [101, 158], yields an optimal approximation for the
maximum coverage problem. Na¨ıve implementation of this greedy algorithm for
best-q-guess, however, requires searching over exponentially many strings in S. We
can exploit the fact that in our setting, a small number of correctors are used, and
these correctors are efficiently invertible. Additionally, password weights are highly
non-uniform. Thus it is efficient to enumerate all balls above a certain threshold
weight, yielding the efficient implementation of Feige’s greedy approximation al-
gorithm specified in Figure B.4. The algorithm intuition is this: as an invariant,
in any iteration of the external while loop, all new balls (balls of w˜) pushed onto
the heap have max-weight password w, and hence total weight ≤ b · p(w). This
observation enables a global selection of balls in weighted order.
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nextPw()
Returns the passwords in P in decreasing order of
their probability p.
FindGuesses(q)
/* B(w˜) = ball around w˜, and b = maxS |B(w˜)| */
/* N (w) = {w˜ |w ∈ B(w˜)} */
P ← P





while p(B(w˜m) ∩ P ) ≥ b · p(w) {
g ← g ∪ {w˜m}
P ← P \B(w˜m)





foreach w˜ ∈ (N (w) \A)
A.heappush(w˜)
} while (|g| < q)
return g
Figure B.4: Figure presents a greedy algorithm to compute the best q guesses and thereby
compute λgreedyq , for an attacker who estimates the the password distribution with p.
B.6 Proofs
We restate and then prove the free correction theorem from Section 3.5.4.
Theorem B.6.1 (Free Corrections Theorem) Fix some password distribution
p with support P, a typo distribution τ , 0 < q < |P| and an exact checker ExChk.
Then for OpChk with any set of correctors C, it holds that λfuzzyq = λq.
Proof: Let Sˆ be the optimal set of q strings which maximizes the total acceptance
rate for the given checker OpChk. (Note that the order in which the queries are
made does not change the success probability.) Let B(S) = ∪w˜∈S B(w˜) for some
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set S of strings in S. Recall that λq = ∑qi=1 p(wi) is the sum of the probabilities of





holds because B(w˜) is the set of passwords checked by OpChk for a given string w˜.
The checker OpChk ensures that the cumulative probability mass of any ball is
less than or equal to p(wq) whenever the size of the ball is more than 1, but, if the
size is one, the cumulative probability can be more than p(wq). So, we split Sˆ into
two distinct groups Sˆ1 and Sˆ>1, where Sˆ1 is the set of all strings in S whose ball

















Equation (B.1) is true because the |B(Sˆ1)| = |Sˆ1|, and the right hand side is
the highest cumulative probability that any set of that size can achieve under p.
Equation (B.2) is true because of the facts that p(B(w˜)) ≤ p(wq) for all w˜ ∈ Sˆ>1,
and p(wi) ≥ p(wq) for all i ≥ q. So, by a union bound over B(Sˆ>1), we can achieve

















To show strict equality, simply observe that an attacker against OpChk can al-




Theorem B.6.2 Fix q > 0, a distribution pair (p, τ ), and a corrector set C. Define
OpChk to work over C and let Chk work for a set of correctors C ′ ⊆ C. If ∆q(Chk) = 0,
then Utility(Chk) ≤ Utility(OpChk).
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Proof: First recollect utility of any checker Chk is defined as







where B(w˜) is the ball of w˜ under Chk.
Let assume for contradiction that there exists a checker Chk which uses only
the correctors in C, achieves a ∆q(Chk) = 0 and still beats the OpChk in utility, that
is, Utility(Chk) > Utility(OpChk). Let denote a ball of OpChk by B(·) and a ball of
Chk by B˜(·). So, if Utility(Chk) > Utility(OpChk), then there exists at least one w˜ ∈ S
such that ∑
w∈B˜(w˜)
p(w) · τw(w˜) >
∑
w∈B(w˜)
p(w) · τw(w˜). (B.3)
Now, by construction, the optimal checker OpChk selects the B(w˜) that maxi-
mizes the utility under the constraint that no ball of size 1 has higher cumu-
lative mass than p(wq). Here by utility we mean the sum
∑
w∈B(w) p(w) · τw(w˜).
(See Eqn. 3.5.4.) The checker Chk can achieve higher utility only if it violates
one of the two constraints in (3.5.4). The first constraint, required for complete-
ness, is inviolable. The second constraint determines security; if p(B˜(w˜)) > p(wq)
when |B˜(w˜)| > 1, then the security loss ∆q(Chk) > 0 according to Lemma B.6.1.
Thus there cannot exist any w˜ ∈ S fulfilling Eqn. B.3. Thus the assumption
Utility(Chk) > Utility(OpChk) is false.
Lemma B.6.1 For any password and typo distribution pair (p, τ), checker Chk,
and parameter 0 < q < |P|, if there exists a string w˜ ∈ S, s.t. |B(w˜)| > 1 and
p(B(w˜)) > p(wq), then ∆q > 0.
Proof: Security loss ∆q > 0 implies that λ
fuzzy
q > λq. Let Pq = {w1, . . . , wq} and
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recall that λq = p(Pq). Recall too that:
λfuzzyq = max
S⊆S
p(B(S)), where |S| = q.
First set S ← (Pq \B(w˜))∪ {w˜}. Clearly λfuzzyq ≥ p(B(S)). If we look at the union
of balls of the strings in the set S,
B(S) ⊇ Pq ∪B(w˜)
⇒ p(B(S)) ≥ p(Pq) + p(B(w˜) \ Pq)
Now, if B(w˜) \ Pq , φ, then clearly λfuzzyq ≥ p(B(S)) > p(Pq), and so ∆q > 0.
If B(w˜) \ Pq = φ, then |S| < q, as |B(w˜)| > 1. Thus as long as there exists
a password w′ ∈ P \ S such that p(w′) > 0, we can add w′ to S, resulting in
p(B(S)) > p(Pq). This concludes the proof.
B.7 Toy Example of Poor Ball Estimation
Consider the following toy example of the attacker’s estimated distribution pˆ and













The best guess of the attacker against ExChk is 123456, which yields success
rate 1/2. If the attacker wants to optimize her guess in the presence of a typo
tolerant checker, e.g., Chk-All with correctors Ctop2, the she select as her first guess




APPENDIX - PERSONALIZED PASSWORD TYPO CORRECTION
C.1 Benefits of the PLFU Caching Scheme
We now describe the intuition behind the utility benefits of the probabilistic least
frequently used (PLFU) caching scheme over its deterministic counterpart (LFU).
Recall that during each PLFU cache update, the cached typo w˜o is replaced with
the wait listed typo w˜n with probability ν = fw˜n/(fw˜n + fw˜o), where f denotes
the frequency count of the typo in the subscript. The main goal of the PLFU
caching scheme is to let the cache be agile enough to adapt and change, while
simultaneously increasing the likelihood that the most useful typos ultimately stay
in the cache.
The PLFU scheme has two key benefits over the non-probabilistic LFU scheme.
First, it makes it more likely that a typo which is repeated in small amounts over
many login attempts (and thus is likely to increase usability if cached) ultimately
enters the cache, as opposed to one which appears multiple times in a single (and
possibly anomalous) login attempt. For example, if a typo w˜n is repeated once
across r login attempts in which the least frequently used typo w˜o is not en-
tered at all, the probability that w˜n will not enter the cache is approximately(
1− 1/(1 + fw˜o)
)r, which is less than 1/e if r ≈ fw˜o > 2. Conversely, if the same
typo appears r ≈ fw˜o times in a single login attempt, the probability that it does
not then enter the cache is
(
1− r/(fw˜o + r)
) ≈ 1/2 > 1/e.
Second, by setting the frequency count for the newly cached typo to fw˜n + fw˜o ,
the PLFU scheme increases the eventual stability of the cache, as the increasing
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frequency counts of the cached typos mean that the probability that they are
replaced by a wait listed typo decreases over time. In contrast the LFU caching
scheme updates the cache on each login attempt, increasing the chance that useful
typos are accidentally evicted from the cache.
C.2 Modeling the Typo Distribution τw
In this section, we describe the procedure with which we built the typo model
τ used for the simulations on Page 143. We use a supervised training method
to learn the typo distribution using the typo data collected in our MTurk study
(Section 4.6.1) and the data released with [30]. Our approach is inspired by that
of Houser et al. [159].
A simple way to build the typo model would be to compute the frequency
distribution of typos for each password. However, our data set contains only 30, 000
typos of 20, 000 distinct passwords in total. As such, both the set of passwords on
which we have typo data, and the amount of typo data we have for the individual
passwords, is too small to build a good frequency based model. Therefore, we
make two simplifying assumptions about typographical errors: that a typo of a
given character in a password is influenced by the characters very close to it, and
that this typo is independent of the characters in the remainder of the string.
Given a list of pairs of passwords and typos, we first align each pair by inserting
a special symbol “ ” zero or more times (as required), such that the resulting pair
of strings are of the same length, and have the same DL distance as the originals.
For example, the password-typo pair (password, pasword) may be aligned to
(password, pa sword). If there are multiple alignments possible, we consider
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all of them. For each of the aligned password-typo pairs (w, w˜), we take the set
of substring pairs (wi:j, w˜i:j) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ k; 0 ≤ i ≤ |w| − j, and compute the
frequency distribution of those pairs across all the aligned password-typo pairs.
Here |x| denotes the length of the string x; xi:n denotes the sub-string of length
n of x beginning at location i ≤ |x| − n; and k is a parameter of the model. We
let E denote the frequency distribution of these pairs of strings, and will use it in
subsequent steps to compute the typo probability of a given password.
We define an edit as a triplet (i, l, r), where i denotes a location in the string,
and l and r are strings of length at most k. An edit (i, l, r) is valid for a password
w if wi:|l| = l. Transforming a password w by applying a valid edit (i, l, r) means,
replacing wi:|l| with the sub-string r. For a given password w we let Ew denote
the set of all possible valid edits in the set Z|w| × E. We assign weights to each
edit (i, l, r) in Ew as the frequency of the pair (l, r) according to the frequency
distribution E, divided by the number of locations j ∈ [0, |w|] for which (j, l, r)
is a valid edit for w. The weights are then normalized to define a probability
distribution Pw over the valid edits of w.
With this in place, the process of sampling a typo of a password w according
to the typo model τw is reduced to sampling an edit from Pw and applying it to
w. Note that there could be multiple edits of a password w which result in the
same typo w˜. Thus, τw(w˜) is equal to the sum of the probabilities of all edits that
transform w into w˜.
Efficacy of the typo model. We use the average log likelihood — which is a
typical measure for evaluating generative models — to gauge the efficacy of our
typo model. We compare our model against the naive uniform model, that assigns
uniform probabilities to all the typos. Note, a model is better if the average log
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likelihood value is higher.
We perform a cross validation of our model over five 80:20 train-test splits of
the data set of password / typo pairs. For each split, we train our typo model using
the training data, and compute the average log likelihood of test samples as the
average of log τw(w˜) taken over all pairs (w, w˜) in the test data. We find that the
average log likelihood of the test data according to our model is –7.2 with standard
deviation 0.4, which is much better than base uniform model, which obtains an
average likelihood of –11. This suggests that our model captures the real world
typo distribution fairly well.
C.3 Proofs from Section 4.5
Proof of Lemma 4.5.1. We begin by proving Lemma 4.5.1 which we shall utilize
in subsequent analysis.
Proof: We argue by a series of game hops. Let game G0 denote game OFFDIST
A
Π,T
(as defined in Figure 4.4), so
AdvoffdistΠ,T (A) = 2 ·
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [G0 ⇒ 1 ]− 12
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Recall that the cache of TypTop stores up to (t + 1) ciphertexts, each of which
corresponds to a password-based encryption (using the canonical PBE scheme
PBE[SH, SE]) of the secret key of the PKE scheme sk under the real password and
each of the (at most t) cached typos.
We define a new game G1 which is identical to G0 except that the keys sampled
to encrypt cached ciphertexts are now sampled without replacement. In more
detail, when a new typo is cached during the evolution of the challenge state
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sn, a salt is chosen sa←$ {0, 1}`salt , and the cached ciphertext is computed as
c←$ E(SH(sa||w˜), sk). In game G0 oracle SH responds to fresh queries of this form
by returning kj ←$ {0, 1}κ, whereas in G1 oracle SH samples these keys without
replacement. In the distinguishing phase of G1, SH returns to sampling keys with
replacement. These games run identically unless two keys sampled during the
computation of these cached ciphertexts collide. Since at most (t · (n+ 1)+ 1) such
keys are sampled while processing a transcript of length n (where the (t + 1) term
corresponds to the maximum number of keys sampled to encrypt the ciphertexts
in the initial cache, and the t ·n term arises as processing each of the n typos in the
transcript can introduce at most t new ciphertexts in the typo cache), it follows
that




Next we define game G2 which is identical to G1 except we replace Checker[Π]
with PChecker[Π] and a sequence of statements that encrypt the final typo cache,
state and wait list returned by it as specified by the scheme. Notice that these
games run identically unless during the process of updating the state we find two
distinct keys k1 , k2 such that Dk2(Ek1(sk)) ,⊥ where sk denotes the secret key of
the PKE scheme which is encrypted under each of the cached typos. As such the
fundamental lemma of game playing [160] implies that the gap between game G1
and G2 is upper-bounded by the probability that this event occurs. Notice that
we can further upper bound this probability by AdvrobSE (R) as follows. Consider an
adversary R in game ROBRSE who simply executes the game G1, simulating SH by
sampling random strings without replacement, and checking if there ever exists
a typo cache ciphertext Ek1(sk) that decrypts under some subsequently sampled
k2 , k1 (recall that since G1 samples without replacement, all keys are distinct).
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The gap between these two games is upper bounded by the probability that this
event occurs, and so the robustness of the encryption scheme implies that
2 · |Pr [G1 ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [G2 ⇒ 1 ]| ≤ 2 · AdvrobSE (R) .
Next we define game G3 which is identical to G2 except we re-
turn SH to sampling keys with replacement. An analogous argu-
ment to that above bounding the probability that two keys collide en-
sures that the gap between these games is again bounded above by
(t·(n+1)+1)2
2κ .
Notice that G3 is identical to game OFFDISTΠ,T , and so may be perfectly
simulated by an attacker A′ in this game. On input challenge state sn, attacker A′
passes this state to A in game G3, simulating A’s random oracle by querying his
own oracle SH, and returning the responses. Since A′ makes precisely the same set
of oracle queries as A, it follows that if A makes at most q queries, then A′ does
also. At the end of the game A′ outputs whatever bit A does, and so
2 ·
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [G3 ⇒ 1 ]− 12
∣∣∣∣∣ = AdvoffdistΠ,T (A′) ,
concluding the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.5.1. We now provide the full proof of Theorem 4.5.1.
Proof: Consider an adversary A in game OFFDISTAΠ,T . Recall that by
Lemma 4.5.1, there exist adversaries A′ and R both running in time approxi-
mately that of A and where A′ makes the same number of oracle queries as A such
that,
AdvoffdistΠ,T (A) ≤ AdvoffdistΠ,T (A′) + 2 · AdvrobSE (R) +
(t · (n + 1) + 1)2
2(κ−1)
;
so it is sufficient to upper bound the success probability of an attacker A′ in game
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SH(sa‖w) // G0, G1G2,...,5 , G6
Y ←$ {0, 1}κ
If SH[sa‖w] =⊥
SH[sa‖w]← Y
If ∃i : (sa‖w) = (sai‖T[i])
bad← true; SH[sa‖w]← Y
Return SH[sa‖w]
proc. main//G0, G1, G2
(w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)←$ T
s¯n←$ PChecker[Π](w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)
parse s¯n as (S,T,W, γ)
(pk, sk)←$K
For i = 0, . . . , t
sai←$ {0, 1}`salt
If sai ∈ {sa0, . . . , sai−1}
bad-sa← true
sai←$ {0, 1}`salt/{sa0, . . . , sai−1}








For j = 0, . . . , ω do
W[j]←$ Epk(W[j])
sn ← (pk, c,T,W, γ)
b′←$ASH(sn)
Return b = b′
proc. main//G3, G4
(w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)←$ T
s¯n←$ PChecker[Π](w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)
parse s¯n as (S,T,W, γ)
(pk, sk)←$K
For i = 0, . . . , t
sai←$ {0, 1}`salt
If sai ∈ {sa0, . . . , sai−1}
bad-sa← true





For j = 0, . . . , ω do
W[j]←$ Epk(W[j])
W[j]←$ CE
sn ← (pk, c,T,W, γ)
b′←$ASH(sn)
Return b = b′
proc. main//G5 ,G6
(w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)←$ T
s¯n←$ PChecker[Π](w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)
parse s¯n as (S,T,W, γ)
(pk, sk)←$K
For i = 0, . . . , t
sai←$ {0, 1}`salt
If sai ∈ {sa0, . . . , sai−1}
bad-sa← true




For j = 0, . . . , ω do
W[j]←$ CE
sn ← (pk, c,T,W, γ)
b′←$ASH(sn)
Return b = b′
Figure C.1: Games used in the proof of Theorem 4.5.1.
OFFDIST
A′
Π,T . We argue by a series of game hops, shown in Figure C.1. We begin
by defining game G0, which is identical to game OFFDIST
A′
Π,T with b = 0. We also
set two flags, bad-sa and bad neither of which affect the outcome of the game.
Next we define game G1 which is identical to G0 except the salts used by the
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canonical PBE scheme to compute the ciphertexts in the challenge state are now
sampled without replacement. Games G0 and G1 run identically unless the flag
bad-sa is set to true. Since there are at most t+1 salts sampled, the birthday bound
and the fundamental lemma of game playing therefore imply that this transition




|Pr [G0 ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [G0 ⇒ 1 ]| ≤ Pr [ bad-sa = true in game G1 ]




We now define game G2 which is identical to G1 except we change the way in
which the random oracle SH responds to queries. Now if in the guessing phase A
queries SH on a salt / password pair (sa, w) on which it was queried during the
computation of the challenge state sn, it responds with an independent random
string k←$ {0, 1}κ updating its hash table to this new value, as opposed to the
previously used value. Accordingly in G2 the keys k used by the SE encryption
scheme are now random and independent of the underlying password. Games
G1 and G2 run identically unless A manages to guess and query SH on one of
the cached passwords and corresponding salt; an event we mark by setting a flag
bad = true. The fundamental lemma of game playing then implies that,
|Pr [G1 ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [G2 ⇒ 1 ]| ≤ Pr [ bad = true in game G2 ] ,
a probability which we shall upper bound in a later game.
Next we define game G3, which is identical to G2 except we replace all sym-
metric encryptions with random ciphertexts. This transition is bounded by a
reduction to the MKROR security of SE. Formally, let B1 be an adversary in
game MKRORB1,t
SE
with challenge bit b′. Adversary B1 runs (w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)←$ T ,
followed by s¯n←$ PChecker[Π](w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n), and generates a public / secret key
pair (pk, sk)←$K. B1 then constructs the encrypted state sn as follows. B1 first
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chooses sai←$ {0, 1}κ and uses his RoR oracle to compute ci = RoR(i, sk) for
i = 0, . . . , t, placing the salt / ciphertext pairs in the appropriate positions in the
cache. (Recall that from game G2, the symmetric keys used to create the cipher-
texts in sn are random and independent of the salts and underlying passwords,
and so identically distributed to those used by B1’s RoR oracle). Next, B1 encrypts
S and the entries in W under the public key pk, and assembles challenge state sn
accordingly. Finally B1 passes sn to A′, simulating queries to SH by returning a
random bit string to each fresh query, and at the end of the game outputs whatever
bit A′ does. Notice that if b′ = 1 and B1 is receiving real encryptions from the RoR
oracle then this perfectly simulates G2, and if b
′ = 1 this perfectly simulates G3. It
follows that,
|Pr [G2 ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [G3 ⇒ 1 ]|
= |Pr [ B1 ⇒ 1 | b′ = 0 ]− Pr [ B1 ⇒ 1 | b′ = 1 ] |
≤ AdvmkrorSE (B1, t).
We can similarly show that the probability that bad is set in G3 is close to the
probability that it is set in G2 via a separate reduction to the MKROR security
of SE. Formally let B2 be an adversary in game MKRORB2SE,t. B2 constructs the
simulated state sn as described above, using its RoR oracle to compute the sym-
metric encryptions in the state. However now when B2 passes sn to A′, it watches
the queries A′ makes to SH. If there exists a query (sai||w˜i) where i ∈ [0, t] such
that w˜i is equal to the typo corresponding to position i in the cache (in which case
the flag bad← true), B2 outputs 1; else it returns 0. By the same argument made
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above, it follows that,
Pr [ bad = true in G2 ] ≤ Pr [ bad = true in G3 ]
+ |Pr [ B2 ⇒ 1 | b′ = 0 ]− Pr [ B2 ⇒ 1 | b′ = 1 ] |
≤ Pr [ bad = true in G3 ] + AdvmkrorSE (B2, t) .
We may now define a third adversary B in game MKRORB,t
SE
who flips a bit and
depending on the outcome runs either B1 or B2 and then outputs the same bit
as that adversary. It is easy to see that AdvmkrorSE (B, t) = 12 · (AdvmkrorSE (B1, t) +
AdvmkrorSE (B2, t)), and so it follows that





AdvmkrorSE (B1, t) + AdvmkrorSE (B2, t)
)
+ Pr [ bad = true in G3 ]
≤ 2 · AdvmkrorSE (B, t) + Pr [ bad = true in G3 ] .
Now we can define a game G4 which replaces all encryptions under the public-key
encryption scheme PKE with random ciphertexts, where this transition is bounded
by a reduction to the ROR security of PKE. Formally we can define an adversary
C1 in game RORC1PKE with challenge bit b′ who proceeds as follows: on input pk,
C1 first runs (w1, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)←$ T , s¯n←$ PChecker[Π](w, w˜1, . . . , w˜n). C1 submits
S and the elements in W to its RoR oracle, chooses random symmetric ciphertexts
and salts, and assembles the final state including the public key pk it was given
as part of its challenge. C1 then passes sn to A′, simulating queries to SH in the
natural way, and at the end of the game outputs whatever bit A′ does. Notice that
if b′ = 0 then C receives real encryptions and this perfectly simulates G3; otherwise
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it perfectly simulates G4. It follows that,
|Pr [G3 ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [G4 ⇒ 1 ]|
= |Pr [ C1 ⇒ 1 | b′ = 0 ]− Pr [ C1 ⇒ 1 | b′ = 1 ] |
≤ AdvrorPKE(C1) .
Furthermore, an analogous argument to that made above implies that we can
construct an adversary C2 in the RORC2PKE game against PKE who simulates the
final state sn using its RoR oracle, passes sn to A′ and outputs 1 if and only if A′
sets the flag bad by guessing one of the cached passwords. It follows that,
Pr [ bad = true in G3 ] ≤ Pr [ bad = true in G4 ] + AdvrorPKE(C2) .
With this in place, we may again define an adversary C in the RORCPKE game
against PKEwho randomly chooses to run either C1 or C2, and outputs the same
bit that they do. It follows that







+ Pr [ bad = true in G4 ]
≤ 2 · AdvrorPKE(C) + Pr [ bad = true in G4 ] .
Notice that in game G4 all values in the state sn given to A′ are random and
independent of T , and so the state sn may be perfectly simulated by an adversary
G in game OFFGUESSG,q
Π,T ; we shall now use a reduction to this game to bound
the probability that bad is set in game G4. G generates a public / secret key pair
(pk, sk)←$K, assembles the remainder of sn by choosing the appropriate random
components, and passes sn to A′. Now each time A′ makes a new query (sa||w˜)
to SH such that sa ∈ {sa0, . . . , sat}, G returns a fresh random string to A′, and
submits a query of the form (i, w˜) to its Test oracle. Since by construction all salts
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are distinct, it follows that if A makes q queries to SH then G makes at most q
queries to his Test oracle also. Therefore,






Π,T (G, q) .
In game G5 we return SH to responding truthfully to oracle queries. Since these
values are no longer set during the construction of challenge state sn, this does not
affect the outcome of the game and so |Pr [G4 ⇒ 1 ] = Pr [G5 ⇒ 1 ]| .
Finally in game G6 we return to sampling salts without replacement. An iden-
tical argument to that made previously implies that,




Now G6 is identical to game OFFDIST
A′,q
Π,T with challenge bit b = 1. Putting all
this together, we conclude that,
AdvoffdistΠ,T (A) ≤ AdvoffguessΠ,T (G, q) + 2 · AdvmkrorSE (B, t) +
(t + 1)2
2`salt
+ 2 · AdvrobSE (R) + 2 · AdvrorPKE(C) +
(t · (n + 1) + 1)2
2(κ−1)
.
C.4 Proof of Theorem 4.5.2
Before giving the full proof of Theorem 4.5.2, we begin by proving a useful lemma
which we will use in subsequent analysis.
Lemma C.4.1 Let {p1, . . . , pn} and {x1, . . . , xn} be sequences of numbers such
that each pi, xi ∈ [0, 1] and p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn. Then
n∑
i=1
pi · xi ≤
r∑
i=1







Proof: Since p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pn, the rearrangement inequality [161] implies that ∑ni=1 pi·
xi is maximized when the xi are such that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xn, so to upper bound
this sum, we reorder them so this is the case. Notice that since r = d∑ni=1 xie ≥∑r
i=1 xi +
∑n














With this in place, it follows that
r∑
i=1
pi · (1− xi) ≥ pr ·
r∑
i=1






pi · xi .
The first inequality follows since p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pr. The second inequality since∑r
i=1(1 − xi) ≥
∑n







pi · xi ,
as required.
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 4.5.2.
Proof: We wish to upper bound the maximum advantage of an attacker G who
makes at most q queries to the Test oracle in game OFFGUESSG,q
Π,T . Let the
sequence of guesses made by G be denoted G = {(w˜1, j1), (w˜2, j2), . . . , (w˜q, jq)},
and recall that if ji = 0 then this corresponds to a guess at the value of the real
password; otherwise the guess represents a guess at the typo stored at position
0 < ji ≤ t in the cache. Without loss of generality, we may assume that G never
repeats a query, since this would decrease his success probability. We split the
guesses into two sets Z0 and Z1 where,
Z0 = {(w˜i, ji) | ji = 0} and Z1 = {(w˜i, ji) | 0 < ji ≤ t} .
We let q0 = |Z0| and q1 = |Z1|, so q1 ≤ q−q0. We let T [j] denote the distribution of
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the typo at the jth position in the cache. Notice that the adversary G will succeed if
either the real password T [0] lies in the set Z0, or T [ji] = w˜i for some (w˜i, ji) ∈ Z1.
It follows that
Advoffguess
Π,T (G, q) = Pr[T [0] ∈ Z0 ∨ ∃(w˜i, ji) ∈ Z1 : T [ji] = w˜i]
= Pr[T [0] ∈ Z0] + Pr[T [0] < Z0 ∧ ∃(w˜i, ji) ∈ Z1 : T [ji] = w˜i] .
We may rewrite the above expression
Advoffguess











T [ji] = w˜i |T [0] = w] · Pr[T [0] = w] .
For each w ∈ P , Pr [∨(w˜i,ji) T [ji] = w˜i | T [0] = w] ∈ [0, 1], and so an application
of Lemma C.4.1 implies that
Advoffguess
Π,T (G, q) ≤
∑
w∈Z0
Pr[T [0] = w] +
∑
w∈Z∗1




Pr[T [0] = wi] ,
where Z∗1 is the set of the q
′








T [ji] = w˜i | T [0] = w]
 .
We now upper bound q′1. Since by assumption the error setting is t-sparse, it holds
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· bτ˜ (w˜i) ≤ q − q0 .
The first inequality follows since P \ Z0 ⊆ P for any Z0. The second inequality
follows by taking a union bound over the points in Z1. The next equality follows
because the typo cache elements are distinct and randomly permuted, so Pr[T [ji] =
w˜i | T [0] = w] = 1t · τ˜w(w˜). The next equality follows since by definition bτ˜ (w˜i) =∑
w∈P τ˜w(w˜i). The final inequality follows since bτ˜ (w˜i) ≤ t for all w˜i, and there are
at most q − q0 guesses in Z1. Putting this all together implies that,
q0 + q
′
1 ≤ q0 + (q − q0) = q ,
and we conclude that
Advoffguess





Following from the discussion in Section 4.5.3, we now detail the security analysis
of TypTop in the online setting.




(w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)←$ T
sn←$ Checker[Π](w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)




(b, sn+r+1)← Chk(w˜, sn+r)
r ← r + 1






(w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)←$ T
s¯n←$ PChecker[Π](w0, w˜1, . . . , w˜n)
parse s¯n as (S,T,W, γ)




If w˜ ∈ T
b← 1
r← r + 1
If (b = 1) and (r ≤ q)
win← true
return b
Figure C.2: Security games for online attacks.
adapting the corresponding notion formulated by Chatterjee et al. in [30] to the
adaptive checking setting, with the advantage defined
Advonguess






We sample a password and login transcript via the transcript generator T and
evolve the state of the adaptive checker accordingly. The attacker is given access
to an oracle Test to which he may submit guesses; he succeeds if he makes a guess
which is accepted by the checking algorithm Chk. The game is parameterized
by q representing the number of Test queries A is allowed; this reflects the stan-
dard online attack countermeasure of locking an account after a certain number of
incorrect guesses.
The analysis. Following the similar discussion in Section 4.5, we first define
a game ONGUESS analogous to OFFGUESS, in which the final cache state is
generated via the plaintext checker PChecker, and the advantage is defined as
Advonguess







In Lemma C.5.1 we bound the difference between the two games for TypTop in
terms of the robustness of the underlying SE scheme SE.
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Lemma C.5.1 Let (p, τ ) be an error setting with associated transcript generator
T , and let Π = (Reg,Chk) be TypTop’s password checker with associated plain-
text checker PChecker[Π]. Let Π be implemented using the canonical PBE scheme
PBE[SH, SE] = (E,D) where SE is a symmetric encryption scheme and SH is a ran-
dom oracle. Then for any adversary A running in time T , there exist adversaries
A′, R such that
Advonguess
Π,T (A, q) ≤ AdvonguessΠ,T (A′, q)
+ AdvrobSE (R) +
(t · (n + 1 + q) + 1 + q)2
2κ
,
and, moreover, A′ runs in time T ′ ≈ T . Here t denotes the size of the cache, n
denotes the length of the transcript output by T and SE has key space {0, 1}κ.
Proof: We argue by a series of game hops. Let game G0 be equivalent to game
ONGUESSΠ,T , so
Advonguess
Π,T (A, q) = Pr [G0 ⇒ 1 ] .
Let game G1 be identical to G0 except that the keys used to compute the cached
ciphertexts in state sn, and those used for trial decryptions in response to Test
queries made by A in the guessing stage of the game while win = false, are sampled
without replacement. These games run identically unless two of the keys sampled
during these phases collide. There are at most (t·(n+1)+1) such keys sampled while
computing the cached ciphertexts for a transcript of length n, and at most q · (t+1)
keys sampled during the guessing phase (reflecting the (t + 1) trial decryptions
performed by Chk for each of the q Test queries made by A). Notice that since
cache updates only occur in the guessing phase if A guesses a string which is
accepted by Chk, the cache will never update while win = false. It follows that





Next we define game G2 which is identical to G1 except that we replace Checker[Π]
with PChecker and redefine Test to perform comparisons on the plaintext typo
cache output by PChecker. Since the adversary in these games never sees the
internal state of the checker, not encrypting the values which lie in this state
does not change the adversary’s view of the game; rather the two run identically
unless during the process of updating the state and the adversary’s subsequent
queries to Test we find two distinct keys k1 , k2 such that Dk2(Ek1(sk)) ,⊥ where
sk denotes the secret key of the PKE scheme which is encrypted under each of
the cached typos. Thus the fundamental lemma of game playing implies that
the gap between game G1 and G2 is upper bounded by the probability that this
event occurs. Consider an adversary R in game ROBRSE who simply executes
the game G1, simulating SH by sampling random strings without replacement,
and checking if there ever exists a typo cache ciphertext Ek1(sk) that decrypts
under some subsequently sampled k2 , k1 (recall that since G1 samples without
replacement, all keys are distinct). The robustness of the encryption scheme implies
that the probability that this event occurs, and thus the gap between games G1
and G2 is upper-bounded by Adv
rob
SE (R)
|Pr [G1 ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [G2 ⇒ 1 ]| ≤ AdvrobSE (R) .
Next we define game G3 which is identical to G2 except we return SH to sam-
pling keys with replacement. An analogous argument to that above bounding the
probability that two keys collide ensures that




Notice that G3 is identical to ONGUESS
A
Π,T , and so can be perfectly simulated
by an adversary A′ in this game. A′ simulates A’s Test oracle by submitting A’s
queries to his own oracle, and returning the responses. Since A′ makes precisely
the same set of queries as A, it follows that if A makes at most q queries, then A′
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does also. Since both games are identically distributed, it follows that
Advonguess
Π,T (A′, q) = Pr [G3 ⇒ 1 ] ,
concluding the proof.
Online guessing advantage. It remains to bound Advonguess
Π,T (A, q). The key
difference between the online guessing game and its oﬄine counterpart is that in
the former each guess is tested for equality against each of the t + 1 positions in
the cache, whereas in the latter a guess is only checked against the specific slot to
which it was guessed.
We reduce the online guessing game — in which the attacker’s goal is to find q
guesses that maximizes its success probability — to a weighted maximum cover-
age problem, and use an approximate greedy algorithm to compute the attacker’s
advantage. We can then bound the advantage of the optimal attacker using the
classic result of [100]. However, due to the complex dependencies of the cached
elements, we could not show the reduction in the other direction: that is to say,
reduce an NP-complete problem to that of finding the optimal set of guesses in the
online guessing game. We strongly believe that this problem is NP-hard but leave
the detailed reduction as an open problem.
Approximation via greedy algorithm. Recall that the maximum coverage
problem is defined as follows. Given n subsets Si from a universe U , the goal is
to find k subsets that cover the maximum number of elements. In the weighted
version of this problem, every element in U is weighted, and the goal is to maximize
the sum total weight of the covered elements.
We reduce the online guessing game ONGUESS for a particular error setting
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(p, τ ) and plaintext checker PChecker[Π] to a weighted maximum coverage problem
as follows. We define the universe U to be the set of all possible cache-tuples,
where a cache-tuple consists of a password w ∈ P followed by at most t distinct
and alphabetically sorted typos w˜i ∈ S. The weight of a given cache-tuple is
defined to be the probability that this tuple lies in the cache of the state s¯n that
the attacker guesses against in game ONGUESS. For each password or typo w˜,
we define Sw˜ ⊆ U to be the set of all cache-tuples that contain w˜. Given all such
subsets, the attacker’s goal is to find q subsets so that the sum total of the covered
cached-tuples is maximized.
With this reduction in place, we can apply the greedy approximation algorithm
for finding the weighted maximum coverage.
Empirical analysis. We wish to compute the advantage of an adversary in the
online guessing game for real world error settings. While it is easy to describe
the reduction to a weighted maximum coverage problem, generating the universe
of cache-tuples and the corresponding subsets for large numbers of passwords and
typos is computationally very expensive. For example, there could be more than a
billion cache-tuples for a password with 100 typos and cache size t = 5, and finding
all such cache-tuples for a large number of passwords seems infeasible.
We therefore perform the simulation on a subset of k passwords from RockYou
in the following way. For each real password w, we sample m typos from τw
with replacement, run the plaintext checker PChecker[Π] on the sampled list, and
record the final cache-tuple. We repeat this process n times for each password,
and record all the unique cache-tuples with their weight set to p(w) · f/n, where f
is the number of times the cache-tuple was observed. We set the universe U to be
the set of all cache-tuples we collected in the above experiment, and for each string
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w˜, subset Sw˜ is defined as the set of all cache-tuples from U which contain w˜. The
attacker’s goal is to find a set of q strings w˜ such that the cumulative weight of
the elements covered by their subsets is maximized.
The greedy algorithm to find the weighted maximum cover works as follows:
find the subset Sw˜∗ that has the highest cumulative weight, add the corresponding
string w˜∗ to the list of guesses, remove all occurrences of cache-tuples in Sw˜∗ from
other subsets, and repeat until q guesses are found or all subsets are empty.
We wish to compute the security loss incurred by using TypTop compared to an
exact checker. Recall that λq denotes the success probability of an optimal attack
against an exact checker with a budget of q guesses, and that λq =
∑q
i=1 p(wi). We
define the security loss of a checker Π over the exact checker to be
∆q = Adv
onguess
Π,T (A, q)− λq .
Using k most frequent passwords from RockYou, we ran the above simulation with
m = 200, n = 500. We chose k = 105, and for each caching policy we compute the
greedy attacker’s advantage for q = 100. For all caching policies the security loss
∆q is minimal, with a maximum security loss of ∆100 = 0.001 for the MFU caching
policy, and less than 0.0006 for all other caching policies. We also tried sampling
passwords randomly from the support of the password distribution, and taking the
k most frequent passwords in RockYou after ignoring the first million passwords.
The security loss is even less in such samples as we observed in the oﬄine scenario
in Section 4.5.2. To see the effect of n on the final security loss, we also ran the
experiment with n = 1000 for the PLFU caching strategy. We found negligible
change in the security loss.
By the result of Hochbaum [100], we know that the output of the greedy algo-
rithm is no less than 1 − 1/e times that of the optimal algorithm. If we include
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this adjustment into the output of our greedy approximation algorithm, we get
∆q ≤ ee−1 · AdvonguessΠ,T (A, q) − λq. Therefore, the security loss due to TypTop is at
most ∆100 ≤ 1.582× 0.0456− 0.045 = 0.027.
This bound is pessimistic. It assumes the attacker has precise knowledge of the
typo distribution. Moreover, the final bound is looser if the greedy approximation
results are closer to the optimal—which we believe to be the case.
We might be able to use a blacklisting strategy similar to the one proposed
in [30] to further reduce the security loss. A naive blacklisting approach would be
to block a set of ‘risky’ typos (that is to say those which allow an attacker to achieve
too great an advantage) from entering the typo-cache. However to decide which
typos to blacklist, we need an accurate measure of the cache inclusion function,
which will itself change each time a new typo is blacklisted, significantly compli-
cating the analysis of this approach. We leave a detailed treatment of blacklisting
strategies for future work.
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APPENDIX D
APPENDIX - CHECKING LEAKED PASSWORDS











⌈ |B| · pˆs(w)
pˆs(wq¯)
⌉
≤ |Pq¯ ∩ S˜| · |B| +
∑
w∈S˜\Pq¯




≤ |B| · q¯ + |B| · 1
pˆs(wq¯)
+N
The first equality is obtained by replacing the definition of β(w); the second in-
equality holds because dxe ≤ x + 1; the third inequality holds because S ⊆ W .
n = |B|; and m > n logn, if q¯ > logn. Therefore, the maximum bucket size for







D.2 Correlation between username and passwords
In Section 5.3 the username and password choices of previously uncompromised
users can be modeled independently.
To check whether this assumption would be valid or not, we randomly sampled
105 username-password pairs from the dataset used in Section 5.6 and calculated
the Levenshtein edit distance between each username and password in a pair. We








Figure D.1: Statistics on samples with low edit distance between username and password,
as a percentage of a random sample of 105 username-password pairs.
We found that the mean edit distance between a username and password was
9.4, while the mean password length was 8.4 characters and the mean username
length was 10.0 characters. This supports that while there are some pairs where
the password is almost identical to the username, a large majority are not related
to the username at all.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 5.4.2
Because the IDB bucketization scheme does not depend on the password,
Pr
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Pr [W = wi ∧ U = u ]
= Advgs(q)
The first step follows from independence of password and bucket choice, and the
third step is true because there is only one bucket for each username.
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The second step follows from the independence of usernames and passwords in the
uncompromised setting.
We will use Pq¯ to refer to the top q¯ passwords according to password distribution
pˆs = pw, and wq¯ to refer to the q¯th most popular password according to pˆs.
For any w ∈ Pq¯, pˆs(w)|βFSB(w)| =
pˆs(w)
|B| .
For any w ∈ P \ Pq¯,
|B| · pˆs(w)
pˆs(wq¯)
≤ |βFSB(w)| < |B| · pˆs(w)
pˆs(wq¯)
+ 1.


















Since the values of pˆs(w)|βFSB(w)| are always larger for w ∈ Pq¯, the values of w1, . . . , wq
chosen for each bucket will be the top q¯ passwords overall, along with the top q− q¯
of the remaining passwords in the bucket, ordered by pˆs(·)|βFSB(·)| .
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= λq¯ + (q − q¯) · pq¯
For q ≤ q¯, we have Advb-gs
βFSB
(q) ≤ λq¯.
To find a lower bound on Advb-gs
βFSB
(q), let w∗q¯+1, . . . , w
∗
q be the q− q¯ passwords in














































pˆs(w∗i )/2 ≥ λq¯ + (λq − λq¯)/2 =
λq + λq¯
2
Therefore, ∆q ≥ λq−λq¯2 .
Note, for every password to be assigned to a bucket, |B| ≥ pˆs(wq¯)/pˆs(w), or for
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